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Claire Greenstein: Pressures, Promises, and Payments:  
Explaining Governments’ Reparations Decisions after Domestic Human Rights Abuses 
(Under the direction of Milada A. Vachudova) 
 
After governments commit human rights abuses against their own citizens, what 
motivates those governments (or their successors) to promise and pay reparations? In this 
dissertation, I combine insights from the literatures on transitional justice, democratization, and 
social movements to create the first generalizable theory explaining the motivations behind 
governments’ reparations decisions. I argue that governments promise and pay reparations due to 
the efforts of strong, pro-reparations victims’ rights organizations. I use a mixed-methods 
approach to support this argument.  
In Chapter 1, I introduce my theory about why governments promise and pay reparations 
to domestic victims of severe, government-sanctioned human rights abuses. In Chapter 2, I 
provide quantitative evidence for my argument by analyzing my original dataset on reparations 
promises and payments. This dataset records the domestic reparations outcomes for 180 cases of 
internal conflicts and dictatorships in Europe, Latin America, and Central Asia from 1939 to 
2006. Using this data, I find that strength of pro-reparations victims’ organizations has a 
meaningful and statistically significant influence on reparations outcomes. Chapters 3-5 consist 
of three separate qualitative case studies that allow me to process-trace governments’ reparations 
decisions over time. In these chapters, I present qualitative data that I gathered in fieldwork 
conducted in Germany and Peru from 2015 to 2017 to examine the motivations behind the West 
German government’s reparations promises and payments to Jewish German citizens after the 
 iv 
Holocaust, the West German government’s reparations promises and payments to Romani 
German citizens after WWII, and the Peruvian government’s reparations promises and payments 
to Peruvian citizens who were harmed in Peru’s 1980-2000 Armed Internal Conflict. Drawing on 
personal interviews, archival documents, primary sources, and selected secondary literature, I 
show that the efforts of victims’ organizations are the central factor in explaining the reparations 
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Before WWII, reparations were a way for militarily victorious states to punish their 
losing adversaries. After WWII, reparations evolved from an international punishment into a 
mechanism of domestic transitional justice, prompted by West Germany’s groundbreaking 
reparations payments to German Holocaust survivors. The rationale behind turning reparations 
into a tool for postwar and post-authoritarian reconciliation efforts is simultaneously hopeful and 
cynical, and this tension between idealism and self-interest is a constant undercurrent in my 
work. Although reparations can help restore some of the fractured trust between a government 
and its citizens, they can just as easily become a political tool that is announced and implemented 
to enhance a politician’s reputation, not a policy that is thoughtfully constructed and sustained in 
a way that will genuinely help victims.  
Seen through a positive lens, reparations are a way to address grievous injustices, make 
amends, and help victims repair their lives (hence the term ‘reparations’). Although proponents 
of this viewpoint acknowledge that reparations cannot right the wrongs of the past or provide 
justice to someone whose life has been irreparably damaged, reparations can provide some 
assistance to traumatized victims of severe human rights abuses. When governments are 
cognizant of the victims’ individual and communal needs, they can design reparations programs 
that target these specific issues. For example, because most of the violent episodes in the 
Peruvian government’s fight against the Shining Path occurred in rural, underdeveloped 
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communities, Peruvian reparations are often paid in the form of schools, hospitals, and other 
public works projects constructed to benefit entire towns.  
Reparations programs can even be amended over time to reflect victims’ changing needs. 
For example, once Germany reunified, former East German political prisoners were quickly 
granted financial reparations. However, decades later, victims’ rights groups and governmental 
officials realized that the legal restrictions on this money meant that the program was no longer 
meeting its clients’ practical needs. After speaking with the target population, governmental 
officials in Brandenburg implemented a program that allows victims to apply for up to 10,000 
Euros to spend on whatever they want, without providing the government with every individual 
receipt, as long as the government approves the initial request. Victims have used this money for 
a range of purposes, including replacing shoddy furniture, traveling to a health spa, and buying a 
confidence-boosting wardrobe (Poppe 2016). The brilliance of this program lies not in the 
amount of money disbursed, however, but rather in how it recalibrates the way victims relate to 
the government. By allowing people whose health, careers, educations, and relationships were 
destroyed by a paranoid, hyper-observant government to spend this money freely and without 
oversight, Brandenburg is resetting victims’ expectations of government and reaffirming that the 
current government sees these individuals as trusted German citizens, not enemies of the state.  
In addition to financial payments and development projects, reparations can come in a 
number of other forms, including pensions (Argentina), education vouchers (Chile), free entrance 
to national cultural festivals (Estonia), free public transportation (much of Eastern Europe), and 
physical memorials (Cambodia). In my dissertation, I do not include memorialization projects as 
reparations, simply because of the difficulty of gathering comprehensive data on government-
sponsored memorials that are built as reparations, but I count all other types of reparations that 
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entail some sort of financial obligation on the part of the government. I have also decided to 
include property restitution as part of my analysis, although restitution is not exactly the same as 
reparations. Restitution involves returning property or paying compensation for something that 
has a concrete value, whereas reparations are paid for the loss of something irreplaceable and 
invaluable. However, because property restitution is often closely linked to and administratively 
overlaps with reparations efforts, seeing as the victims of property confiscation are also victims 
of further governmental human rights abuses, I have included promises and compensation for 
property restitution as a category in my quantitative analysis.  
 Seen through a cynical lens, reparations allow governments to buy victims off while 
reaping international—or even domestic—praise for making progress in respecting human rights. 
Victims are particularly likely to see reparations in this light when governments fail to pair 
reparations payments with both an explicit apology for the government’s crimes and a guarantee 
of non-recurrence. Unfortunately, it is relatively common for governments to issue reparations 
without apologies, even though this undermines the abstract ideal of ‘justice’ that reparations are 
theoretically supposed to promote. Although paying reparations without acknowledging victims’ 
suffering can quiet public criticism and satisfy the majority of non-victims, it invariably insults 
victims and leads to the perception that governments are attempting to exchange cash for silence, 
as is the case in Argentina and Northern Ireland (Hamber and Wilson 2002). The Peruvian case 
also shows that, without an apology, victims are likely to view reparations as social assistance, 
not as a genuine reparative gesture, which, again, invalidates the moral ends that reparations are 
ideally supposed to serve. Nevertheless, reparations without apologies do have the advantage of 
being politically expedient, because they allow governments to avoid uncomfortable confessions 
while still garnering positive international press.  
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The cynical view of reparations is particularly relevant when it comes to setting the 
amount of money that is paid for each kind of violation. Reparations are perceived as an 
instrument of justice, as a way to help make things right, but this idealization runs into trouble 
when it confronts reality. How much do you pay someone for the loss of their leg? For their 
inability to sleep without nightmares? For murdering their mother? Distasteful as it may be, 
governments have to pick a financial sum or a service to provide, and the amounts often end up 
being a pittance. For example, West Germany compensated Holocaust survivors with 5 Deutsch 
Marks (DM) for each day they spent in a concentration camp, and, until recently, even that 
money was available only to individuals who had spent at least three months in an officially-
recognized camp (BEG §45, Heuss 2016). Although 150 DM a month was enough to make a 
difference to someone living on the edge of poverty, 5 DM a day for surviving what Auschwitz 
survivor Frank Bright described as “hell on earth” seems more like an insult than a show of good 
faith (Woodger 2017). Indeed, despite Israel’s dire financial situation after WWII, many 
members of the newly formed Israeli government saw West Germany’s offer of reparations as 
highly offensive “blood money” that, if accepted, would amount to nothing more than the 
betrayal of millions of murdered Jews (“Knesset Debate” 1952).  
Unfortunately, obscenely low sums of money are generally a hallmark of reparations 
payments. Although, as in the case of Germany, these payments can add up to billions of dollars 
over time, the amount paid to each individual is often laughably small (Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen 2017). Governmental assistance with health care, job retraining, or education may 
represent a much greater in-kind benefit to survivors, although, depending on the harm they 
suffered, these benefits might not be relevant or useful to them (Drescher 2016). It is important 
to realize that although the theoretical goal of reparations is to restore individuals to the life they 
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had before they were harmed, reparations do not and cannot accomplish this. Life-changing sums 
of money are rare, and anyone who expects reparations payments and benefits to furnish a 
comfortable life will invariably be disappointed. Instead, reparations are a symbolic gesture 
whose value lies in their existence rather than their financial worth.  
Victims are rarely under any illusions about this; in fact, survivors who pursue 
reparations payments often want reparations not for purely financial reasons, but also because 
reparations represent the government’s concrete acknowledgement of its crimes (Goschler 2016; 
Robins 2011). When implemented properly, reparations serve as a signal of the government’s 
contrition and its commitment to non-recurrence, two things whose symbolic worth outweighs 
any monthly cash payment. This approach to reparations is clearly exemplified in the German 
Sinti and Roma’s1 quest for reparations from the West German government. The constant refrain 
of the lobbying campaign run by the Central Council for German Sinti and Roma had nothing to 
do with how much money the government should pay to Sinti and Roma. Instead, the activists 
wanted the government to take responsibility for the Nazis’ actions, admit that Germany had 
committed genocide against the Roma, and embark on a path of apology and reconciliation—and 
reparations were a tangible way to do this (Greußing 1980). 
                                                        
1 Roma are the largest ethnic minority in Europe. There are multiple subgroups within the 
Romani community, including the Lalleri, Kalderash, and Ashkali. Roma and Sinti are the two 
most common Romani subgroups in Germany. Although these individuals are often referred to 
as ‘Gypsies’ in historical documents, I do not use this word in this dissertation unless I am 
quoting historical sources, because, starting in the 1970s and 1980s, many Sinti and Roma 
rejected this label as an insulting and discriminatory racial slur. Throughout this dissertation, I 
have done my best to use respectful language when describing and referring to persecuted 
individuals, but linguistic conventions are different across space, time, and language, and I have 




It is important to note that when victims lobby a particular government for reparations, 
they are not usually asking for reparations from the exact same group of elected officials that 
persecuted them. Although there could certainly be some overlap in terms of the politicians, 
staffers, and bureaucrats present in the abusive regime and the current political structure –indeed, 
this is quite likely if the violations were recent–, the governments that promise and pay 
reparations are rarely the same governments that committed the crimes in question. Although 
there are cases in which an abusive regime has paid reparations, with Morocco being a recent 
example, the overwhelming majority of reparations payments are made by successor 
governments, not perpetrator governments (Guillerot and Carranza 2009). Thus, the link between 
human rights abuses and reparations payments is not a particular government, but rather the state 
in which the abuses and payments occurred.  
Clearly, it is necessary to make a distinction between a state and a government. States 
neither commit nor make amends for human rights abuses; for the purposes of this dissertation, 
states are merely the territory in which abuses occurred, not independent actors capable of 
abusing people. Governments, on the other hand, are made up of individuals who can silently 
approve, tacitly permit, or actively commit human rights abuses in the state they are governing. 
And, after human rights abuses occur, that same state can be run by a government composed of 
individuals who promise reparations, pass reparations legislation, and ensure that reparations are 
paid. As a result, the phrase “state-sponsored human rights abuses,” though commonly used in 
journalism and advocacy work, is imprecise within the context of my dissertation. Human rights 
abuses are committed, sponsored, and atoned for by individual governments, not the states those 
governments represent, and the language in my dissertation reflects this.  
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In the years since the West German government became the first to ever pay reparations 
to its own citizens, reparations programs have spread to the point where they are no longer a 
novelty. Indeed, after West Germany broke new ground in the 1950s with its federal reparations 
law, many other Western European countries followed suit by paying reparations to their own 
citizens, particularly their Jewish citizens, for the crimes that collaborator governments had 
permitted and perpetrated or that occupied governments had failed to hinder. Thus, there was a 
large spike in the incidence of reparations promises immediately after WWII, and a similar spike 
in payments just a couple of years later.  
Although reparations were paid for various crimes between 1960 and 1989, these were 
isolated incidents. The next big spate of reparations did not occur until the fall of communism, 
when governments across the Eastern Bloc started promising and paying not just for communist-
era crimes, but for WWII-era crimes, as well (which Communist governments had not wanted to 
acknowledge or take responsibility for). These long-overdue payments, combined with 
Germany’s progressive expansion of the pool of victims eligible for its own Holocaust 
reparations payments, point to the development of reparations as an international norm. Although 
the number of reparations programs established in the 21st century does not rival the large 
clusters of promises and payments caused by the end of fascism and communism, democratic 
governments are becoming increasingly likely to pay for past crimes committed in the name of 
the state, regardless of when those abuses were committed. Thanks to the slow but steady spread 
of reparations as a global norm, it seems that, regardless of when governmental human rights 








FIGURE 1: REPARATIONS PAYMENTS BY DECADE 
 
The frequency of reparations is not the only thing that has changed over the years; the 
perception of reparations has evolved significantly, as well, as this formerly “elites only” issue 
has started to become a topic of more mainstream conversation and remains relevant in the 21st 
century. For example, in 2013, several Caribbean countries got the world’s attention by 
launching a concerted effort to get former colonial powers to pay reparations for slavery; in 
2014, the United States was abuzz with talk of Ta-Nehisi Coates’ article “The Case for 
Reparations,” which argued that the American government should pay reparations to victims of 
systemic racism; and in January 2016, the United States was again fixated on reparations, as the 
city of Chicago announced it would pay $5.5 million to victims of police abuse (CARICOM; 



























punishments like those enacted via the Treaty of Versailles; rather, they are a way for 
governments to help citizens whose human rights were violated by the country’s current or 
former government. Reparations are no longer something considered and discussed only by 
presidents, prime ministers, and parliaments—they are resource for ordinary citizens, a 
mechanism for targeted social assistance, and, as mentioned above, an increasingly expected 
policy tool of governments emerging from internal conflicts and dictatorships. 
 Despite the increased visibility of reparations, their expanded usage, and their developing 
status as a global norm, we know very little about the whens and whys of this transitional justice 
mechanism. After governments commit human rights abuses against their own citizens, what 
motivates them to pay reparations? Why do governments decide to devote precious resources to 
individuals who, until recently, were so devoid of political influence as to be incapable of 
preventing their own government from imprisoning, torturing, and even killing them? 
Governments could certainly find other ways to spend that money; why, then, would a sovereign 
nation choose to make the financially costly commitment of paying reparations to seemingly 
powerless individuals? 
My dissertation breaks new ground by investigating this puzzle and offering a theory that 
accounts for when and why governments promise–and pay–reparations. Although governments 
have been paying reparations to their own citizens for systematic, government-sponsored human 
rights abuses since the end of WWII, political science has yet to offer a theory about why 
governments choose to promise and pay millions of dollars to traumatized citizens–who 
oftentimes belong to marginalized groups in society–rather than spending that money on public 
works projects, healthcare, education, or any number of other competing demands. In the 
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following chapters, I use an original quantitative dataset and qualitative data gathered from 68 
elite interviews to explain the underpinnings of this globally relevant phenomenon. 
Drawing from literature on social movements and transitional justice, I hypothesize that 
governments promise and pay reparations only after they have been subjected to substantial 
pressure from survivors who are demanding reparations. Although previous studies have shown 
that reparations payments are correlated with democratic government and higher levels of 
economic development, I argue that these factors do not cause governments to pay reparations 
(Powers and Proctor 2015). Instead, my hypothesis is that when victim-survivors2 get organized 
and place strong pro-reparations pressure on governments, attracting powerful political allies 
along the way, then governments will be more likely to promise and pay reparations. It is 
important to note that my theory is probabilistic rather than deterministic and that pro-reparations 
pressure from organized victim groups is not a sufficient cause for reparations promises and 
payments. Still, with these two caveats in mind, my dissertation finds both quantitative and 
qualitative support for the idea that we must look to survivors themselves to discover why some 
governments promise and pay reparations when others do not. 
I test this theory using a mixed-methods approach. In Chapter 1, I review the relevant 
literature on transitional justice, democratization, and social movements and use these insights to 
construct and explain my original theory on reparations. In Chapter 2, I test my theory 
quantitatively. In order to do this, I had to create my own dataset on reparations promises and 
                                                        
2 There is an ongoing debate in the literature whether to use the term ‘victim,’ ‘survivor,’ or 
something else altogether to refer to affected individuals. Although ‘victim’ is, by definition, an 
accurate term, it carries connotations of passivity and helplessness. ‘Survivor’ bestows greater 
agency on an individual, but it can elide the severe pain and trauma that can continue to 
negatively affect people’s lives in the wake of governmental human rights abuses. Consequently, 
I use these two terms interchangeably and do not use either term to signal any moral judgment of 
affected individuals and the way they handled what happened to them. 
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payments. Constructing an original dataset was necessary because, with the exception of the 
dataset created by Kathy L. Powers and Kim Proctor (2015), currently available transitional 
justice datasets do not focus on reparations, and no dataset includes information on both 
reparations promises and reparations payments. I felt that it was important to include the 
promise/payment distinction in my work because some governments publicly promise to pay 
reparations and/or pass reparations laws but never follow through on making these promised 
payments. A reparations law is not the same as a reparations disbursement, and I believe that 
making this distinction will add an important level of precision to future reparations work.  
In order to test my theory, I develop and include a variable that measures victim group 
strength. Given that this factor is the linchpin of my theory, a quantitative analysis without this 
variable would be empirically informative but theoretically useless. Creating and coding a 
measure of such an abstract construct proved difficult, but the theory necessitated its 
construction. I look forward to refining this measure in the future and anticipate that improving 
the quality of this measure will become easier over time, because data on contemporary and 
future cases will be more extensive and readily available than data on the historical cases that 
make up the bulk of my current dataset. Historical cases occurred in a context where reparations 
were not a subject of quantitative scholarly research and when it was less common to keep 
records on global human rights abuses, whereas I can collect data on future cases via the Internet 
and as they occur. Currently, my dataset contains data on reparations promises and reparations 
payments made for domestic, government-sponsored/approved/permitted human rights violations 
that were committed in 180 cases across 57 countries in Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America 
during internal conflicts and dictatorships that took place between 1939 and 2006. I explain the 
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creation process, case selection rationale, structure, and contents of my dataset in more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
The next three chapters are in-depth case studies in which I use process tracing to show 
how the behavior of victim groups impacts governments’ timing and approach to reparations. By 
selecting three cases in which reparations were eventually promised and paid, I am able to 
conduct a more focused examination of how the causal mechanisms of my theory translate 
victim group strength into reparations outcomes across a diverse set of circumstances. Although I 
include non-payment cases in only the quantitative chapter of my dissertation, not in the three 
qualitative case study chapters, there are distinct advantages to focusing my attention on positive, 
rather than negative, cases. The victim groups in my qualitative case studies exhibit wide 
variation in how strong they are, both in comparison to one another and over time, and tracking 
these three different victim groups over a series of decades allows me to show how victim group 
strength is directly tied to governments’ reparations decisions. Chapters 3-5 serve to corroborate, 
deepen, and expand upon the insights from Chapter 2, as I draw on elite interviews, archival 
data, primary sources, and secondary literature to show how the uneven trajectory of victims’ 
movements explains both the timing and the approaches that governments employ when 
promising and paying reparations.  
Chapter 3 contains my first case study, that of the West German government’s 
reparations promise and its reparations payments to Jewish Germans for the horrific human 
rights abuses of the Holocaust. I selected this case because it constitutes the first time that a 
government paid reparations to its own citizens for abuses committed in the name of the state 
that government represents. As a precedent-setting case, there are some highly unique elements 
to this case study, but the fact that West Germany’s reparations laws and reparations program 
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served as a model for all of the cases that came after it constitutes ample reason to support its 
inclusion in my dissertation. The data for this chapter come from primary documents, including 
archival materials gathered at four different archives across Germany, as well as from secondary 
literature, museum and memorial exhibits, and eleven elite interviews that I conducted with case 
experts in Germany in Summer 2016.3 Although this case differs from the cases explored in 
Chapters 4 and 5 because the victim population in question was largely located outside of West 
Germany once the war ended, rather than remaining within the country’s borders, my theory still 
holds: Jewish organizations, run in part by victims and victims’ relatives, along with morally-
motivated political allies within West Germany, prove to be the decisive factor in forcing a 
reluctant set of politicians to pay reparations. 
In Chapter 4, I examine a different post-Holocaust case, that of West Germany’s 
reparations promises and payments to Romani Germans, most of whom describe their ethnicity 
as Sinti. By selecting this case in addition to the Jewish German case, I am able to hold a large 
number of factors constant from one analysis to the next. Even though both of these groups were 
persecuted by the same government, were targeted for racial reasons, and suffered many of the 
same abuses, Jewish Germans received reparations forty years earlier than Romani Germans did. 
Given these similarities, identifying which factors vary across these cases help explain their 
vastly divergent reparations trajectories. As in Chapter 3 
, Romani Germans’ initial failure to acquire reparations, as well as their eventual success 
in the 1980s, are best explained by the extent to which this victim group was organized and 
actively exerting pro-reparations pressure on the government. To collect the data for this chapter 
                                                        
3 Funding for the research in Chapters 3 and 4 was generously provided by the Free University of 
Berlin’s Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies. 
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I visited libraries across Berlin, consulted four German archives, interviewed eleven case experts 
within Germany between 2015 and 2016, and visited relevant memorial sites, museums, and 
exhibits. Ultimately, I conclude that German Sinti and Roma received recognition and renewed 
reparations from the federal government in 1981 as a direct result of their own organized, 
publicized, and internationally-supported lobbying efforts—lobbying efforts that were 
completely absent in the immediate postwar period.  
Chapter 5, my final case study, examines the case of the Peruvian government’s 
reparations payments to Peruvian citizens who were brutalized during the 1980-2000 Armed 
Internal Conflict in Peru. Across this twenty-year period of conflict and dictatorship, thousands 
of Peruvians were forcibly disappeared, wrongly imprisoned, murdered, raped, and otherwise 
abused by government forces and domestic revolutionary groups. Including a contemporary 
Latin American case permits me to test the generalizability of my theory by broadening both the 
temporal and geographic scope of my work. I base my analysis in this chapter primarily on the 
data I collected in the 18 elite interviews that I conducted in Lima, Peru in 2017 with Peruvian 
activists, lawyers, human rights advocates, scholars, and other individuals who were personally 
involved in the fight for reparations and who generously shared their eyewitness perspectives 
with me. Once again, I find that the concerted efforts of organized victims, supported by 
educated and influential allies, are the decisive factor in motivating governmental reparations 
promises and payments.  
I conclude by summarizing the most important points of my dissertation, which 
constitutes a novel and significant contribution to the literatures on transitional justice, post-
conflict peace and reconciliation, and social movements. Not only does my work contribute a 
new dataset to the field, but also it adds the first generalizable theory as to why governments 
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decide to promise and pay reparations to their own citizens after the current government or one 
of its predecessors has committed, sponsored, sanctioned, or permitted human rights abuses 
against those self-same individuals. This section also includes a short discussion of avenues for 
future research on reparations, as my dissertation is merely a single step towards understanding 
the dynamics of reparations promises and payments. Such a complex phenomenon requires 













 Although the idea of compensating individuals for damages to their property, health, and 
physical integrity is nothing new, the notion that a state must make reparation when it violates its 
responsibility to take care of its citizens, either when the government actively commits human 
rights abuses or passively prevents them from occurring, is relatively recent. In fact, it was not 
until the end of WWII that occupied Germany became the first example of a government4 paying 
its own citizens for the harm inflicted by a predecessor government.5 Since the 1940s, however, 
the incidence of reparations demands, promises, and payments has climbed steadily, to the point 
that reparations are no longer seen as an optional method of addressing past human rights 
violations, but rather as a human right.6 Nor is there an end to the need for reparations—in 
addition to cases of historical abuses for which reparations are long overdue, governments 
around the world continue to commit systematic, widespread, and oftentimes grievous human 
rights abuses against their own citizens.  
                                                        
4 West and East Germany did create their own national-level reparations schemes later on, but at 
this point in time there was no national government in Germany. As a result, each occupation 
zone had its own set of reparations laws, which were not necessarily drafted by the Allies but 
which were certainly mandated, heavily shaped, and overseen by the Allies. 
 
5 Reparations are sometimes paid by the same government that committed the abuses, but this is 
uncommon. More often than not, a subsequent government is responsible for writing and 
implementing reparations laws that pay for the sins of its predecessor. 
 
6 See UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147, 2005.  
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In this chapter, I provide a short history of reparations, examine the relevant literature, 
and present my theory about what motivates governments to promise and pay reparations. It is 
important to clarify what I mean by ‘reparations,’ as governments can promise and pay many 
different kinds of reparations.7 In my dissertation, I examine both communal and individual 
material reparations. I have opted not to include symbolic reparations in my analysis because 
they often take on abstract forms. This makes them much harder to identify and measure, and it 
also means that they are subject to different political dynamics than material reparations. With 
these restrictions in mind, I use the transitional justice literature, democratization literature, and 
social movement literature to help me develop my theory as to why governments promise and 
pay reparations. I argue that governments are motivated to promise and pay reparations by strong 
pro-reparations pressure exerted by victims themselves. In the following chapters, I show that 
when strong victims’ organizations push for reparations promises and payments, they greatly 
increase the likelihood of these promises and payments occurring.  
It is important to note that this argument makes the starting assumption that governments 
are resistant to promising and paying reparations, which may not always be the case. It holds true 
in most cases, though; the vast majority of governments do not leap to promise and pay 
reparations. Instead, they require an external incentive to persuade them to allocate precious 
government resources to individuals who, up until recently, were so politically meaningless as to 
be subjected to brutal, government-sanctioned abuses. Even when governments are committed to 
                                                        
7 As mentioned in the introduction, reparations are usually thought of as being monetary 
payments from one government to another, but in practice they are highly diverse. Reparations 
can take a wide range of material forms, such as pension payments, housing vouchers, or medical 
care; they can be symbolic, as when governments build memorials to honor victims, open 
museums that document the abuses of the past, and include victims’ stories in school curricula; 
they can be paid to individual citizens; or they can be given to entire communities, perhaps by 
building a local hospital or by providing seeds to a farming village. 
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addressing the crimes of the past, there are many transitional justice mechanisms at their 
disposal, and they need not adopt reparations. Reparations programs require a great deal of 
bureaucratic coordination, often involve substantial sums of money, and usually the cost of such 
programs ends up expanding well beyond initial expectations. It is therefore unsurprising that 
entire governments rarely, if ever, immediately support such a financially costly initiative. At the 
very least, finance ministers will almost certainly attempt to block or weaken reparations efforts; 
this is often the case even when the finance minister’s party supports reparations (Goldmann 
1952). Even when victims themselves rise to political power, they are not necessarily vocal 
reparations advocates, and those who are will probably not be able to persuade the rest of the 
government to adopt pro-reparations views without incentivizing this position. Thus, there is a 
strong justification for assuming that governments will be resistant to reparations and will need 
external inducement to adopt a reparations policy. I argue that a particular segment of civil 
society, namely victims’ organizations, provides this external inducement. 
Although the transitional justice literature has yet to explicitly examine the connection 
between civil society and governments’ reparations decisions, it has documented the importance 
of civil society in steering, supporting, and/or blocking the course of transitional justice overall. 
Thus, the transitional justice literature offers an important starting place for constructing my 
theory. Reparations are a unique transitional justice mechanism in many respects, however, 
because they are the only transitional justice mechanism that focuses solely on victims. All other 
mechanisms—truth and reconciliation commissions, trials, amnesties, lustration, and exiles—are 
either directed at perpetrators or, in the case of truth and reconciliation commissions, involve 
perpetrators, victims, and society at large. As a result, other mechanisms are more likely to 
involve prominent domestic elites (e.g. perpetrators who were or still are high level government 
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officials) and, therefore, to both affect and interest the public at large. Reparations, in contrast, 
benefit a small minority of the population and are rarely, if ever, a salient electoral issue. 
Therefore, in order for a government to find value in promising and/or paying reparations, a 
strong pro-reparations lobby must make the case for using public funds to compensate a formerly 
politically powerless minority.  
Victims’ organizations make this case by threatening governments with heavy 
reputational costs that could then induce economic costs. The social movement literature is 
critical to building this element of my theory, because it explains how non-elites can use 
organizational strength to force a government to cater to a small but mobilized minority. In 
keeping with the social movement literature, I argue that, if victims want to receive reparations, 
the first step is to get organized and articulate their demands. The next step is to enlist outside 
help from allies, who are able to give advice on running a lobbying campaign, make 
introductions to politicians, and use their own influence to draw attention to the movement. 
Media attention is often critical, as survivors’ stories can help attract sympathetic allies both 
domestically and internationally. It also helps by making reputational threats more credible, 
which in turn makes the government more responsive to victims’ demands.  
Clearly, some political systems are more responsive to citizens’ demands and to 
reputational costs than others, and as a result some victims’ organizations will experience 
success at lower levels of organizational strength than others. The democratization literature is 
helpful in this respect, as it provides insight into how citizens and governments interact in the 
post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts in which reparations are most likely to be needed, 
demanded, and implemented. While I do not expect that strong victims’ organizations will 
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always succeed in forcing reparations promises and payments, I do expect that if victims do not 
lobby for their interests, governments will neither promise nor pay reparations.  
Offering a theory about when and why governments pay reparations is an important 
contribution to the literature, because relatively little work on reparations exists. This is likely 
due to in large part to the fact that, up until 1980s, when the aftershocks of the Third Wave of 
democratization began spreading human rights norms in what is now known as the “justice 
cascade,” human rights were not a priority on the international agenda (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2001). Governments did pay reparations to citizens prior to the 
justice cascade, and not solely to Holocaust victims, either, but reparations were most often 
thought of as post-conflict payments from one state to another, not as a reparative effort from a 
government to its electorate. However, as the scholarly field of transitional justice began to 
coalesce in the 1980s, reparations gained traction as being part of the post-authoritarian, post-
conflict playbook. The fundamental principle of transitional justice is that democratizing 
countries ought to address and overcome the past by seeking truth, justice, and reconciliation, 
and one way to do that is by compensating individuals who have been subjected to severe 
repression. 
Over time, practitioners began applying the principles of transitional justice to non-
transitional contexts, as well, which expanded the scope of reparations. This opened a door to 
consider reparations for historical reparations and recent human rights violations that occurred in 
consolidated democracies, such as slavery in the United States, forced sterilization programs that 
were common across the Western world in the 20th century, and the genocides that colonizers 
perpetrated against native peoples, most notably in Australia, Canada, and the United States. 
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Subnational entities in longtime democracies have also started adopting reparations,8 as was the 
case in 2014, when North Carolina began paying reparations to victims of that state’s forced 
sterilization program, and again in 2016, when the city of Chicago began paying reparations to 
victims of police torture (America 1995; Coates 2014; Kennedy 2016; Mennel 2014).  
Due to the increased demand for and the rising implementation rate of reparations 
programs in developed Western nations, as well as to the spread of transitional justice more 
broadly, reparations have gone mainstream. They are also just as timely today as they were 
seventy years ago, when the German occupation zones began paying reparations to Holocaust 
survivors. This continued relevance and growing Western interest in the topic has gradually 
attracted more scholars to study reparations, but reparations still receive less attention than most 
other transitional justice mechanisms, and the big questions regarding reparations remain 
unanswered. There have been no cross-temporal, cross-national investigations into why 
governments pay reparations or how reparations programs materialize, and the discipline is only 
just beginning to examine what effect reparations have on a post-conflict or post-authoritarian 
society (Firchow 2017; Vera-Adrianzén 2018). Not only that, there are no generalizable theories 
about reparations that could help answer these questions. This makes my dissertation 
groundbreaking: The theory that I present in this chapter is the first theory about what motivates 
governments to promise and pay reparations, and it constitutes an important step in moving the 
discipline forward in its understanding of reparations dynamics. 
Given the comparative scarcity of research on reparations, I draw on three broader 
strands of literature in order to develop my theory: The literature on transitional justice, the 
                                                        
8 Studying the dynamics of subnational reparations programs is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but it presents an interesting opportunity for future work. 
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literature on democratization, and the literature on social movements. These three fields are 
closely linked; the name transitional justice implies that a regime transition—generally assumed 
to be a democratizing one—is taking place, and social movements are commonly studied in 
relation to democratic transitions and, increasingly, in relation to transitional justice (Backer 
2003; Burt et al. 2013; Gready and Robins 2017; Musila 2009; Pajibo 2007; Rangelov and Teitel 
2011; Sikkink 2008; van der Merwe and Schkolne 2017). My dissertation adds yet another piece 
to our understanding of these fields and the ways in which they connect. I turn now to sketching, 
in turn, how these literatures underpin my theory. 
1. Transitional Justice Literature 
The transitional justice literature shows that civil society is an important determinant for 
the path of transitional justice overall, but it has less to say about reparations in particular. Given 
the relative newness of the field, a great deal of work remains to be done. Currently, a few 
noteworthy cases receive a disproportionate amount of attention, truth commissions and trials are 
by far the most-studied mechanisms, and the limited existing work on reparations is 
overwhelmingly qualitative, which limits the generalizability of the findings. In fact, my dataset 
is only the second dataset to focus solely on reparations, and it is the first to include both 
reparations promises and reparations payments (Mallinder and O’Rourke 2016; Powers and 
Proctor 2015). However, the transitional justice literature still yields important insights about 
reparations and transitional justice in general that will allow me to create an informed theory 
about why governments decide to make reparations promises and payments. 
 I begin by discussing the findings from the only three quantitative datasets that include 
reparations: the Transitional Justice Data Base/Transitional Justice Data Project (Olsen, Payne, 
and Reiter 2010b), the Post-Conflict Justice (PCJ) dataset (Binningsbø et al. 2012), and Kathy L. 
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Powers and Kim Proctor’s (2015) reparations dataset. Although these existing datasets have 
different inclusion criteria, which necessitates some caution when assessing and comparing the 
results of studies that use this data, it is worth presenting the results and seeing how they align 
with or diverge from qualitative work. First of all, Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew 
G. Reiter (2010) find that post-dictatorship cases are more likely to utilize transitional justice 
mechanisms than post-conflict cases and that European countries have a higher incidence of 
reparations payments than other regions. They also find that the likelihood of implementing 
transitional justice mechanisms increases when a country is experiencing economic growth, 
although reparations were not included in this study (Olsen et al. 2010b). Secondly, Powers and 
Proctor (2015) find that countries are more likely to pay reparations when they are wealthy, 
when they are democratic, and when they have implemented other transitional justice 
mechanisms. Finally, Helga Malmin Binningsbø, Cyanne E. Loyle, and Scott Gates (2012) find 
that reparations are paid more often after bargained conflict cessations than decisive victories, 
when a conflict was fought over territory rather than over control of the government, and when 
the conflict was a civil war rather than a low-intensity conflict. Thus, the quantitative literature 
does not yet speak to the causal mechanisms behind reparations, but it does indicate that 
economics, geography, and regime type may have some explanatory power. 
 Some of these findings have not yet been investigated in the qualitative reparations 
literature; others, however, align with recurring themes in the transitional justice, 
democratization, and social movement literatures. Perhaps the most fundamental of these 
transitional justice literature findings is the importance of the impact of regime type, because 
many of the other findings follow from this one. Powers and Proctor (2015) do not offer a theory 
as to why democracies may be more likely to pay reparations than non-democracies, but the 
 
 24 
transitional justice, democratization, and social movement literatures all contribute pieces of the 
puzzle. To start with, all governments, regardless of how democratic they are, have a limited 
amount of resources with which to meet citizens’ demands. This means that they will not usually 
choose to fund unpopular projects that could cause them to lose an election or, in the case of 
autocracies, to risk popular unrest. Thus, if we view transitional justice mechanisms as but one 
option on a menu of policy choices, governments will neither pursue transitional justice in 
general, nor select a certain mechanism in particular, unless the public has demonstrated support 
for –or at least not mounted active resistance to– the initiative (Bosire and Lynch 2014; Grodsky 
2006; Lessa et al. 2014; Subotić 2007).  
It is also much easier for governments to say they will pursue justice than it is for them to 
act on that promise. As a result, many governments end up twisting so-called justice initiatives to 
their own ends, gradually abandoning promised transitional justice projects, or never even 
attempting to fulfill their promise (David 2006; Horne 2009, 2012, 2014; Subotić 2007). The 
public plays a particularly important role in prompting justice initiatives when governments 
prove recalcitrant. Strong, supportive civil societies can embolden victims to voice their 
reparations demands, oppose governmental efforts to repress human rights efforts, and help to 
ensure that transitional justice in general, and reparations programs in particular, are 
implemented appropriately (Adhikari, Hansen, and Powers 2012; Kurze 2012; Laplante 2007; 
Oette 2009).  
International actors can certainly exert additional pressure on reluctant governments, and 
this additional pressure can aid domestic actors in their efforts, but the transitional justice 
literature cautions that the impact of international influence on domestic transitional justice 
efforts is overemphasized (Kim 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010; Suh 2012; Olsen et al. 2010a). 
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As previous work has shown, international attention fades, and without domestic actors to pick 
up the slack, justice and reparations will not be implemented if there is no local initiative to drive 
them forward (Kim 2008; Suh 2012; Olsen et al. 2010a). Consequently, as is the case with 
democratization, transitional justice is unlikely to succeed if it has international, but not 
domestic, buy-in. However, the reverse is not the case.  
2. Democratization Literature 
Given how critical domestic support is to transitional justice, it is easy to see how the 
success of pro-justice and pro-reparations efforts would be heavily influenced by regime type. It 
is much simpler for activists to demand and acquire justice in a democracy, which respects the 
rule of law and which allows citizens to vote governments out of office if they do not respond to 
citizens’ demands, than in an autocracy, which does not hold free and fair elections and which 
can restrict citizens’ ability to organize, protest, and/or report on such events (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 2003).  
However, in terms of theory construction, I do not expect democracy to cause 
reparations. Rather, my research indicates that the driving force behind reparations –both 
promises and payments– is pro-reparations pressure from domestic activists, particularly 
pressure from victims themselves. Given the primacy of regime type in the literature on 
transitional justice, though, it is worth unpacking the link between the fields of transitional 
justice and democratization a little further, so as to gain a clearer picture of how domestic 
activism, which is tied to democracy, influences transitional justice in general and reparations in 
particular. The importance of democracy to transitional justice is reflected in the very name of 
the field: transitional justice implies that a democratic transition is taking place. Indeed, the field 
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was designed to apply in transitional contexts, even though, as mentioned above, it can be 
applied to pre- and post-transitional contexts, as well.  
It should be no surprise, then, that reparations research can likely benefit from examining 
the democratization literature to see how power dynamics function in transitional contexts. 
Previous work on democratization as it relates to justice has found that when the old elite 
remains in power, justice tends to be more lenient (Huyse 1995; Pion-Berlin 1994; Zalaquett 
1992, 1994). This, too, is unsurprising; justice –including, presumably, reparations– is hardly 
likely to be on a government’s to-do list when the government has a vested interest in 
maintaining impunity. Pacted transitions, in which democratic reformers and former hardline 
autocrats negotiate a transition together, offer more hope for reparations than transitions without 
any elite turnover, although pursuing justice and democracy after a pacted transition can still be a 
difficult endeavor (Lynch 2012; Powers and Proctor 2015; Rigby 2001; Stepan 1986). After a 
pacted transition, new, pro-justice elites do hold some positions of power, but holdover elites 
will likely seek amnesty for their crimes or try to institutionalize other methods of obstructing 
justice (Laplante and Theidon 2006; Nalepa 2009; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/4; Subotić 2009; 
Weah 2012). When it comes to democracy and justice, a clear break with the past offers the best 
prospects for developing a democracy that respects civil rights and the rule of law. And although 
reparations do not surface explicitly in the democratization literature, it seems reasonable to 
expect the dynamics of reparations to depend on many of the same factors that influence 
democratization. 
Regime type is also important because of how it influences the form and vibrancy of civil 
society. Civil society is a key player in the transitional justice process, and the literature on 
democratization has shown that although protests are possible in authoritarian regimes—and that 
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they can and do influence governmental behavior—autocracies do stifle civil society, whereas 
democracies offer the participatory environment and civil liberties protections necessary for 
fostering active, robust civil societies (Putnam 1993; Reuter and Robertson 2015; Robertson 
2009, 2010). A quick glance at social movements in communist Eastern Europe shows that it is 
sometimes possible for people to engage in collective action in abusive dictatorships, although 
the stars must align on a myriad of factors in order for collective action to occur, let alone change 
governmental policy.  
These factors can and do align on occasion, however. In a move that was largely seen as 
an attempt to quiet domestic discontent and preserve Morocco’s international reputation, King 
Mohammed VI paid reparations to certain people who had suffered human rights abuses at the 
hands of the monarchy during his father’s tenure (Loudiy 2014). Autocrats may not have the 
same electoral incentives to respond to domestic pressure that democrats do, but they still need to 
maintain a modicum of public support in order to stay in power, and they have reputational and 
economic incentives to avoid attracting too much negative international attention (Loudiy 2014). 
Thus, although it is easier to generate pro-reparations pressure in a democracy, committed and 
lucky activists in autocracies can successfully push for reparations, as well.  
Transitional justice and reparations are also like democratization in that sometimes they 
seem to be bottom-up movements, whereas at other times they seem to be purely elite affairs. 
When examining the qualitative transitional justice literature, however, and the reparations 
literature in particular, a clearer pattern emerges. Almost without exception,9 the main drivers 
                                                        
9 The rare exceptions occur in post-Holocaust cases. Jewish victims were highly mobilized and 
acquired reparations fairly quickly after the war in Western countries, and they often acquired 
reparations in Eastern Bloc countries after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Years afterwards, in order 
to avoid being seen as playing favorites, some governments promised and paid reparations to 
other, less mobilized (or unmobilized) groups of Holocaust victims. For example, reunified 
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behind transitional justice efforts are the victims themselves. The influence that victims’ 
organizations can have on transitional justice decisions has been brought to light more often in 
recent years, as the discipline has started emphasizing that victims are not passive observers, they 
are active protagonists in their own lives (Méndez 2016). Although this research does not focus 
directly on using social movement theory to explain transitional justice outcomes or utilize 
victim group organization as a causal mechanism, the details provided in these case studies show 
that when victims are organized and passionate about transitional justice, their efforts propel 
such policies forward, but when they do not advocate for themselves, the government will be 
much more likely to sideline justice initiatives (Kurze 2012; Méndez 2016; Moffett 2016; Sajjad 
2016). Again, even though scholars have yet to focus explicitly on the causal link between victim 
organizations and reparations, a close reading of qualitative research on countries as diverse as 
the United States, Uganda, Haiti, and El Salvador provides repeated examples of how vocal, 
active involvement from victims’ organizations is critical to achieving reparations payments 
(Bowens 2011; Buford and van der Merwe 2004; Segovia 2006; Otwili and Schulz 2012).  
These findings help hone my theory. Rather than looking to the catch-all descriptor 
“domestic activists” or to civil society in general for an explanation as to why some governments 
promise and pay reparations when others do not, I argue that victims themselves are the key 
ingredient in motivating governments to first promise, and then pay, reparations. As mentioned 
above, victims’ groups have been shown to have a demonstrable impact on transitional justice 
policy—the literature repeatedly emphasizes that the success of transitional justice mechanisms 
                                                        
Germany paid reparations to Jehovah’s Witnesses in 1997 not because Jehovah’s Witnesses got 
organized, but because the German government did not want to be seen as having privileged one 
category of victims over another. Even in these cases, however, reparations are the result of 
victim pressure; the difference here is that the mobilized victims happen to be from a different 
victim group from the same abusive episode.   
 
 29 
relies primarily on domestic organizations, including organizations led by victims themselves 
(Anonymous 2011; ICTJ 2010; Oette 2009; Olson 1965; Putorti 2011; Rigby 2001; van der 
Auweraert 2013). The impetus for reparations promises and reparations payments has not yet 
been analyzed through the lens of victims’ movements, but there is sufficient evidence from 
careful qualitative work to indicate that this is a line of inquiry worth pursuing. 
3. A Note on Victims 
 However, it is important to note that victims are not a monolithic group. They are unique 
individuals with agency, and, given the sensitivity of the issues being addressed, these individual 
differences invariably spark internal rivalries, give rise to conflicting needs and demands, and 
cause victims to work at cross-purposes rather than advancing a common cause of justice 
(Jochum 1979; Lütsches 1950; Moffett 2016; Sajjad 2016). Some of this is motivated by victims’ 
justified fear that they will be refused reparations unless they are deemed ‘worthy’ of 
reparations. As a result, victims may try to distance themselves from ‘undeserving’ victims. For 
example, Jewish Holocaust victims are generally seen as innocent, but what if the individual in 
question was a Kapo in a concentration camp who abused fellow prisoners? Do that person’s 
abusive actions in a dire situation mean that they are a ‘guilty’ victim who should no longer 
receive reparations for the horrific abuses that they suffered at the hands of others? If this 
behavior were seen as being ‘typical’ of survivors, might all survivors be deemed unworthy? Just 
as society at large argues over who qualifies as a ‘deserving’ victim, so, too, do victims create 
their own hierarchies, hoping that if they avoid being associated with ‘guilty’ victims, then the 




The construction of such hierarchies can be clearly observed after WWII, when Cold War 
dynamics caused Germany’s largest victims’ organization to split into a vehemently anti-
communist faction and its much-maligned communist counterpart, the Organization of People 
Persecuted by the Nazis, or VVN (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes). In democratic 
West Germany, non-communist political victims desperately wanted to avoid being associated 
with the communist victims,10 who were accused of supporting efforts to dismantle the 
democratic order (Lüdtke 1993; Pawlita 2003; Winkler 2010). As a result, the non-communist 
victims vocally opposed the VVN and its activities, these fellow Holocaust survivors’ right to 
reparations, and communist ideology in general (Lütsches 1950). The non-communists’ goal was 
to preserve their own access to reparations by distancing themselves from this undesirable victim 
group, and it worked—non-communist political victims continued receiving reparations 
payments, whereas, from the early 1950s onward, people who had been sent to concentration 
camps for being communists were often barred from receiving any further reparations payments 
(Lüdtke 1993).11  
These “Victimization Olympics,” in which victims and society compete to see who is 
more deserving, who suffered most, and who qualifies as a victim, are constant themes in post-
                                                        
10 That is, individuals who had been sent to concentration camps because they were (or were 
believed to be) members of the Communist Party or involved in communist activities. 
 
11 The 1953 reparations law was imprecise and interpreted to communists’ disadvantage. 
Lawmakers’ intent was to bar high-ranking communists in the prewar German Communist Party 
(KPD), its West German successor party, and its East German counterpart, the German Socialist 
Unity Party (SED) from accessing reparations, but in practice even rank-and-file party members 
were excluded. One man was denied reparations simply for having “put six to seven copies of 
the SED information bulletin ‘The Truth’ into apartment mailboxes” (Winkler 2010, 21). The 
1956 revisions to the law made it easier for former communists to access reparations as long as 
they had left the party by 1950, and by the 1960s court rulings made it easier for many more 




conflict and post-authoritarian contexts (Novick 1999; Woolford and Wolejszo 2006). The 
Peruvian government still refuses to pay reparations not just to documented members of the 
Shining Path (many of whom were brutally tortured by the police and/or Peruvian security 
services), but also to anyone who was so much as accused of being affiliated with the Shining 
Path—even if the accusation is incorrect (Lerner 2017; Rivadeneyra 2017). Colombia is 
currently facing a similar problem as it decides how to handle reparations to victims of its own 
internal conflict, which dragged on for over fifty years. Should members of the FARC guerrilla 
insurgency, many of whom suffered severe human rights abuses, receive reparations? Northern 
Ireland’s answer to this question was no. Members of the IRA and PIRA, paramilitary groups in 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, are ineligible for reparations, regardless of how or what they 
suffered at the hands of Unionists and British forces, or even if they left the insurgency and 
happened to be a casualty of an attack mounted by the IRA or PIRA later on. Thus, even while 
acknowledging the key role that victims play in advancing transitional justice and reparations 
claims, it is important not to assume that victims form a single, unified group (de Waardt 2016). 
All of this has implications for explaining why victims’ mobilization influences 
governments’ reparations decisions. Given that victims as a constituency may be fragmented, 
small in number, disenfranchised, and/or disadvantaged, I do not expect governments to respond 
to victim pressure because they fear electoral consequences. Instead, governments respond to 
victims’ demands because, under the right circumstances, victims can inflict prohibitively high 
reputational costs for avoiding reparations. In most of the cases I studied, victims could not rely 
on their own voting power to force social change (Vargas 2017). However, when victims 
mobilized in West Germany and Peru, they were often able to attract support from large swaths 
of the voting population and/or from influential individuals whose opinions could hold sway 
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over political outcomes. In turn, governments granted reparations rather than risk the reputational 
and economic consequences of failing to promise and pay such a mobilized group.  
As victims’ organizations grow larger, more internally cohesive, and better at 
establishing links to influential domestic and international figures, the better able they will be 
able to inflict reputational damage on recalcitrant politicians and governments. If victims can 
succeed in attracting societal sympathy, there will be clear reputational and, consequently, 
concomitant electoral costs to denying victims much-needed assistance in the form of 
reparations. If victims fail to attract societal sympathy but also do not attract negative domestic 
attention, they can still convince politicians of the necessity of paying reparations due to the 
threat of negative international reputational/economic costs. This is particularly likely to occur if 
the abusive events were highly publicized while they were occurring, but domestic activists 
can—and do—work to publicize human rights abuses after the fact and to gain international or 
regional attention for such issues in hopes of inducing outside entities to place pressure on 
governments (Macher 2017). Note that these perceived reputational costs need not be a result of 
actual pressure from international heavyweights, nor do they even need to be likely to occur. 
What matters here is the threat of electoral, reputational, and economic costs, not proof of their 
inevitability. 
Furthermore, depending on a politician’s constituency, policy platform, and party, an 
anti-reparations position may have negative electoral consequences or conflict with the internal 
coherence of a politician’s external or internal image, thereby confusing voters. This is 
particularly likely to be the case when the issue of handling the aftereffects of the East German 
dictatorship is salient to a voter, as is the case with many former East German political prisoners 
(Bélanger and Meguid 2008). For example, many of my interviewees in Germany said that 
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members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a center-right party, were frequently 
supportive of the needs, organizations, and causes of former East German political prisoners 
(Diederich 2016; Donth 2016; Sachse 2016). As a party that has historically been staunchly anti-
communist, the CDU is the most natural political fit for former East German political prisoners, 
who, when they do get politically organized, often join the CDU (Dore 2016). The political 
ideology of the CDU and its long-term support for victims of the East German dictatorship 
constrain the actions of the CDU on the issue of reparations and support for former East German 
political prisoners, as any active anti-reparations or anti-memorial position would, in keeping 
with the literature on issue ownership, conflict with voters’ perceptions of the CDU and 
potentially endanger their credibility, voter support, and messaging clarity (Budge, Robertson, 
and Hearl 1987; Geers and Bos 2017; Meguid 2008; Petrocik 1996).  
Of course, even in democratic contexts with vibrant civil societies and other 
characteristics that would foster and strengthen victim organizations, such as institutional support 
for trauma survivors, free medical care, an openness to helping individuals with mental health 
problems, an excellent public transport system that permits travel to government offices to lobby, 
an institutional culture that permits constituents to meet promptly and frequently with their 
representatives, and a free and friendly media environment, victims must often overcome sizable 
obstacles in order to get organized. Certainly, it is reasonable to expect that survivors might be 
likelier to get organized in contexts where these aforementioned factors (and others) are present. 
However, victims’ organizations constitute just a small subset of civil society, and it can take 
years, sometimes decades, for victims to get to the point where they feel capable of even 
beginning to organize. Sometimes, such mobilization simply does not occur. 
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To explain further, only a subset of survivors—who may be limited in number to begin 
with—will be physically, mentally, and emotionally capable of publicly organizing with other 
individuals to discuss their traumatic histories at length, in great detail, before a society and a 
political establishment that permitted, enabled, and perpetrated severe human rights abuses 
against them. Even fewer individuals will be both capable and willing to organize in this way, let 
alone to do it in a sustained manner. Some survivors will reach the point of being able to publicly 
advocate for themselves, but for most people that takes a great deal of time and support, which 
means that many victim groups do not form or coalesce quickly, even in conducive 
circumstances.  
Furthermore, most victims will have to overcome disadvantages even beyond their 
trauma, such as linguistic barriers if they do not speak the language of the elite, educational 
barriers if they are from a lower class or if their repression including being denied access to 
education, and financial barriers due to adverse socioeconomic status or to governmental forces’ 
having dispossessed them of their wealth and property. Victims may not even view themselves 
as victims, or, depending on why they were persecuted, they may view themselves as too 
different from other types of victims to want to organize with them in any formal way. Given 
these barriers, future research on transitional justice should further investigate the question of 
how victims manage to get organized at all, but that is a topic beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
4. Social Movement Literature 
Instead of viewing victims as the sort of idealized, grassroots force that topples a 
dictatorship and then uniformly pursues democratic ideals, victims and their reparations efforts 
are perhaps best viewed through the lens of social movements. Although the reparations 
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literature has yet to interact with the social movement literature in an explicit and systematic 
way, there are striking similarities between social movements and what we have learned about 
reparations from qualitative work. From organizational tactics to media strategies, campaigns for 
reparations mirror –sometimes knowingly, sometimes not– social movement campaigns for other 
causes (Reuter 2016; Birthler 2016).  
a. Resource Mobilization Theory 
The first component of the social movement literature that I examine is resource 
mobilization theory, which posits that organizations and movements allow individuals to achieve 
their goals in a way that is less costly than alternative forms of political engagement (McCarthy 
and Zald 1977; Morris 1981; Smelser 1962; Tilly 1978; Wood and Jackson 1982). In an abusive 
authoritarian regime or a context of violent internal conflict, it is unlikely that citizens will be 
able to seek redress through traditional political means, such as the voting booth or the courts. 
Even after the abuses end and a country transitions to democracy, victims generally remain 
distrustful of the government. In an interview with the regional representative for the Records of 
the State Security Services of the Former East Germany in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Anne 
Drescher, she remarked that “the people who come into our office are afraid of the state; they’re 
afraid that if they enter a state institution they will become anonymous and disappear” (2016). 
Social movements, however, offer an appealing, non-governmental channel for political 
expression.  
Survivors and their allies often speak of how being victimized by their own government 
causes many survivors to lose all trust in state institutions, and so such individuals may prefer to 
seek avenues for political engagement independent from voting and getting involved in political 
parties (Birthler 2016; Diederich 2016; Reininghaus and Schabow 2013). Victims can also 
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minimize the potentially negative consequences of political action by acting as part of a group 
rather than individually. Victims’ organizations give survivors a framework through which to 
organize and a group identity that amplifies their claims against the government, both of which 
significantly reduce the costs of political engagement for vulnerable individuals. This is 
particularly pertinent given that the perceived cost of campaigning for reparations has been 
shown to significantly influence victims’ likelihood of engaging in this type of political action 
(Adhikari, Hansen, and Powers 2012). 
Thus, I expect that when victims want reparations and are willing to participate in politics 
in some form or fashion, they will be more likely to push for reparations through social action 
rather than at the ballot box. The preference for social action rather than electoral action is not 
simply a result of distrust in the government, however; it is also partly due to the fact that 
reparations is rarely an issue of primary salience to either voters or politicians. Politicians may 
campaign on the issue of transitional justice more broadly, but reparations need not be a part of 
that platform, nor are reparations likely to inspire enough animus to sway a voter either for or 
against a given politician or political party.  
Such mobilization is critical, however, because although non-victim voters are highly 
unlikely to cast their vote purely in response to the issue of reparations, they will probably 
consider the extent to which a politician seems to be trustworthy and sympathetic to needy 
individuals. Thus, if politicians were seen ignoring a concerted victims’ rights campaign that had 
a significant amount of societal support, the perceived lack of compassion and fairness could 
hurt them negatively at the ballot box, even if the general population is not thinking about a 
politician’s stance on reparations. According to one of my interviewees who helped to draft 
Germany’s reparations laws for former East German political prisoners, even the political parties 
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that were supportive of the reparations cause did not see the pro-reparations activists as a 
cohesive and sizable group of voters, but there was enough societal sympathy for victims of the 
East German dictatorship that these parties saw supporting victims’ reparations claims as a way 
to “make themselves loved” (Interview 24, 2016). Thus, even if victims do not form a large 
enough voting bloc to influence an election, politicians may cater to their interests in order to 
improve their image with the public, or to avoid tarnishing their existing image.  
In order for a politician’s attitude towards victims to have electoral consequences, 
though, victims must be visible in society, so that the broader population, which is large enough 
to matter electorally, can be aware of victims’ desire for reparations and decide whether or not to 
consider politicians’ treatment of victims when voting. In this sense, social action is more likely 
to yield positive results for victim groups than voting. Thus, even when victim groups are not 
large enough to constitute an electoral threat on their own, politicians can still have electoral 
incentives to commit to reparations in democracies.  
As mentioned above, however, when it comes to reparations cases, it is far more common 
for politicians to be motivated by reputational incentives rather than electoral incentives. Victim 
groups with powerful allies can threaten to punish the government for noncompliance even when 
victims do not possess domestic electoral clout. For example, in the Peruvian case, victims and 
their domestic human rights activist allies were by no means a majority of the population. 
However, they were able to use the attention and support of international entities such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Union, as well as the clout of 
internationally-renowned personalities such as Nobel Prize Winner Mario Vargas Llosa, to 
persuade reluctant domestic politicians that failing to pay reparations would tarnish Peru’s 
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international reputation, result in negative international press, and subject the current Peruvian 
government to international criticism and a tarnished legacy.  
The case of postwar West Germany demonstrates that the support of these allies and the 
potential reputational costs that they could inflict need not even be real—as long as domestic 
politicians believe that victim groups can call on influential individuals, foreign governments, 
and organizations to inflict reputational and, perhaps, concomitant electoral and economic costs 
for not paying reparations, governments may be willing to cooperate. In the 1950s, West German 
politicians were convinced by advocates for Jewish reparations, not by representatives of the 
United States government, that the United States would react to the absence of reparations by 
barring West Germany from the international community. Even though the burgeoning Cold War 
meant that West Germany’s geopolitical position as a crucial Western ally would have almost 
certainly allowed it to avoid paying reparations without suffering any negative international 
consequences whatsoever, West German politicians—even the ones who were reluctant to pay 
reparations—were unwilling to risk the severe reputational and economic costs that could result 
from refusing to promise and pay. (Goschler 2005, 2016; Heuss 2016) 
Thus, although victims were unable to dispel the deep-rooted antisemitism in West 
Germany that made the general population largely unsympathetic to the prospect of reparations, 
they were able to activate politicians’ fears of reputational and economic costs and convince 
them that the politically savvy move was to promise and pay reparations. (Byrnes 1945; 
Goschler 2005, 2016; Heuss 2016; Thonke 2004) Furthermore, since both democratic and non-
democratic governments are, in general, more likely to implement costly policies when 
constituents actively ask for them than when constituents are silent, vocal and mobilized groups 
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of victims demanding reparations ought to be associated with a greater likelihood of reparations 
promises and payments (Anonymous 2011; Oette 2009; Putorti 2011; Rigby 2001).  
The literature on social movements also predicts that organizations will more likely to 
achieve their goals if they have a clear internal structure, a large membership, concrete 
objectives, and a professional operational approach (Brill 1971; Gamson 1990; McAdam 1982; 
Morris 1981; Olson 1965; Olzak et al. 2016). Victims’ organizations may not always check all of 
these boxes, but, particularly once such groups have had time to find their footing, they can 
provide victims with material and emotional support, technical expertise on how to apply for 
reparations benefits, a network of potential allies, and a safe structure through which to demand 
reparations from the government. Over time, victims’ groups will gather the resources necessary 
to develop a clear structure, attract members, articulate specific goals, and professionalize their 
internal operations, and many of them will succeed in doing these things, too. When victims’ 
groups are organized, they can be a powerful facilitator for political action.  
Although domestic victims’ organizations are the key component of my theory, I do not 
want to overlook the role of the international community entirely. I expect it to be extremely rare 
(though not impossible)12 for a particular victim group to receive reparations promises and 
payments if that victim group did not mobilize to request reparations for a given abusive episode, 
but, once victims’ groups do form and mobilize, then they can boost their likelihood of acquiring 
                                                        
12 As mentioned above, certain groups of Holocaust victims have received reparations without 
mobilizing extensively (relatives of euthanasia victims, for example) or, in some cases, without 
organizing at all (Jehovah’s Witnesses). However, these cases do not really disprove my theory, 
because other groups of Holocaust victims campaigned for reparations, and the politics of 
granting reparations to one group of Holocaust victims and not another has grown increasingly 
unacceptable in Germany. So, I expect that in some situations, if one group of victims is able to 
pressure the government into paying and/or promising reparations, then the government will also 
include other, less organized or unorganized groups of victims in the reparations program. 
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reparations by attracting international support. This is clearly illustrated by the way in which 
Eastern European Jewish communities went about re-acquiring communal property from post-
communist governments. With the end of socialism in Eastern Europe, local Jewish groups often 
wanted to have Jewish communal property, which had been stolen during WWII and then 
appropriated by the state under communism, returned to the Jewish community’s control. 
Outside organizations like the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) were instrumental 
in providing local Jewish groups with political clout, administrative and technical skills, and 
media attention, all of which aided these small communities in translating their reparations 
claims into reparations payments and/or property restitution. This, too, is in line with the social 
movement literature, which says that organizations and the movements they support can benefit 
greatly from having outside allies, particularly allies with political influence (Jenkins and Perrow 
1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Piven and Cloward 1977).  
b. Political Opportunity Structure 
The importance of allies overlaps with the next element of social movement literature 
that I discuss, which is the theory of political opportunity structure. This theory was first 
proposed by Peter K. Eisinger in 1973 and was summarized by David S. Meyer and Debra C. 
Minkoff (2004) as “the basic premise… that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for 
mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular 
strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional 
politics and policy” (1457).  
This perspective on social movements provides space for allies to play a substantial role 
in a movement’s success, as movement allies can work to create the prospects for mobilization 
necessary for movement success. However, it also places a great importance on the strength of 
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the state, because, in line with the democratization literature discussed previously, the ability of 
social movements to access the state and achieve policy desiderata is ultimately dependent on 
state structure (Banaszak and Ondercin 2016; Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; 
Tilly 1978). As this structure interacts with societal, economic, and political shifts, political 
parties, their ideologies, and their alliances are also forced to change. This, in turn, creates or 
closes opportunities for social movements (Amenta and Zylan 1991; Gamson 1975; Jenkins and 
Perrow 1977; Lipsky 1970; McAdam 1982; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Piven and Cloward 
1977; Schumaker 1975; Tarrow 1988). We see such dynamics at work in the transitional justice 
literature, both in terms of the importance attributed to state structure –and to democratic 
governments in general– and the extensive documentation of how societal, economic, and 
political openings can either accelerate or stall the pace of transitional justice (Arthur 2009; 
Bakiner 2010; Davis 2005; Golob 2008; Hockerts 2001; von dem Knesebeck 2011).  
This lens helps explain why reparations are generally granted in democratic societies, 
whose structure allows citizens to articulate their demands and pressure governments electorally. 
Again, victims do not have enough electoral influence on their own to make credible electoral 
threats, but they can threaten reputational costs that may then result in electoral and/or economic 
costs. As stated above, this process is much easier in democracies than in autocracies. Although 
victims’ organizations can organize and agitate for reparations in both democratic and non-
democratic contexts, and although their influence is likely to be substantively meaningful in all 
types of regimes, victims’ organizations generally have less political leverage in non-democratic 
contexts due to an unfavorable political opportunity structure. The lack of a conducive political 
opportunity structure should, in turn, lead to a lower incidence of reparations promises and 
payments in non-democratic societies.  
 
 42 
The theory of political opportunity structure also helps to explain why transitional justice 
implementation is thought to depend in large part on the balance of power between pro- and anti-
justice elites, as these people can permit or preclude access to important external resources such 
as media attention, political support, and money (Lynch 2012; Powers and Proctor 2015; Rigby 
2001; Stepan 1986). In other words, the central implication of applying this theory to reparations 
outcomes is that while the necessity of pro-reparations factions ought to remain the same 
regardless of regime type, the effect of pro-reparations civil society groups is muted in contexts 
where political access, media, and funding are less readily available (e.g. in non-democracies).  
Thus, government’s reparations promise and payment decisions depend to a certain 
extent not just on a victim group’s own financial, educational, and human resources, but also on 
the external political opportunity structure. This structure is not permanently fixed, however, and 
allies can help victims alter it in favorable ways. Allied politicians can propose a draft 
reparations law, call for a parliamentary debate on the topic, or form a committee to investigate 
the need for reparations. Allied human rights advocates can teach victims how to interact with 
politicians, how to garner media coverage, and how to navigate bureaucratic structures. Allied 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can offer funding, provide legal support, and draw 
international attention. As these allies work with the victim groups to change the status quo, the 
political opportunity structure will start to shift. Whether by persuading colleagues, keeping 
reparations on the political agenda, or vocally opposing efforts to persist in impunity, political 
allies can open up space for a reparations law to become a genuine possibility, and non-political 
allies can provide victims with the support, skills, and attention (both domestic and international) 
that they need to find and keep such valuable political allies. 
 
 43 
Societal shifts influence the political opportunity structure, as well, but I do not expect 
the general public’s views of a victim group to be nearly as important in influencing the political 
opportunity structure as the views and efforts of elite allies, at least in most cases. Reparations 
are generally elite affairs, meaning that populations do not usually pay much attention to 
reparations (Holzapfel 2016; Pullman 2016; Vargas 2017). Exceptions to this dynamic can occur 
when the victim population constitutes a large percentage of the overall population, as is the case 
in Colombia currently, or when the cost of reparations is expected to be extremely high in a 
country where even the non-victim population is in desperate need of assistance, as was the case 
in immediate postwar Germany. In most cases, these conditions do not hold, and reparations 
remain the purview of victims and elites. This, in turn, reduces—although it does not negate—
the influence that societal prejudice has on reparations.  
This expectation is based both on personal observations of cases and on findings in the 
academic literature. The literature does indicate that vehement public dislike of a victim group 
can help or hinder efforts for justice: ethnically divided societies are less likely to pursue 
transitional justice, experts on transitional justice in Bosnia repeatedly point to that country’s 
ethnic fractionalization as a leading reason for why reparations have yet to be implemented at a 
national level, and politicians in postwar Germany were careful to balance their domestic 
audience’s dislike for Jews with their international audience’s dislike for Nazis by passing the 
first national-level reparations law for Holocaust victims at the same time they passed a law 
providing financial assistance to individuals affected by denazification (Buford and van der 
Merwe 2004; Goschler 1992; Hockerts 2001; Winkler 2010). 
However, there are multiple examples in which governments pay reparations to ethnic 
outgroups, even though society continues to hold deep prejudices against those groups. This was 
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the case in most Western European nations after WWII. The average European held no particular 
affection for Jewish Holocaust survivors, and many were openly resentful or antagonistic to Jews 
who returned home, but most Western European governments still eventually paid reparations to 
Jewish Holocaust survivors. Indigenous people in South America have experienced similar 
dynamics in their reparations campaigns. Looking at Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico, we see that 
ethnic minorities receive reparations from their governments even though society at large 
continues to discriminate against them. Thus, I do not include societal shifts in my theory. 
Economic shifts are the last component of the political opportunity structure. There is 
some indication that economics influences transitional justice and reparations. Powers and 
Proctor (2015) find that wealthier countries pay reparations more often than poorer nations, and 
Olsen et al. (2010b) report that transitional justice mechanisms are more likely to be 
implemented when a country is experiencing economic growth. However, examining case 
studies in detail does not provide consistent support for Powers and Proctor’s findings or grounds 
to believe that Olsen et al.’s findings could be extended to include reparations (which were not 
part of the original study). Guatemala has paid millions of dollars in reparations to victims of its 
36-year civil war, which resulted in approximately 200,000 civilian deaths, whereas El Salvador, 
Guatemala’s slightly wealthier neighbor, has yet to pay reparations for its 12-year civil war, 
which cost 125,000 fewer civilian lives than the Guatemalan Civil War. The West German 
occupation zones began paying reparations in 1947, well before the advent of the Economic 
Miracle in the 1950s. 
 Canada, Australia, and the United States have been wealthy, developed countries for 
generations, and yet it was not until 2007 that Canada promised compensation to Native children 
who were forcibly removed from their families and placed in abusive residential schools, and 
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even this money was the result of a lawsuit settlement, not reparations (Fullenwieder and Molnar 
2018). The United States has paid reparations to victims of WWII-era Japanese internment 
camps, but it has yet to promise or pay reparations for slavery,13 just as the Australian federal 
government has yet to promise or pay reparations to indigenous citizens who suffered abuses like 
the ones committed against Native peoples in Canada (AAP – SBS 2018). To further underscore 
the comparative unimportance of finances when it comes to governments’ decisions about 
reparations promises and payments, the Peruvian government even went so far as to turn down 
Germany’s offer to provide financial assistance for the reparations program there (Lerner 2017).  
Based on my own research, I do not expect economic factors to be important, and 
therefore I do not include them in my theory. Although isolated examples like the ones given 
above are not necessarily representative of the larger whole, statistical findings are also subject 
to bias. Indeed, this divergence between quantitative results and qualitative trends may simply be 
due to how Powers and Proctor (2015) decided to define reparations. Their dataset looks only at 
monetary reparations, whereas my definition of reparations includes material but non-monetary 
forms of redress, such as health care, scholarships, and free public transportation. Reparations 
are notoriously difficult to define and measure, and so I opt to lean towards the qualitative 
evidence rather than the quantitative evidence on this particular issue. As a result, economic 
shifts in the political opportunity structure do not figure in my theory, although I do include 
economic variables in my quantitative models and discuss economic factors in my qualitative 
case studies to assess whether this theoretical assumption was justified. 
                                                        
13 Like Canada, the United States has paid money to Native Americans as a result of lawsuit 
settlements, but it has not paid reparations. Broadly speaking, Native Americans are also not 
lobbying for reparations, because they want their land to be returned, and accepting money for 
that land is morally incompatible with the way they view the land (Fletcher 2014; Wildcat 2014). 
 
 46 
5. Reparations Theory 
I build on these insights from the transitional justice literature, the democratization 
literature, and the work on resource mobilization and political opportunity structures in the social 
movements literature to construct my own theory. I theorize that governments both promise and 
pay reparations due to pressure from victims themselves. Therefore, if victims do not – or cannot 
– voice demands for reparations, they will not receive reparations. However, simply demanding 
reparations is not enough to induce a government to promise and then pay reparations. Instead, 
victims must get organized. 
As victims organize and start to attract attention with their efforts, they may draw 
politically influential allies to their cause. These allies, whether they come in the form of 
domestic politicians, NGOs, activists, lawyers, sympathetic journalists, and/or international 
human rights advocates, aid victims by sharing their expertise, their connections to domestic 
policymakers, their finances, their framing expertise, and more. These efforts make allies a 
critical resource for victims’ organizations, because such assistance creates political 
opportunities for the reparations campaign.  
These political opportunities may be difficult to quantify; for example, victims’ 
organizations and their allies may help develop a political climate that is receptive to ideas of 
justice and human rights and therefore conducive to drafting and enforcing a reparations law. 
Although such a shift is impossible to measure, it can nonetheless be instrumental in causing 
politicians to support victims’ demands for reparations. Political opportunities may also be 
obvious and concrete, as when victims gain the attention and sympathy of the current head of 
government, have strong ties to certain political parties, or attract such a groundswell of support 
that politicians are forced to either promise and/or pay reparations or risk losing their jobs. 
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Political opportunities can be increased international attention to a government’s reluctance to 
follow through on promised reparations, which then induces an administration to speed up the 
implementation timeline of a drafted reparations program. Regardless of the form these political 
opportunities take, however, strong victims’ organizations will be able to take advantage of such 
openings to pressure the government and force it to promise reparations or, if a reparations 
promise has already been forthcoming, to pay reparations.  
I expect similar although not precisely identical dynamics to influence governments’ 
reparations decisions (given the finances involved in paying reparations as opposed to just 
promising them, victim pressure may need to be higher to force a payment), and so the 
theoretical argument is the same for a reparations promise as for a payment. I also expect my 
theory to apply in both democratic and nondemocratic regimes. This is because I believe that the 
difference from promise to payment and from democratic to nondemocratic regimes lies not in 
the broad framework, but in the details—how much pro-reparations pressure is necessary? What 
kinds of allies are most helpful? How important are international versus domestic allies, and how 
are victims’ efforts affected by economic concerns, victim group size, and ethnic identity? These 
more detailed questions are addressed in my statistical chapter, where I use an original dataset on 
reparations promises and payments to examine the trends and relationships between a variety of 
independent variables and my two dependent reparations variables.  
As far as the broader theoretical argument goes, however, I anticipate that both 
reparations promises and reparations payments will materialize only if victims organize and 
attract allies to help them voice their reparations claims, thereby creating the political space 
necessary to cause the government to promise and/or pay reparations. Sometimes this process 
will need to go through two iterations: The first iteration will force the promise, while the second 
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will force the payment. In other cases, there is either no delay between a reparations promise and 
a reparations payment, or the delay is due to the bureaucratic and logistical hurdles that can – and 
often do – spring up on the way to implementing any piece of legislation, let alone something as 
complex as a reparations program. A condensed version of the theory is presented in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2: THEORY OF REPARATIONS PROMISES AND PAYMENTS 
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This theory is the first generalizable theory about reparations dynamics, and it is also the 
first in the literature to offer a framework as to why some governments decide to promise and/or 
pay reparations to victims of widespread, systematic, government-sponsored human rights 
abuses when other governments do not. The next step is to apply this theory to various settings. 
In Chapter 2, I apply the quantitatively testable elements of my theory to an original dataset on 
reparations promises and payments. In Chapters 3-5, I test my theory’s validity and 










CHAPTER 2:  
 





 Although there is no magical formula to right the wrongs of the past, most contemporary 
roadmaps to truth, justice, and reconciliation involve paying reparations to victims/ survivors of 
governmental human rights abuses. In the nearly seventy years since the West German 
government first began paying reparations to victims of the Nazis, reparations for government-
sponsored human rights abuses have become an international norm (Powers 2017). Headlines 
about reparations payments, reparations promises, and reparations demands surface regularly in 
the news, giving the impression that reparations are de rigueur in post-conflict and post-
authoritarian contexts.  
In practice, however, there is wide variation in the extent to which post-conflict and post-
authoritarian countries actually promise and pay reparations. This presents a puzzle: Why do 
some states persist in impunity, while others promise and pay reparations to victimized citizens? 
Despite the global and perennial relevance of reparations, the literature offers no generalizable 
theories about when or why governments choose to promise and pay reparations. As a result, the 
inner workings of this common and financially costly phenomenon remain a mystery, even 
though, every year, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individual 
activists spend considerable amounts of time and money on demanding, designing, and 
implementing reparations programs. 
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Drawing on the transitional justice, democratization, and social movement literatures, I 
construct a generalizable theory as to when and why domestic governments decide to promise 
and pay reparations to victims of within-country human rights abuses that were committed or 
tacitly sanctioned by the government. Although conventional wisdom holds that financial 
concerns are of paramount importance when it comes to reparations, I argue that the decisive 
factor in explaining the variation in governments’ reparations promises and payments is actually 
the concerted pro-reparations efforts of victims’ rights groups. I look to social movement theory 
in particular to explain why the main determinant of reparations is not domestic financial 
concerns, the number of individuals affected, or even regime type, but rather the strength of the 
pro-reparations efforts of victims themselves. 
In order to test this explanation for reparations outcomes, it was necessary to create my 
own dataset on reparations. Existing datasets on transitional justice and reparations do not 
include a measure of victim group strength, nor do they distinguish between the occurrence and 
timing of reparations promises versus reparations payments, making them inappropriate for 
testing my theory. As a result, I gathered my own data on the reparations promises, payments, 
non-promises, and non-payments for internal conflicts and abusive dictatorships that occurred 
between 1939 and 2006 in Europe, Latin America, and Central Asia. 
In this chapter, I introduce three new variables from my dataset that will increase the 
precision, validity, and richness of future quantitative studies on transitional justice. First, 
whereas all previous datasets examine only reparations payments, my dataset also records the 
presence, absence, and timing of reparations promises. Distinguishing between reparations 
promises and reparations payments allows me to disentangle the dynamics that lead to 
reparations promises versus reparations payments and to identify why some governments never 
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promise reparations, why others promise but never pay reparations, and why many both promise 
and pay reparations. Examining reparations in this more nuanced way enhances the validity of 
my central finding about reparations: governments are more likely to both promise and pay 
reparations when strong victims’ rights organizations pressure them to do so.  
The strength of victims’ rights organizations is the second new variable I include in my 
dataset. Of course, defining and measuring ‘strength’ presents several challenges, but it is 
impossible to test my theory without this variable. Although such a nebulous concept cannot be 
measured in a way that quiets all objections and considers all eventualities, I have used the 
approaches and typologies from previous work, as well as my own expertise on the topic, to 
create a high/low scale that assesses the strength of victims’ rights organizations based on the 
best information available about these organizations. Coding is based on a holistic evaluation of 
factors that would allow an organization to exert influence on the government, such as size, 
cohesion, unity of purpose, and sociopolitical prominence. I discuss this measurement in greater 
detail later in the chapter.  
Third, my dataset is the first to examine the extent to which governments’ reparations 
promises and payments vary across different groups of victims in the same internal conflict or 
dictatorship. Governments often promise reparations to one group but not another, and my 
dataset accounts for this. Consequently, it allows me to hold contextual, historical, and conflict-
specific variables constant across certain cases so that I can focus more closely on the group-
specific dynamics that influence reparations promises and reparations payments.  
In this chapter, I analyze the quantitative data that I collected and find that neither the 
strength of a country’s economic indicators (specifically GDP growth, GDP per capita, and 
imports and exports) nor a country’s geopolitical region make governments more likely to either 
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promise or pay reparations. As for regime type, democratic governments are much more likely to 
make a reparations promise; moving from a borderline anocracy (Polity score of 5) to a 
consolidated democracy (Polity score of 10) makes a governmental reparations promise nearly 9 
times as likely, and moving from an autocracy (Polity score of -6) to a consolidated democracy 
(Polity score of 10) makes a reparations promise 1000 times as likely. 14 Victim group strength 
has a large substantive effect on the likelihood of governmental reparations promises, too, as a 
government being pressured by a strong victim group is 45 times more likely to promise 
reparations than a government that is being subjected either to pressure from a weak victim 
group or to no pressure at all.  
Despite the substantively meaningful effect of regime type on reparations promises, 
regime type has no independent effect on the likelihood of reparations payments. Instead, when it 
comes to reparations payments, victim group strength is by far the most influential factor, as 
governments in contexts with strong victim groups are nearly 75 times more likely to pay 
reparations than governments in countries with weak or nonexistent victim groups. Thus, I find 
strong support for my expectation that victim group strength is a critical determinant of both 
reparations promises and payments.  
I support my argument in the following manner. First, I briefly resummarize a few key 
theoretical expectations from the previous chapter alongside the presentation of my hypotheses, 
which build on the full theory presented in the previous chapter of this dissertation. Second, I 
introduce my original dataset and explain the methods I use to test my hypotheses. Third, I 
                                                        
14 There are autocracies in the dataset for many reasons. Firstly, countries in transition need not 
be transitioning to democracy; they can transition into authoritarianism under a new 
government/leader. Secondly, internal conflicts in authoritarian countries can end without a 
simultaneous transition to democracy. Thirdly, some countries do not promise or pay reparations 
for years, during which time they can experience multiple different autocratic periods. 
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present the results of my analysis. I conclude by discussing my results and their broader 
implications. Although the transitional justice literature does indicate that there is value in 
investigating the explanatory power of victims’ organizations, this dissertation represents the 
first time that victim group strength has been used as the basis for a theory of reparations 
promises and payments, measured and compared across a set of post-conflict and post-
dictatorship cases with both positive and negative reparations outcomes, and tested using 
statistical methods.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Given the democratization and transitional justice literature’s emphasis on civil society, I 
expect social forces to have a large influence on reparations efforts. The social movement 
literature and transitional justice literature prompt me to narrow this focus even further, because 
civil society is made up of diverse forces that sometimes work at cross-purposes. Civil society is 
hardly a uniformly pro-justice coalition, however, and it is important not to view it as such 
(Berman 1997). Indeed, this is one of the emerging themes in transitional justice literature, as 
recent works consistently emphasize that the desires and demands of a specific sector of civil 
society, namely victims’ organizations, carry special weight in the development and 
implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. As the discipline continues to move toward 
emphasizing victim-centered responses to human rights abuses, the centerpiece of which requires 
recognizing that victims are not passive observers but rather active participants in their own 
lives, it has also devoted more attention to examining the influence that victims’ organizations 
can have on transitional justice decisions. (Méndez 2016; Fletcher and Weinstein 2017) 
From a theoretical standpoint, there is strong reason to believe that victims’ organizations 
hold the key to governments’ reparations decisions. While other civil society sectors play a role 
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in steering the course of transitional justice, I expect victims’ organizations to be the driving 
force behind both reparations promises and payments. Reparations are the only victim-centered 
transitional justice mechanism, victims stand to gain or lose the most from a government’s 
reparations policy, and the literature shows that victims can play an influential role in shaping 
transitional justice and reparations endeavors when they get involved (Goschler 1992, 2005; 
Lillteicher 2007a; Méndez 2016; Fletcher and Weinstein 2017).  
Reparations tend to be elite affairs rather than an issue that draws voters to the polls, but 
victims can turn their reparations demands into a feature of an electoral contest by rallying 
supporters and influencers to their cause. Society cannot be sympathetic to victims or reward 
politicians for caring about victims when people are unaware of or unfavorably disposed towards 
victims and their needs, however, and so victims must be visible advocates for their position in 
order to attract the domestic sympathy necessary for political influence. It is particularly 
important for the victims in my universe of cases to attempt to attract societal sympathy or to at 
least avoid attracting negative attention from the broader population, because these individuals 
are victims of government-sponsored abuses. This means that, for whatever reason, a majority of 
the country’s citizens either tacitly permitted or actively supported the commission of these 
crimes. Consequently, it is unlikely that the general population thinks kindly enough of these 
individuals to do an immediate about-face and support a massive expenditure of government 
funds on their behalf. As a result, victims need to either work actively to change societal 
perceptions of them or remain inoffensive enough to be able to convince politicians of the 
political benefits (electoral and/or reputational) of promising and paying reparations.  
Although victim group strength and societal sympathy are clearly closely linked, ideally I 
would include both of these variables in my analysis. However, there are no data on the level of 
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societal sympathy for victims in a given context, nor is there a metric for assessing, much less 
quantifying, societal sympathy. Furthermore, given the lack of detailed documentation on these 
cases, at this point in time it is simply impossible to collect valid cross-temporal, cross-regional 
data on societal sympathy. With appropriate country-level expertise, it may be possible to 
qualitatively evaluate the varying levels of societal sympathy present in a single case and then 
assess how that connects to governments’ reparations decisions, but conducting such an analysis 
in a quantitative fashion, let alone across multiple cases, is not feasible with a dataset that 
includes largely historical cases. However, because societal sympathy for victims of 
government-sponsored abuses will not develop unless victims and their allies make concerted 
efforts to reeducate and persuade the general population, and because it requires organization on 
the part of victims and their allies in order to mount such efforts in the first place, a measure of 
victim group strength will likely capture some of the effects of societal sympathy, as well. Future 
research into the how societal sympathy relates to reparations would be welcome, but it is 
beyond the scope of this project. 
In cases where there are reputational (and potentially concomitant economic) costs for 
denying reparations to victims of human rights abuses, politicians have an incentive to commit to 
these promises and payments, regardless of the electoral power of the victims. However, such 
reputational benefits are unlikely to exist when victims are not visible enough to attract either the 
domestic societal sympathy or the international support that expose politicians to reputational 
costs in the first place. Only when victims’ organizations mobilize to demand reparations are 
they able to place pressure on the government, increase the domestic and international visibility 
of the need for reparations, attract allies who do have the political clout necessary to extract 
concessions from politicians, and ensure that reparations promises are translated into genuine 
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reparations payments. Consequently, I expect that, in the absence of strong, pro-reparations 
victims’ organizations, governments are unlikely to either make or fulfill a commitment as costly 
as reparations. To clarify, this theory is probabilistic rather than deterministic, arguing that strong 
victims’ organizations make reparations promises and payments more likely, not that they are, on 
their own, a sufficient cause of reparations promises and/or payments.   
H1: Governments will be more likely to promise and pay reparations in cases where strong 
victims’ organizations demand reparations. 
  
My second hypothesis deals with regime type. In line with both Powers and Proctor 
(2015) and the general truism about democratic governments being more responsive to citizens’ 
demands than autocratic ones, I expect democracy to have a positive effect on the incidence of 
both reparations promises and payments. There are, of course, many different ways to define 
democracy, but my argument is not tied to a specific definition. Instead, I expect that regime type 
matters because it influences governments’ responsiveness to citizens and citizens’ willingness 
and ability to seek political change through social mobilization. Consequently, it does not matter 
whether the state in question qualifies as, say, a polyarchy, a consolidated democracy, or a 
representative democracy; what matters is that the state has the political feedback mechanisms, 
respect for democratic norms, and citizen protections that are present in democracies—
particularly free and fair elections, respect for the rule of law, and the right to free speech, all of 
which are included in basic operationalizations of democratic quality. In order to ensure that my 
results are robust to the plethora of definitions of democracy, I utilize multiple different 
operationalizations of democracy when I run the quantitative tests of my hypotheses. 
As a rule of thumb, office-seeking politicians in democracies need to appeal to voters in 
order to win elections and gain power, whereas the rulers of autocratic regimes do not face that 
same imperative. This is not to say that autocratic regimes are immune to citizens’ desires; they 
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are sensitive to public opinion, and they are highly unlikely to simply ignore mobilized civilian 
groups (Geddes and Zaller 1989; Robertson 2010). However, the opportunities to form, foster, 
and consolidate civil society groups are much more limited in an autocratic regime than a 
democratic regime, and they are more likely to be met with repression, as well (Diamond 2002; 
Howard 2002). As a result, citizens are more likely to be able to vocally demand that their 
government promise and pay reparations in a democracy than an autocracy. 
This does raise the potential of a chicken-and-egg question; what if victim organizations 
form only in countries where they expect to succeed in making their reparations claims? The 
simple answer to this is that the facts on the ground do not support this. Victims’ organizations 
generally form primarily to offer solidarity and meet fellow survivors’ immediate needs, and 
they usually do not consider the possibility of agitating for reparations for years, if they ever do 
at all. Because the original purpose of most victims’ organizations is to provide support and 
solidarity, not to pursue reparations claims, these organizations are created in all sorts of contexts 
and under all sorts of regime types. Indeed, most, if not all, victims’ organizations exist for 
years—often in highly informal configurations—before they even begin considering reparations, 
let alone actively requesting reparations. Many victims’ organizations never articulate 
reparations demands at all. Thus, there is no compelling reason to believe that victims’ 
organizations exist only in places where victims expect their reparations claims to succeed.  
Furthermore, the information I gathered during my fieldwork showed that survivors 
generally band together while abusive periods are ongoing, e.g. in nondemocratic contexts. They 
usually do not demand reparations until the abuses have ended and the country has begun to 
democratize, but, even then, the timing of groups’ initial reparations demands tends not to 
coincide with the installation of a particularly friendly government. This indicates that survivors 
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are not mobilizing and formulating demands in response to what they believe the government is 
willing to give; they are mobilizing and formulating demands at their own pace, in response to 
their own needs.  
Similarly, victim groups can be extremely strong even in adverse contexts where they 
have no realistic expectation of encountering a receptive government. For example, the Mothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo (Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo), which spearheaded the victims’ 
rights movement in Argentina, was visible, vocal, and influential even during the repressive 
climate of the military dictatorship (1976-1983), over a decade before the government even 
began considering, much less promising, reparations.15 The low correlation coefficients between 
victim strength and various measures of regime type also provide a quantitative rebuttal the idea 
that victim group strength is an artifact of regime type or a proxy for regime type (See Appendix 
Table 7). However, because democracy and reparations results could still be having an 
interactive effect on each other, I include an interaction term of democracy and victim group 
strength in my models. 
H2: Reparations promises and reparations payments will be more likely to occur in democratic 
rather than undemocratic contexts.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
  
 To address the puzzle of what motivates governments to promise and pay reparations, I 
introduce a new dataset that I have built using original data on reparations. It was necessary to 
gather my own data because pre-existing datasets that include information on reparations do not 
distinguish between promises and payments, do not include data on victim group strength, utilize 
different inclusion criteria, and, with the exception of Powers and Proctor (2015), they do not 
                                                        
15 Reparations for victims of political persecution, torture, and imprisonment/removal of freedom 
were promised in a 1991 law (“Ley 24043” 1991)  
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focus specifically on reparations. As a result, there has been very little quantitative work on 
reparations, and the work that does exist has neither tried nor been able to assess the interplay 
between victim-group characteristics and reparations decisions. This means that I am 
constructing not only an original theory, but original counterarguments to that theory, as well. 
The literature simply does not examine the phenomenon I am investigating in my dissertation, 
and therefore one important contribution of this dissertation is that it provides an explanation as 
to why governments promise and pay reparations promises. Given that this theory will lay a 
foundation for future work on the political, social, and economic dynamics of reparations, I 
spend the bulk of my time focusing on my theory about governments’ reparations decisions 
rather than developing and discounting alternative explanations to that theory.  
The novelty of this research also means that in order to assess what factors influence a 
government’s likelihood of promising and paying reparations, I needed to gather my own data on 
reparations promises, reparations payments, and the independent variable that is the key to my 
theory: the strength of victims’ organizations. My dataset includes information on the reparations 
promises and payments made in response to dictatorships and internal conflicts in Europe, 
Central Asia, and Latin America that occurred between 1939 and 2006 and resulted in 
widespread, systematic human rights abuses. My dataset includes an important fraction of the 
universe of positive cases: 107 cases from Europe (29 post-conflict cases and 78 post-
dictatorship cases), 20 from Central Asia (12 post-conflict cases and 8 post-dictatorship cases), 
and 35 from Latin America (21 post-conflict cases and 14 post-dictatorship cases). I selected 
these regions because there is more documentation available on abuses committed in these 
regions, not only in terms of accessible government publications, legislation, and websites, but 
also in terms of scholarly work and articles published in the popular press. Furthermore, my 
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language skills in English, German, and Spanish enabled me to search both primary and 
secondary sources in these regions much more easily and thoroughly than I could for cases in 
Africa and Asia. The unit of analysis is the victim group in a given abusive episode.  
For example, the dataset contains multiple cases of West German reparations promises 
and payments made to Holocaust victims: Jewish German Holocaust victims constitute one case, 
Romani German Holocaust victims form a second case, and German Jehovah’s Witnesses 
present a third case. All of these cases involve reparations paid to German citizens for egregious 
human rights abuses committed during the same time period by the same German government, 
but subsequent West German regimes did not promise and pay reparations to these groups on the 
same schedule. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer promised reparations to Jewish 
Germans in 1951, and the West German government began paying these reparations in 1953. 
German Jehovah’s Witnesses, in contrast, were theoretically legally eligible for reparations 
under the same 1953 law that initiated reparations payments to Jewish Germans, but they did not 
receive reparations payments until 1997.  
The West German case provides an opening to discuss the way I coded successor states, 
as well. Technically, the West German government did not abuse its citizens during WWII, 
because West Germany did not exist. However, West Germany became the legal successor state 
to Nazi Germany, and so the West German government inherited all of Nazi Germany’s 
reparations obligations. Similarly, both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are legal 
successors to Czechoslovakia, and so they both inherited Czechoslovakia’s Communist-era and 
WWII-occupation-era reparations responsibilities. Thus, when these states were legally 
established, they enter the dataset with the obligation to promise and pay reparations to victims 
of the crimes committed by their respective predecessor states.  
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I classified a country as a dictatorship when it was scored as not democratic for a given 
time period on at least two of three regime classification scales that I consulted.16 I opted for this 
coding scheme because regime classification scales do not always agree on when a country 
qualifies as a democracy. By coding countries as dictatorships only when multiple scales agreed 
that a country was in fact experiencing an autocratic period, my coding is robust to the 
definitional peculiarities of any single classification scale. This also means that current autocratic 
countries can be (and are) included in the sample due to having failed to pay reparations for 
previous periods of internal conflict, abusive dictatorial regimes, or present abuses. Thus, my 
analysis is not just of democratic countries, but of countries of all regime types that have 
experienced either an internal conflict or dictatorship in the past. Currently abusive governments 
are included in the analysis and are coded for having promised/not promised and/or paid/not paid 
reparations not just for the abuses that are ongoing, but also for abuses that were committed by 
previous governments.  
As another hypothetical example, let us imagine that a country experienced abuses at the 
hands of an autocratic regime, transitioned into democracy, transitioned out of democracy, and 
acquired a non-democratic government that promised and paid reparations. This country would 
be included in the dataset for all of those time periods, insofar as coding victim group strength 
was possible for the years in question. It would also be classified as a post-autocratic case, 
because the abusive period in question was one of autocracy. This does not imply that the case is 
not currently autocratic (or, in the case of a post-conflict coding, that it is no longer in a state of 
violent internal upheaval); it simply identifies the abusive period for which reparations ought to 
                                                        
16 A country had to receive a non-negative Polity2 score, an NF rating from Freedom House, 
and/or a 0 on Ulfelder’s Democracy/Autocracy Dataset.  
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be paid as having been a period of autocracy rather than internal conflict. If this same country 
experienced an internal conflict at a different point in time, a separate case would be added in the 
dataset and coded as post-conflict to track the reparations promises and payments made for that 
specific abusive episode. 
The internal conflicts consist of cases in the Correlates of War Dataset included on the 
list of intra-state wars in which the government was a participant17 and cases in the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset of state governments fighting internal armed conflicts against one or 
more domestic opposition groups (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sarkees and Wayman 2010). I also 
included cases in which the CIRI data and Political Terror Scale averages out to 3 or more, 
indicating that citizens are frequently subjected to government violence and political 
imprisonment, and where the CIRI Human Rights Dataset records a government as having no 
respect for citizens’ rights to freedom from disappearance, extrajudicial killing, imprisonment, 
and/or torture (Cingranelli et al. 2014; Gibney et al. 2017). 
 When coding reparations promises, I looked for laws, peace agreements, news reports, 
and official statements in which the government guaranteed citizens that reparations would be 
paid for abuses committed in a certain dictatorship or conflict. To compile this information, I 
consulted the UCDP Peace Agreements database, the Notre Dame Peace Accords Matrix, the 
University of Ulster Transitional Justice Peace Agreements Database, and the UN Peacemaker 
Database, as well as countries’ own databases of past legislation, domestic and international 
news outlets, field reports from human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, and books and scholarly articles about each case. I coded this dummy 
                                                        
17 This includes civil wars for central control, civil wars over local issues, and regional internal 
wars, but not wars of independence.  
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variable as 1 when there was evidence of a reparations promise and as 0 when there was no sign 
that the government had made an official reparations promise. 
 I collected the information on reparations payments from similar sources. In addition to 
reading primary and secondary literature on reparations and on each conflict and dictatorship 
included in the dataset, I consulted national budget reports, government websites, reports on 
domestic reparations programs, statements from victims’ organizations, news articles, and 
reports from organizations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice, Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the United States Institute of Peace. For each case, I 
searched for data in both English and the applicable local language. I did not code reparations as 
paid unless I found documentation confirming that at least a subset of the victims had received 
some sort of governmental aid that qualifies as reparations. 
 Reparations can take many forms besides the traditional cash payment model. These run 
from measures that are employed almost universally, such as educational vouchers and 
healthcare, to less common methods, such as free public transportation and admission to state-
run museums. Reparations can also be communal rather than individual. Peru has employed 
communal reparations in addition to individual financial compensation and healthcare measures, 
as the government funds local development projects in towns where the entire community was 
affected by the Armed Internal Conflict. Communal reparations can also be made in the form of 
symbolic reparations. In contrast to material reparations, which come in the form of money, 
goods, and services, symbolic reparations are much more abstract. Examples of widely-used 
forms of symbolic reparations include state-sponsored memorials, changes to educational 
curricula, and government-funded initiatives to locate, exhume, and identify victims’ remains.  
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Although individual, communal, material, and symbolic reparations are all valid forms of 
reparations, I constrain my analysis to individual material reparations. From a theoretical 
standpoint, there is good reason to believe that the political dynamics behind symbolic 
reparations may be too different from those of material reparations to permit meaningful 
comparison. First of all, symbolic and communal reparations generally impose much smaller 
financial costs on governments than material reparations. Consequently, the government’s 
resistance to reparations claims and the intensity of victims’ political struggle for acquiring these 
types of reparations, particularly symbolic reparations, is likely to be greatly diminished.  
Second of all, projects that politicians like to refer to as being symbolic and communal 
reparations may not actually be reparations at all. Regardless of a politicians’ assertions, should 
we view a government as having made symbolic reparations when it adds a paragraph about 
historical crimes to a textbook when the next scheduled textbook revision date rolls around, 
builds a commemorative statue without survivors’ input, or publicly acknowledges the site of a 
mass grave? Communal reparations encounter similar difficulties in terms of validity. Although 
some of Peru’s communal reparations development projects have been genuinely reparative, 
many were excuses for politicians to say they were paying reparations when actually they were 
completing infrastructure and development projects that had already been scheduled. Thus, due 
to the heightened political dynamics behind individual material reparations, as well as their 
concrete and easily measurable nature (which makes data collection both more feasible and more 
reliable), I have opted to exclude symbolic and communal reparations from my quantitative 
analysis. 
Some of the greatest obstacles and greatest rewards in this project center on the data that I 
have gathered on the characteristics and behavior of victims’ groups’ efforts to acquire 
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reparations. Measuring the strength of victims’ organizations presents a genuine challenge, both 
due to the difficulty of deciding precisely what a measurement of ‘strength’ entails and the 
scarcity of data on characteristics of victim groups. Consequently, I look to work in the fields of 
transitional justice and social movements to assist me in creating a coding scheme for victim 
group strength. 
I start with the model given by Conor O’Dwyer (2012) in his study of gay rights activists 
in post-communist Poland. He evaluates the robustness of activist networks by assessing three 
characteristics. The first of these is the activist network’s density, or the number of active 
organizations involved in the cause. The more groups that are involved, the larger the movement 
and the better able it is to pursue pro-LGBT+ efforts in multiple arenas. The second 
characteristic is the coordination between groups in the activist network; that is, to what extent 
are different groups in the movement cooperative or competitive with each other in terms of 
resources, goals, and projects. The third and final characteristic is the “capacity to engage in 
political lobbying,” which at the low end of the spectrum simply requires groups to define 
themselves as political, whereas highly robust groups could file lawsuits, train and field electoral 
candidates, and be closely involved in writing relevant laws (15).  
Next, I look to Hugo van der Merwe and Maya Schkolne’s (2017) discussion of civil 
society and transitional justice to be sure that, when I looked at the transitional justice landscape 
of a given country, I searched for all types of relevant groups and advocacy efforts. Van der 
Merwe and Schkolne list eight types of civil society actors that are generally engaged in 
transitional justice work: Religious organizations, human rights NGOs, peacebuilding NGOs, 
psycho/medical NGOs, gender justice NGOs, community-based organizations/victim 
organizations, social movements, and coalitions between these different groups (226-228). Then, 
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they define eight ways that these organizations can pursue transitional justice: “mobilizing 
action; targeted advocacy; monitoring and transparency; official support; public engagement; 
service provision and victim support; peace building, reconciliation and development; and truth 
telling, commemoration and memorialization” (229).  
The same sources with information on reparations promises and payments in a particular 
case often had information on the extent to which victims’ organizations existed, were pushing 
for reparations payments from the government, were collaborating with other civil society 
organizations, and were attracting attention and sympathy from society in general. Although 
sometimes non-governmental organizations or scholars would explicitly refer to victims’ 
organizations as being unified, vocal, and decisive in acquiring reparations, my coding decisions 
more often required triangulating the information I could find about the number of victims’ 
organizations that existed at the time (O’Dwyer’s density criterion), victims’ organizations’ self-
reports of their activities, goals, and collaborative efforts, both present and historical (O’Dwyer’s 
coordination criterion and capacity for political action criterion); contemporary news reports, and 
outside assessments about the strength and reach of the human rights sector of civil society (all 
three of O’Dwyer’s criteria). I also examined to what extent the victims’ rights movement 
contained organizations in van der Merwe and Schkolne’s eight categories of civil society and 
how involved they were in pursuing the eight types of pro-transitional justice work listed in van 
der Merwe and Schkolne’s typology. I then used this information to score the strength of 
victims’ rights organizations, focusing on how much pro-reparations pressure they placed on the 
government via their network density, coordination, and political lobbying. 
Due to the scarcity of such data, it was impossible to create an explicit typology, and the 
coding is necessarily comparative rather than rigidly defined. Although some of the cases in 
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question have generated an extensive scholarly literature—for example, the case of German Jews 
after the Holocaust, the case of political victims of Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile, and the case 
of political victims of Argentina’s military junta—most cases received much less attention. 
Given that reparations did not start becoming an international norm until fairly recently, it was 
particularly difficult to find data on the historical cases. However, consulting sources in local 
languages usually yielded enough data for me to make an informed assessment of the state of 
victim groups in those contexts. When data was too sparse to be reliable, I dropped the case from 
my analysis. 
Another difficult element of this project was collecting data on victim groups for each 
year from the end of the abusive period up through the first year that reparations were paid. 
Although part of the power of the analysis lies in its cross-temporal nature, which allows me to 
identify what factors are present or absent in promise and payment years as opposed to years 
where no reparations activity occurs, finding victim group data for a span of thirty to forty years 
was not always possible. I was usually able to find data on the state of victims’ groups during the 
first few years after the abuses and for three to four years directly preceding reparations promises 
and payments, but, depending on how long it took for a government to promise and/or pay 
reparations, I could not always gather data on the intervening years. Luckily, civil society 
groups—in this case, victim’s groups—are unlikely to drastically gather or lose strength from 
one year to the next. Thus, I was able to use the data from well-documented years to extrapolate 
the victim strength for the two to three years before and after in cases where those preceding and 
subsequent years were not as well documented. This approach helped to fill in some, though not 
all, of the gaps in the data. 
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For all cases with sufficient amounts of data on victim group strength, I scored this 
strength on a scale from 0-5, with 0 indicating that victims’ rights groups were nonexistent and 5 
indicating that they existed, comprised a large number of people (density), were unified in their 
pursuit of reparations (coordination), and concertedly pressured the government for reparations 
(capacity for political action). A score of 1 might indicate that, while victims’ organizations 
existed in this year, they did not express any desire for reparations, or it could mean that victims’ 
organizations were requesting reparations, but they were so small, disorganized, and/or plagued 
by infighting as to be inconsequential. When victims’ organizations existed and desired 
reparations but were disorganized, small in number, and/or internally divided, I scored their 
strength as a 2. To score as a 3, victims’ movements needed to comprise more than one 
organization with a moderately-sized membership (approximately 50 or more members), most of 
these organizations needed to agree with each other about wanting reparations even if they 
disagreed about what kinds of reparations should be paid, and they needed to be organized 
enough to have spokespeople, an office, a newsletter, or some other indicator of organizational 
legitimacy and financial stability. Organizations scored as a 4 would have all of these 
characteristics but in larger quantities and across a larger number of fields listed by van der 
Merwe and Schkolne.  
In order to reduce the likelihood that a miscoded year would unduly influence my results, 
I averaged these scores over the previous five-years (this also accounts for the cumulative effect 
of lobbying pressure, as political lobbying tends to be a slow process). Then, I collapsed my 0-5 
categories into a dichotomous strength variable where ‘high’ victim group strength is scored as a 
1 and ‘low’ victim group strength is scored as a 0. I created two versions of this collapsed score 
variable—one where ‘high’ included all of the cases where the five-year victim strength average 
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was greater than or equal to 3, and one with a stricter definition of ‘high strength,’ which 
included only the cases where the five-year victim strength average was greater than or equal to 
4. Not only does this keep the coding of any one year from biasing the results, but also it keeps 
the precise categorical distinctions from being too important. Distinguishing between a 2 and a 3 
might be difficult; the distinction between a 2 and a 4 is clear. There is, of course, the risk that 
borderline cases will be incorrectly classified, but the majority of the victim strength five-year 
averages are integers, and very few are on the cusp of falling into a different category. Out of 
1,391 observations, only 5% (75) are greater than or equal to 2.5 but smaller than 3,18 and only 
3% (42) are greater than or equal to 3.5 but smaller than 4.19 
I filled in this year-to-year victim group data for at least five years immediately after the 
abuses ended, at least five years before and after the reparations were promised, and at least five 
years before and after the reparations were paid. If reparations were never promised or if they 
were never paid, I filled in the data for at least the first five years after the end of the abuses and 
then for at least the last five years prior to the end of the dataset’s temporal coverage (e.g. from 
2011 onwards). Cases where reparations were never promised automatically drop out of the 
‘paid’ model, because reparations must be promised before governments can pay them.  
Whether or not I was able to code beyond the five-year periods before and/or after a 
promise or payment event depended on the amount of documentation available for a given case. 
Because victim group strength does not vary greatly from year to year and because the years 
immediately after abuses and prior to promises and payments tend to be well documented, I felt 
                                                        
18 62 observations have a five-year average of 2.5, and 13 have a five-year average of 2.67. 
   
19 28 observations have a five-year average of 3.5, 12 have a five-year average of 3.67, and 2 
have a five-year average of 3.75. 
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able to code in five-year periods without having to extrapolate beyond the information given by 
the sources I consulted, but, due to a lack of data, there are unavoidable gaps in the time series. 
As contemporary cases occur, I will be able to gather current data and avoid such gaps; 
unfortunately, it is impossible to do the same for historical cases. In order to ameliorate the 
potential effects of having miscoded in a given year, and because victim group strength does not 
change dramatically from year to year, the measure of victim group strength included in the 
model is an average of the previous five years’ victim group strength scores. 
To give an example of my coding process, one of the cases in my dataset is the 
reparations promised and paid to victims of Peru’s Internal Armed Conflict (1980-2000). 
Although Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo promised reparations in a speech he made in 
November 2003, his government did not pay collective reparations until 2006, and individual 
reparations did not follow until Ollanta Humala implemented them at the start of his presidential 
term in 2011. In 2003, Peru’s victim’s rights movement had a high density and extensive inter-
activist coordination. Not only did the movement comprise a large number of organizations from 
most of the eight sectors identified by van der Merwe and Schkolne, but many of them also 
coordinated their efforts under the umbrella organization of the National Coordinator for Human 
Rights, which was formed in 1995. These different groups engaged in every single one of van 
der Merwe and Schkolne’s eight approaches to supporting transitional justice, and they were 
highly politically active. Victims’ organizations had the ear and the support of the country’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and helped the Commission formulate its non-binding 
recommendations for reparations, which is what forced Toledo’s 2003 reparations promise.  
Victims’ rights organizations were also involved in bringing court cases on the 
government-perpetrated killings at Barrios Altos and La Cantuta before the Inter-American 
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Court of Human Rights, and they met with and lobbied politicians at the local, national, and 
international levels. In addition, they sought and gained the support of international human rights 
organizations such as the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the 
International Center for Transitional Justice. In summary, the 2003 incarnation of Peru’s victims’ 
rights organizations is strong in all three of O’Dwyer’s criteria for organizational robustness, and 
it also had actors engaged in most, if not all, of the civil society categories and action strategies 
listed in van der Merwe and Schklone’s typology. As a result, I rated the strength of Peru’s 
victims’ organizations in 2003 as a 5. 
The 2011 version of Peru’s human rights efforts was similarly dense and coordinated; the 
core victims’ rights groups still existed and cooperated under the aegis of the National 
Coordinator for Human Rights, but the extent to which these groups were engaged in pro-
reparations political action had lessened. Although victims were now more independent than in 
2003, since they had had time to learn the political lobbying strategies they needed in order to 
make resonant claims on their own and without as much help from non-victim allies, they were 
no longer as focused on pressuring the government for reparations as they had been in 2003. 
Consequently, I scored the strength of Peru’s victims’ rights movement in 2011 as a 4. 
I was careful not to conflate movement success with movement strength. The score for 
movement strength was based on density, coordination, and political engagement—or, to put it 
another way, on numbers, goals, unity, and lobbying activity—not on whether or not reparations 
were paid. Although all cases that I scored with a 5 did result in both reparations promises and 
payments, the Azerbaijani effort to get reparations payments for Azeris who were harmed during 
the communist government’s Black January crackdown on anti-Armenian and anti-government 
protesters (score of 4) was able to get only a reparations promise, not a reparations payment.  
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Because my theory is not deterministic, but rather probabilistic, there are also cases 
where reparations were promised and paid to victims who lacked any sort of organizational 
cohesion or power. Postwar Denmark provides an example of this. Most of Denmark’s 6,000 
Jewish citizens survived WWII,20 but even though Denmark had one of the highest Jewish 
survival rates of any German-occupied country, Jewish Danes were a negligible minority in 
Denmark. Furthermore, I could find no evidence that Danish Holocaust survivors had even 
managed to return to Denmark, much less gotten organized to demand reparations payments, by 
the time the Danish government promised and paid reparations to its (former) Jewish citizens in 
1945. However, Danish resistance fighters were present and respected in Danish society, and 
their pro-reparations efforts helped lead to reparations for other victims. In the same way, 
relatives of German euthanasia victims, who were promised reparations in 1988, were not 
organized or numerous enough to force the West German government to pay reparations. Other 
groups of Holocaust survivors were large and influential, though, and, eventually, the efforts of 
these other groups, combined with the government’s reluctance to be seen privileging one group 
of victims over another, caused the West German government to pay reparations to the 
politically negligible group of euthanasia victims’ relatives. As a result, I created a variable to 
account for the presence of another strong victim group lobbying for reparations. 
 Other variables I created for my analysis include whether the case was a post-conflict 
case or a post-dictatorship case,21 whether the victim group was an ethnic minority, the number 
                                                        
20 The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum estimates that only 120 of them were killed 
during the war, either while escaping Denmark or while imprisoned in the Theresienstadt 
concentration camp (2017). 
 
21 Multiple interviewees expressed certainty that whether a case was a post-conflict case would 
affect the likelihood of victims receiving reparations promises and payments (Pre-Dissertation 
Interviews 2014). Obviously, some cases are both post-conflict and post-dictatorship cases; I 
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of years since the abuses occurred (for the reparations promises model), and the number of years 
since the promise occurred (for the reparations payments model).22 
 I also include a regional dummy,23 measures of GDP growth,24 GDP per capita,25 imports 
and exports,26 population size,27 the country’s Polity score,28 whether there was a democratic 
transition or breakdown (or no regime change) in a given year,29 the number of years a 
                                                        
coded these cases as post-conflict cases. This is because my interviewees expected the post-
conflict/post-dictatorship distinction to matter because states emerging from conflicts have more 
areas in need of government resources than states emerging from dictatorships do. For example, 
post-conflict states need to rebuild infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict; post-
dictatorship states do not. Thus, my interviewees expected post-conflict states to be less likely to 
pay reparations due to strain on federal funds that is not present in post-dictatorship cases. 
 
22 These variables are squared in the model, because I expect a curvilinear relationship to exist. 
 
23 A measure of politico-geographic region from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset 
(Teorell et al. 2018) (hereafter QOG) as used in the V-Dem dataset (2016) (e_regionpol). 
 
24 As measured by the World Bank’s indicator for “annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency” (Quality of Government Standard Dataset 2018, 
657). This variable is lagged because political processes move slowly, and politicians will not 
have access to the current year’s GDP growth rate when they are drafting the relevant reparations 
laws; instead, they will be examining the previous year’s statistics.  
 
25 The natural log of the GDP per capita (e_migdpppcln) (V-Dem 2016). 
 
26 The sum of the Correlates of War Project’s measures of imports and exports (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010). 
 
27 A numerical measure of the size of the population; I used the log of the pwt_pop variable from 
the QOG Dataset (Teorell et al. 2018), which was sourced from Feenstra et al. 2015. 
 
28 From the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2016); e_polity2 in the V-Dem Codebook, 
which is “a modified version of the Polity variable added in order to facilitate the use of the 
Polity regime measure in time-series analyses” (356, 2016). 
 




government has left in its current electoral term,30 the existence of an independent judiciary,31 
whether the country has independent sub-federal units,32 how corrupt the media is,33 and 
measures of both cultural diversity34 and ethnic fractionalization.35 These independent variables 
are drawn from established datasets, such as the Quality of Governance dataset, the V-Dem 
Dataset, the World Governance Indicators, and Polity IV. I would have liked to include a 
measure of Foreign Direct Investment, but the availability and coverage of the data would 
severely limit the temporal and geographical scope of my analysis to the extent that any findings 
would likely be artifacts of the dataset. I also would have liked to include measures of the 
severity of the abuses committed, the amount of reparations paid, and the extent to which victims 
possess a collective identity, but the data for these variables simply does not exist. 
 I use a Cox proportional hazard model to test my hypotheses about governments’ 
reparations promises, because the structure of my data and my hypothesis make this the most 
appropriate model for my analysis. This type of duration model analyzes the length of time it 
takes until a particular event happens, and once the event occurs, that case drops out of the 
                                                        
30 dpi_yct in the QOG dataset (Teorell et al. 2018). 
 
31 As measured by h_j in the QOG dataset (Teorell et al. 2018). 
 
32 A dummy variable from the QOG dataset, sourced from Henisz (2002), coded 1 “if there are 
independent sub-federal units (states, provinces, regions etc.) that impose substantive constraints 
on national fiscal policy” (Teorell et al. 343, 2018). 
 
33 From the V-Dem Dataset, responses to the question “Do journalists, publishers, or 
broadcasters accept payments in response for altering news coverage?” (variable name 
v2mecorrpt) (Pemstein et al. 2015). 
 
34 Fearon’s measure (2003) that measures “the structural distance between languages spoken by 
different groups in a country” (Teorell et al. 2018 p. 280). 
 
35 Taken from Alesina et al. 2003, this indicator measures ethnicity via racial and linguistic 
elements (Teorell et al. 2018, 68). 
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analysis. In my promise and payment models, these events are the year the reparations promise is 
made and the year the reparations payment is made, respectively. The temporal coverage of my 
independent variables reduces the number of cases in my analysis, but there are still 60 cases in 
the promise model and 61 in the payments model. Results are expressed in terms of hazard 
ratios, not coefficients, and are interpreted relative to a baseline of one. A hazard ratio below one 
means that the variable in question reduces the likelihood of the event’s occurrence, a hazard 
ratio above one means that variable makes the event more likely to happen, and a hazard ratio of 
1 means that the variable in question does not have any effect on the likelihood that the event 












Strength of Victims’ Organizations 
(5-yr avg) (strong is 3 or above) 
 
  45.1** 81.8 .035 
Democracy (Polity Score) 
 
  1.54** .326 .041 
Interaction (Strength x Democracy) 
 
.714 .153 .115 
Political Region 
 
.631 .183 .112 
Ethnic Minority 
 
924 .337 .828 
GDP Growth (lagged one year) 
 
  .917** .039 .043 
GDP Per Capita (logged) 
 
6.72 9.23 .168 
Imports and Exports (logged) 
 
  .230** .130 .009 
Post-Dictatorship 
 
.916 .515 .876 
Democratic Transition Year 
 
.296 .234 .124 
Time Since Abuse 
 
.997 .057 .953 
Time Since Abuse ^ 2 
 
1.00 .001 .964 
Population (logged) 
 
  4.15** 2.27 .009 
Years Left in Current Term 
 
  1.65** .332 .013 
Judicial Independence 
 
1.44 .979 .588 
Independent Sub-Federal Units 
 
   38.4** 46.2 .002 
Cultural Diversity 
 
   338** 899 .028 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
   .001** .001 .001 
Non-Corrupt Media 
 
1.93 .959 .184 
Other Strong Victim Group 
Present 
  .564** .144 .025 
p < .1 = * 
N: 320 
No. of subjects: 60 
No. of failures: 27 
p < .05 = ** 
Wald Chi2(20) = 233.26 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 











The results of the reparations promise hazard model are presented in Table 1. The most 
important result is that the core element of my theory, victim group strength, has a statistically 
significant, positive effect on the likelihood that governments will pay reparations. These results 
confirm the first part of Hypothesis 1, which was that governments are more likely to promise 
reparations when they are subjected to pressure from strong victims’ rights groups. Victim group 
strength also has a substantively meaningful effect on reparations promises: Moving from the 
‘low’ victim strength category to the ‘high’ victim strength category makes it 45.1 times more 
likely that the government will promise reparations. This is one of the most substantively 
meaningful results of the promises model, and the effects can be examined more closely in 
Figure 3, which shows the likelihood of receiving a reparations promise in a given year based on 
the level of victim strength. 






Interestingly, the economic variables included in the model either reduce the likelihood 
of a reparations promise or fail to meet statistical significance. The likelihood of a reparations 
promise decreases GDP growth and imports and exports increase, which means that economic 
growth and high trade flows do not make governments more likely to promise reparations; quite 
the opposite. GDP per capita fails to reach statistical significance, meaning that countries with 
strong economic performance on this indicator are not more (or less) likely to pay reparations 
than economically weak countries (as measured by GDP per capita). Given the emphasis that is 
usually placed on financial concerns when it comes to reparations, these findings are worth 
noting. These results indicate that instead of trying to understand governments’ reparations 
decisions by focusing solely on a country’s finances, we ought to direct our attention to victims 
and their allies, because social forces are likely to have greater explanatory power. 
The primacy of victims’ organizations over financial considerations is corroborated by 
my qualitative work. Regardless of the country I was in or the reparations case I was examining, 
interviewees pointed again and again to the importance of victims’ organizations in the fight for 
reparations. Financial considerations, however, were rarely mentioned, and when they were, they 
were often explicitly discounted as a meaningful factor in reparations outcomes. For example, in 
my interview with Francisco Soberón, the founder of the Association for Human Rights 
(APRODEH), which is one of Peru’s leading human rights organizations, and the former head of 
the National Coordinator of Human Rights (CNDDHH), an influential umbrella organization that 
serves to coordinate the lobbying and advocacy efforts of Peruvian human rights groups, he said 
that Peru’s political parties had not supported the idea of reparations, but that reparations 
materialized due to “the force of the NGOs and victims’ organizations, with the help of some of 
the media and particular journalists who reported on these issues” (2017).  
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Then, when I interviewed Salomón Lerner Febres, the former head of the Peruvian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, he said that Germany had offered substantial financial 
assistance to the Peruvian government in order to help Peru with its reparations program (2017). 
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission asked the President of Peru, Alejandro 
Toledo, to accept the offer, but, despite the fact that German officials offered this aid more than 
once, Toledo declined (2017). In light of these findings, it is difficult to discount the influence of 
victims’ groups on reparations outcomes or to argue that finances are a meaningful roadblock to 
implementing a reparations program. Finance ministers might beg to differ, but interviewees 
across multiple cases noted that, regardless of the state of a country’s finances, there were always 
politicians who objected to reparations (chief among these being whoever was finance minister 
at the time), and yet, when reparations were implemented, the government found ways to pay 
(Goschler 2016; Brumlik 2016; Lillteicher 2016; Reynoso 2017). Indeed, in Peru, the Toledo 
government paid reparations without even altering the pre-approved budget, as they simply 
relabeled pre-existing development projects as ‘reparations’ (Macher 2017; Reynoso 2017). 
The results of the promises model also support Hypothesis 2, which predicted that 
reparations promises would be more likely in democratic countries. The hazard ratio for 
democracy is 1.54, indicating that a government in a country with a Polity score of, say, 6, is 
1.54 times likelier to promise reparations than a government in a country with a Polity score of 5. 
This result is also statistically significant. The result of the interaction term between democracy 
and victim strength, which was included to test the idea that the influence of victim strength on 
governmental reparations promises matters based on the context in which victims are advocating 
for reparations, was statistically insignificant. The effect of various levels of democracy on the 
likelihood of a reparations promise can be seen in Figure 4. 
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FIGURE 4: LIKELIHOOD OF A REPARATIONS PROMISE BY POLITY SCORE 
 
Other variables in the promises model that reach statistical significance include the 
population control variable, which could indicate that an increased capacity to mobilize aids in 
forcing reparations, and five other variables that also merit discussion: the number of years left in 
a government’s term, independent sub-federal units, cultural diversity, ethnic fractionalization, 
and the presence of another strong victim group. The number of years left in a government’s 
term has a hazard ratio above one. This indicates that although some governments do promise 
reparations late in their term—a quick look at the data shows that one eighth of reparations 
promises in the dataset occur in an election year, and another seventh occur the year before an 
election year—promises are more likely to occur early on in the electoral cycle. This could be 
because politicians were elected on campaigns that supported transitional justice and want to be 
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seen fulfilling those promises, it could be because politicians want to give a disgruntled wider 
populace time to forget that reparations were promised, or it could be due to both factors.36 
The presence of independent sub-federal units that have substantive influence over 
federal fiscal policy also affects the likelihood of a federal reparations promise, as a reparations 
promises is 38.4 more likely to occur in a context where such sub-federal units exist than in a 
context without sub-federal entities with fiscal power. Finding that independent sub-federal units 
increases the likelihood of reparations promises goes hand in hand with the results of my 
qualitative work. In both Germany and Peru, I heard over and over that subnational governments 
were more responsive to victims, that activists found it easier to work with subnational 
governments than the federal government, and that victims were better able to mobilize and 
lobby locally than nationally. My respondents also discussed how subnational entities can act as 
training grounds for both reparations activists and for government bureaucrats tasked with 
establishing and implementing reparations programs. When given the chance to engage with 
fiscally powerful subnational governments, survivors can learn how to engage in politics in an 
arena that is more likely to be responsive to them, which then allows them to lobby more 
effectively at a national level. In turn, bureaucrats and policymakers can test and observe smaller 
reparations programs and adapt the functional elements to fit the national context. (Poppe 2016; 
Reynoso 2017) 
Fiscally influential subnational entities may begin to help the pro-reparations effort by 
lobbying for a national reparations program, too. Although such actions are presumably 
motivated by self-interest rather than sympathy for survivors, the effect remains positive for 
victims seeking redress at a federal level. Subnational entities might also propel federal 
                                                        
36 This would be a good topic for future research. 
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reparations efforts forward by implementing such disparate reparations policies that victims 
lobby the federal government even more intensely for reparations in order to even out these 
disparities. These dynamics were on full display as West Germany struggled to decide how to set 
up its reparations program. Initially, each individual Land was responsible for its own 
reparations payments, which meant that, depending on the Land in which an individual lived 
before the war, survivors who suffered the exact same abuses could end up receiving 
dramatically different reparations payments (Gumbel 1951). This led to vocal complaints from 
survivors, and the West German government, aware of the consequences of shirking on 
reparations, decided it had no choice but to draft a federal reparations law (Gumbel 1950; “A: 
Rückerstattung” 1951, 264-265). 
As for ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity, the more ethnically divided a state 
is, the less likely it is that the government will promise reparations. This makes sense in light of 
the theory that reparations promises occur as a result of social mobilization, because the more 
fragmented a society is, the less likely it is that victims will be able to organize into large enough 
groups to attract sympathy across a wide range of distinct population segments and form a bloc 
large enough to threaten the government with meaningful electoral, reputational, and/or 
economic costs. However, cultural diversity is positively associated with an increased likelihood 
of reparations payments. Perhaps this is because in linguistically and ethnically divided societies, 
politicians must cater to more targeted groups, because politicians can get away with pushing 
through measures that they do not think will be publicized in a way the full population can 
comprehend, or because there is not one overwhelmingly large, homogenous majority group to 
repress and block the reparations efforts of smaller groups.37  
                                                        
37 Another topic for future research. 
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Interestingly, the presence of another strong victim group reduces the likelihood of a 
reparations promise. This runs counter to what I expected, as many groups of Holocaust 
survivors acquired reparations only because Jewish individuals and organizations lobbied so 
successfully for reparations, and the German government found it increasingly difficult to justify 
not having paid reparations to other groups, too. Still, there are possible explanations for this. It 
may be that governments are less likely to promise reparations to any victim group if there are 
multiple victim groups lobbying for reparations precisely because politicians are concerned that 
what happened in the German case will happen to them, and paying one victim group will spiral 
into having to pay every other victim group, too. It is also possible that one victim group may 
validate its own claims by casting another victim group as unworthy, therefore decreasing the 
likelihood that the second group will receive anything. This second approach was common in 
postwar West Germany, as political victims of Nazism who were not communists tried to protect 
their own chances of getting reparations by distancing themselves from political victims who 
were communists (Böhm 1952).  
Finally, it is worth noting that the judicial independence variable fails to reach statistical 
significance. Although previous literature has confirmed that a country’s legal structure and level 
of judicial independence have meaningful effects on transitional justice paths and outcomes, the 
results of this model indicate that, when it comes to reparations promises, the legal context is not 
of paramount importance. This does not mean that it is unimportant, as judicial decisions can and 
do open up the political opportunity structure that permits activists to mobilize in the first place 
(Chile is an excellent example of this). Instead, the takeaway from this non-finding is that the 
central actors in this story are victim groups, which can be empowered by courts and legal 
structures, not courts and legal structures on their own. 
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The fact that the geopolitical region variable fails to meet statistical significance is also 
worth examining, because this gives some initial evidence against the hypothesis that reparations 
are subject to diffusion and learning effects. However, learning and diffusion effects are not 
easily tested via a regression model, and so, despite this result, it is best to remain agnostic about 
whether (and how) learning and diffusion effects influence reparations promises. 
I also ran alternative model specifications that included the number of other transitional 
justice mechanisms and/or other types of transitional justice mechanisms, including truth and 
reconciliation commissions, amnesties, and trials, as well as instances where the United Nations 
promised funding for reparations (see Appendix Tables 9 and 10). These variables also failed to 
reach statistical significance. Outliers do not seem to be skewing the results, either. 
b. Payments 
 
The results of the payment equation add an interesting twist to the story. In this model, 
the key indicators failed to reach statistical significance when high victim strength was coded to 
include all five-year averages that were greater than 3 (see Appendix Table 8). However, with 
the stricter victim strength variable in which only the cases where the five-year average was 
scored at a 4 or above (on a 5-point scale), victim strength had a substantively meaningful and 
statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of reparations payments. Specifically, 
moving from the ‘low’ strength category to the ‘high’ strength category makes reparations 
payments 74.7 times more likely. This hints that governments will need to be subjected to higher 
levels of pro-reparations pressure in order to force reparations payments than to make reparations 
promises. It is one thing to verbally or legally promise to pay substantial sums of money to 
underprivileged groups; it is quite another to set up a functional reparations program and lock the 
current government and future governments into paying reparations for years to come.  
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As far as regime type goes, the interaction term between victim group strength and 
democracy was statistically significant and the hazard ratio was smaller than one, and the 
democracy indicator failed to reach statistical significance at all. This means that, unlike 
reparations promises, the effect of victim group strength on the likelihood of reparations 
payments is, in fact, somewhat conditional upon regime type. In contrast to reparations promises, 
which are more likely to occur when victim groups are strong regardless of regime type, 
reparations payments are less likely to occur as victim group strength increases in democratic 
contexts. In non-democratic contexts, however, increased victim group strength raises the 
likelihood of a reparations payment.  
This may be partly because authoritarian regimes are more likely to respond to strong 
victims’ rights groups with repression rather than acquiescence, but if victims’ groups manage to 
persist, autocrats may decide to avoid any further negative publicity and extended social unrest 
by paying the reparations and moving the issue out of the public’s view. It is important to note 
that only the cases in which reparations were promised in the first place made it into the 
payments model, and so undemocratic governments that were willing to promise reparations in 
the first place are more likely to be receptive to social pressures and to the idea of reparations 
than the governments of countries where reparations were never promised to begin with. 
Similarly, democratic governments will likely need less prompting to pay reparations than 
autocratic governments. This unusual result could simply be an indication that democratic 
governments are disbursing reparations at lower levels of victim strength, so victim groups in 
democratic societies are able to get to high levels of victim strength only in cases where the 
government is firmly adamant against paying. 
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Thus, the second halves of Hypotheses 1 and 2 are, in a sense, confirmed, but only when 
these hypotheses are combined. These results can be summarized as follows: Democratic 
governments are more likely to pay reparations when strong victim groups demand reparations, 
non-democratic governments are less likely to pay reparations when strong victim groups 
demand reparations, and regime type on its own has no statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of reparations payments.  
FIGURE 5: LIKELIHOOD OF A REPARATIONS PAYMENT BY VICTIM STRENGTH 








FIGURE 6: LIKELIHOOD OF A REPARATIONS PAYMENT BY VICTIM STRENGTH  
 
There are five other statistically significant results in the model worth discussing, with 
the first two being related to the time that has elapsed since the reparations promise. The time 
since promise variable indicates that reparations payments are 1.61 times as likely to occur with 
every year that passes after a promise, but the squared version of this variable shows that at a 
certain point, reparations payments become less and less likely as time goes on. Next, as in the 
promises equation, the longer that governments have remaining in their current term, the more 
likely they are to pay reparations. I discussed possible explanations for this result in the promises 
section above. 
Finally, two variables that were not statistically significant in the promises equation are 
significant in the payments equation: both judicial independence and reduced media corruption 
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make reparations payments more likely. Substantively, neither of these variables has as much of 
an effect on the likelihood of reparations payments as high victim strength, but the fact that they 
are positively associated with the likelihood of a reparations payment points to the role of the 
institutional environment in forcing governments to fulfill their promises. The judiciary and the 
media are often seen as independent watchdogs and human rights defenders, and these results 
support that perception. Judicial and media attention/support can make it easier for victims to 
threaten governments with reputational, electoral, and economic costs for failing to pay 
reparations, and, if the judiciary and the media are independent and able to report and publish 
freely, they are more likely to be able to play this role.  
The statistical insignificance for the political region variable indicates a lack of support 
for the idea that diffusion and learning effects influence reparations payments decisions, but 
again, because diffusion and learning effects are not easily measured in a regression model of 
this nature, and also because a regional dummy is not an ideal proxy for diffusion and learning 
effects, I do not want to make assumptions about the presence or absence of diffusion and 
learning effects on reparations choices; this is something that will need to be addressed in future 
research. An alternative model specification that included other transitional justice mechanisms 
also failed to yield statistically significant results for those variables, and outliers do not seem to 














Strength of Victims’ Organizations  
(5-yr avg) (strong is 4 or above) 
 
   74.7** 160 .044 
Democracy (Polity Score) 
 
.861 .089 .148 
Interaction (Strength x Democracy) 
 
 .815* .095 .081 
Political Region 
 
  1.13 .432 .742 
Ethnic Minority 
 
1.34 .892 .655 
GDP Growth (lagged one year) 
 
.965 .046 .462 
GDP Per Capita (logged) 
 
3.92 4.81 .265 
Imports and Exports (logged) 
 
.562 .414 .434 
Post-Dictatorship 
 
1.09 .644 .888 
Democratic Transition Year 
 
2.82 2.30 .204 
Time Since Promise 
 
     1.61*** .137 .000 
Time Since Promise ^ 2 
 
    .991*** .001 .000 
Population (logged) 
 
2.52 1.62 .152 
Years Left in Current Term 
 
  1.75** .318 .002 
Judicial Independence 
 
  8.93** 7.61 .010 
Independent Sub-Federal Units 
 
1.80 2.24 .636 
Cultural Diversity 
 
8.01 18.1 .352 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
1.53 6.63 .922 
Non-Corrupt Media 
 
  2.43** .822 .009 
Other Strong Victim Group Present 
 
.320 .233 .117 
p < .1 = * 
N: 342 
No. of Subjects: 61 
No. of Failures: 29 
p < .05 = ** 
Wald Chi2 (20) = 497.55 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
 











Table 3 offers a quick comparison of the promise and payment models, showing yet 
again that victim organization strength is of paramount importance, whereas economic indicators 
either fail to increase the likelihood of reparations promises or reparations payments or, in the 
case of the effects of GDP growth and higher levels of imports and exports on the likelihood of 




TABLE 3: PROMISE AND PAYMENT COEFFICIENTS (HAZARD RATIOS) 
 Promise Payment  
Strength of Victims’ Organizations  
(5-yr avg) (strong is ≥ 3 for promises; ≥ 4 for payments) 
 
  45.1**    74.7** 
Democracy (Polity Score) 
 
  1.54** .861 
Interaction (Strength x Democracy) 
 







GDP Growth (lagged one year) 
 
  .917** .965 
GDP Per Capita (logged) 
 
6.72 3.92 
Imports and Exports (logged) 
 




Democratic Transition Year 
 
.296 2.82 
Time Since Promise 
 
.997 -- 
Time Since Promise ^ 2 
 
1.00 -- 
Time Since Promise 
 
--  1.61*** 
Time Since Promise ^ 2 
 
-- .991***     
Population (logged) 
 
  4.15** 2.52 
Years Left in Current Term 
 
  1.65**   1.75** 
Judicial Independence 
 
1.44   8.93** 
Independent Sub-Federal Units 
 
  38.4** 1.80 
Cultural Diversity 
 
   338** 8.01 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
  .001** 1.53 
Non-Corrupt Media 
 
1.93   2.43** 
Other Strong Victim Group Present 
 




No. of Subjects 
 
60 61 
No. of Failures 
 
27 29 
Wald Chi2 233 
(df = 20) 
497 
(df = 20) 
Prob > Chi2 
 
0.00 .000 






BIC 216 231 





 This article breaks new ground by demonstrating the central role of victims’ groups in 
determining whether governments decide to promise and pay reparations. By developing a novel 
coding scheme to operationalize the strength of victims’ groups, I am able to use statistical 
analysis to test the explanatory power of this variable for the first time. The results of the 
analysis confirm my central hypothesis: When victims’ groups organize and vocally demand 
reparations, governments are much more likely to both promise and pay reparations.  
This is not to say that strong victims’ groups are either a necessary or sufficient condition 
for acquiring reparations promises and payments, but rather that they are an important 
contributing factor whose explanatory power and theoretical centrality has not received due 
attention in the literature. Although victim groups are often lauded for their contributions to 
overcoming a culture of impunity after human rights abuses and their work in pursuing truth, 
justice, and reconciliation, scholarly work rarely focuses on victim groups’ campaigns for and 
involvement in forcing governments to promise and pay reparations. Work specifically on 
reparations, in turn, is often focused on the letter of a given reparations law and its legal 
ramifications rather than on the social context that shapes these laws. Consequently, the impact 
that victim groups have on reparations in particular, rather than on political culture as a whole, is 
often overlooked. Clearly, there is both room and need for more work on what prompts 
politicians to draft, pass, and enforce these laws in the first place. This chapter shows that an 
analysis of victims’ groups and their influence on reparations policy should be a primary 
consideration in such research.  
 The other meaningful and novel finding from my statistical analysis is a refutation of the 
conventional wisdom that reparations are purely a financial matter. This finding is both 
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academically interesting and has important practical implications. If reparations promises and 
payments do not depend on a country’s GDP growth, GDP per capita, or trade flows, then 
perceiving reparations as just a matter of national wealth, where rich countries pay and poor 
countries do not, is not only erroneous, but also harmful. A quick example shows why: excusing 
El Salvador’s 24-year delay in paying reparations to victims of its Civil War by saying the 
country is simply too poor to pay ignores the fact that El Salvador’s similarly impoverished 
neighbor, Guatemala, paid millions of dollars in reparations to victims of the Guatemalan Civil 
War a mere nine years after the war ended, and excuses the El Salvadoran government for 
refusing to uphold its obligations to its citizens.38  
Financial constraints undoubtedly play a role in reparations decisions. A few examples 
make this clear: The finance ministries in the countries I studied in-depth consistently pushed 
governments to reduce the amount of money allocated to paying reparations, cash-strapped 
governments might decide to offer reparations in the form of something that does not require a 
sizable monetary commitment (free public transportation, for instance), or governments will 
enact strict reparations eligibility standards to severely limit the number of applicants. However, 
my models show that limited finances cannot account for the incidence of reparations promises 
or reparations payments, and my qualitative work indicates that economics is not a driving 
explanatory factor. Thus, reparations should not be seen as an option for rich states only, but 




                                                        
38 The fact that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has loaned money to El Salvador cannot 
account for the difference between Guatemala and El Salvador’s reparations outcomes, because 
both countries have been subject to IMF observation and, intermittently, IMF conditionality 





 This chapter greatly bolsters my theory that reparations promises and payments are, in 
large part, driven by the strength of victim groups, not by financial considerations. These 
findings constitute an important contribution to the literatures on transitional justice, 
democratization, and social movements, which have largely overlooked reparations, and they 
also serve to further tie these three disparate bodies of literature together. Furthermore, not only 
do these findings contradict the common assumption that reparations decisions are the result of a 
government’s rational financial considerations, but they also affirm the importance of viewing 
victims as active agents in their own stories rather than as passive observers who are too 
traumatized to understand their own situation and acquire what they need from the government.  
By using social movement theory to analyze reparations promises and payments, I enrich 
both the transitional justice literature and the social movement literature. When reparations 
promises and payments are viewed as the results of victims’ ability to mobilize resources, take 
advantage of the political opportunity structure, and frame their reparations claims, the variation 
in governments’ reparations promises and payments becomes much clearer. Through social 
movement theory, we can identify the factors that shape victim group strength, explain 
reparations outcomes, and start demystifying a commonly used but poorly understood 
transitional justice mechanism. Furthermore, applying social movement theory to a new set of 
cases and contexts shows the value of extending this theoretical framework to transitional justice 
settings and to reparations in particular. As a result, this work represents an important step 
forward in understanding reparations dynamics, explaining the variation in governments’ 
reparations promise and payment decisions, and acknowledging the fundamental role that 
victims play in serving as their own best advocates.  
 
 95 
The explanatory power of victims’ groups has implications for the whole field of 
transitional justice, not just reparations; my findings should encourage transitional justice 
scholars and practitioners to prioritize studying the victims themselves, not a country’s financial 
situation. While it is true that governments have limited resources, my results indicate that when 
governments say the government simply cannot afford to pay reparations, they are offering an 
excuse, not a legitimate reason. Thus, when it comes to understanding why some governments 
decide to promise and/or pay reparations when others do not, perhaps the best explanation is 















By the end of 2015, the German federal (Bund) and state (Länder) governments had paid 
approximately $82.3 billion dollars39 in reparations for the atrocities committed by the Nazis. 
While the magnitude of this sum might be surprising to contemporary readers, the fact that the 
German government paid reparations to its victims – many of whom were German citizens – is 
not. The belief that states should compensate victims of government-sponsored human rights 
abuses has become so entrenched that international consternation arises not when sovereign 
nations decide to admit past wrongdoings and pay reparations to their own citizens, but rather 
when sovereign nations fail to fulfill this international norm. At the end of WWII, however, no 
one was sure that Germany would either promise or pay reparations to its victims. This was not 
due to any particular German recalcitrance, but rather to the fact that no state had ever before 
compensated its own citizens for atrocities committed by a government of that self-same state.  
Germany’s reparations payments may seem to have been inevitable in hindsight, given 
the international outrage sparked by the scale and brutality of the Nazis’ crimes, the Allies’ 
postwar occupation of Germany, and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s repeated 
assertion that providing assistance to people harmed by the Nazis was a “debt of honor” 
(Grossmann 1964). However, a closer look at the situation shows that it was far from certain that 
                                                        
39 72.8 billion Euros (Auswärtiges Amt 2016).  
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the West German government would pay Holocaust victims anything at all, particularly at the 
federal level. Indeed, even beyond the issue that no other abusive state had ever paid reparations 
to its own citizens, there were multiple reasons for West Germany to avoid paying reparations.  
For one, the number of victims was staggering, and the economy was in dire straits: how 
could West Germany afford to pay even token amounts of reparations without bankrupting the 
country? Furthermore, it would be incredibly difficult to draft and pass a piece of legislation that 
placed a monetary value on the individual sufferings of a highly diverse group of people, that 
defined precisely which of the Nazis’ myriad abuses would qualify victims for compensation, 
and that was palatable to both German Nazi victims and to Germans who had not been 
persecuted. Additionally, by giving some of the state’s limited financial resources to the least-
loved groups in society, politicians could be risking their careers and, potentially, the stability of 
their new democracy. Finally, while paying reparations would signal a break with the Nazi 
government’s worldview, it could also be interpreted to mean that the West German government 
was Hitler’s successor. This was an unpleasant, and potentially unacceptable, prospect for a state 
locked in a Cold War struggle to be the “Good Germany.” 
In light of these considerations, why was postwar West Germany the first state ever to 
pay reparations to its own citizens for human rights abuses? This chapter helps to answer that 
question by examining the dynamics that led the West German government to pass the first four 
federal laws mandating compensation for Nazi victims: the 1951 Compensation Law for Public 
Servants (BWGöD), the 1953 Federal Supplementary Law (BErG), the 1956 Federal 
Indemnification Law (BEG), and the 1965 Final Federal Compensation Law (BEG-Final Law). 
These early laws did not guarantee compensation to all Nazi victims, however. Some 
groups, such as the Social Democrats, did receive the reparations they had been promised. 
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Another group of persecuted individuals, Roma and Sinti, qualified for reparations under the 
letter of the law, but in practice their claims were often denied. Still other victim groups, 
including people who were forcibly sterilized or who were persecuted due to their sexual 
orientation, were judged to have suffered in ways that did not constitute a “typical national 
socialist injustice” and were therefore ineligible for reparations, at least at the time.  
This variation across victim groups in terms of the reparations promises and reparations 
payments made by the West German government provides an excellent set of cases on which to 
test my theory as to why states promise and pay reparations to their own citizens after having 
committed human rights abuses. By examining different victim groups that suffered the same 
abuses at the hands of the same government and yet received different promises and payments, I 
am better able to parse what factors led to each group’s distinct reparations outcomes. This 
chapter focuses on the largest victim group, Jews, who were both promised and paid reparations, 
and the next chapter follows Roma and Sinti, many of whom were wrongfully denied reparations 
until 1965, and who did not receive attention in the reparations debate until the 1980s, despite the 
fact that they were persecuted for – broadly speaking – the same reasons as Jews. 
This chapter marks a shift in the dissertation, as I move from developing my theory and 
identifying correlations to tracing and exploring the causal mechanisms that drive reparations 
promises and payments. Chapter 2 indicated that governments’ reparations decisions do not rely 
on economics as much as on the level of pro-reparations pressure exerted by victim groups, and 
Chapters 3-5 assess how well those results reflect reality. By tracking the development of West 
Germany’s federal reparations program with qualitative methods, I am able to open the black 
box of my regression models and assess not only if victim group strength is actually driving 
governments’ reparations decisions, but also how.  
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The German Jewish case study is the ideal place to begin this examination, because, 
despite the unique elements of this case, it allows me to examine how the precedent of domestic 
reparations payments was set. The strength of Jewish organizations also makes this case a 
valuable comparison case with that of German Roma (Chapter 4), a German minority group that 
was much less organized up until the 1980s. By first examining a successful reparations case 
where governments’ decisions were clearly driven by victim strength (Jewish Germans) and 
following it with an initially unsuccessful case in which an early lack of victims’ organizations 
resulted in severely delayed reparations (Romani Germans), I am able to track both how and why 
governments promise and pay reparations,   
Drawing on primary and secondary sources, as well as elite interviews, I use process 
tracing to show that although the first Holocaust reparations laws –which were passed at the 
subnational level– were the direct result of international forces in the form of the Allies’ 
occupation governments, subsequent payments were due mainly to the efforts of international 
Jewish organizations, which were staffed and guided mainly by direct and indirect victims, 
coupled with the support of their politically influential allies. Indeed, the reason that reparations 
laws moved from being a subnational consideration to a federal one is because of the concerted, 
sustained pressure that Jewish victims and their influential allies placed on the West German 
federal government. Thus, this chapter shows that the precedent-setting Jewish German case 
supports my theoretical expectation that governments decide to promise and pay reparations 
because of sustained, pro-reparations pressure from victims themselves. 
 International Jewish organizations spent years working with sympathetic politicians to 
keep reparations on the political agenda, convince politicians that there would be high 
reputational costs for not promising and paying reparations at the federal level, and make their 
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demands politically palatable. These efforts paid off, as victims and their allies were able to 
outwait West German society’s initially staunch opposition to reparations and persuade reluctant 
national-level politicians that reparations were an unavoidable necessity. Over the course of this 
chapter, I follow the trajectory of West German reparations promises and payments from 1943 
through 1956 to show how victims and their supporters combined to induce comparatively early 
reparations promises and payments for former and current Jewish German citizens.  
The support for this chapter is drawn from elite interviews, primary and secondary 
sources, and visits to four separate archives within Germany: The German Federal Archives in 
Koblenz, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Archive of Social Democracy in Bonn, the Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung’s Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy in Sankt Augustin, and the Secret 
State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation in Berlin. I conducted my interviews in 
Berlin, Frankfurt, and Lübeck between July and September 2016. Given the historical nature of 
this particular case, I mainly interviewed academics, but respondents also included eyewitnesses 
and members of advocacy and memorial organizations. Interviews were usually approximately 
an hour long, with the shortest lasting thirty minutes and the longest lasting two hours and fifteen 
minutes. All eleven interviews were conducted in German, my respondents’ native language. 
2. The Uniqueness of the West German Case 
 
Before I begin, it is important emphasize that the case of West German reparations to 
Jewish Germans after WWII is indeed unique. However, in order to create a wide-ranging theory 
about what motivates governments to promise and to pay reparations it is important to examine 
multiple, diverse cases. Furthermore, investigating the first case in which a state promised and 
paid reparations to its own citizens will allow me to identify how the practice of making 
reparations promises and payments has evolved –or not– over time. Ultimately, the insights 
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yielded from examining this case and the cases presented in subsequent chapters will help 
account for the wide global variation we see in reparations promises and payments, explain why 
governments would ever choose to make amends for their own wrongdoing in the form of 
financially costly payments to victimized sectors of society, demystify the dynamics of post-
conflict processes, and provide policymakers with concrete evidence and a theoretical foundation 
for their transitional justice recommendations. 
This case is unusual in other ways, as well. Most importantly for my theory, by the time 
Germany capitulated, the country’s prewar Jewish community was almost entirely gone, and the 
future of Germany’s Jews seemed tenuous at best. Germany’s Jewish population rates fluctuated 
even from month to month following the war40 as newly liberated Jews recovered enough to be 
released from hospitals, settled in German cities, decided to emigrate, or died, and most of the 
new arrivals were from Eastern European countries, not prewar German citizens (Goschler 2016; 
Meng 2011, 32; Sellenthin 1959, 100-1). Most German Jews who survived the Holocaust –and 
75% of Germany’s prewar Jewish population did survive– emigrated, and Jewish German 
citizens who did choose to remain in Germany after the war were often viewed as traitors to the 
Jewish community, which strained their relationship with Israel and international Jewish 
organizations (“36 Questions” 1997; Goschler 2016). Thus, although my theory predicts that 
victims themselves are the key element in motivating governments to pay reparations, in this 
instance most of the victims in question were no longer located within Germany—instead, they 
formed the membership and leadership of international Jewish organizations.  
                                                        
40 For example, Berlin’s Jewish population stood at 5,100 in April of 1945, and in November of 
that year, after the war’s end, it had grown to 7000 (Sellenthin 1959, 101). 
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Of the three men leading the World Jewish Congress during the pre- and early postwar 
years, one (Nahum Goldmann) grew up in Germany and fled the country in 1934 due to anti-
Semitism, while another (Aryeh Leon Kubovy, or Aryeh Leon Kubowitzki), was born in 
Lithuania and spent his early adulthood in Belgium, leaving only when the Nazis invaded. Most 
of the high-level members of the executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (now the Jewish 
Agency) had emigrated from Europe well before WWII, but many of them had family members 
who had not. Jews of European descent and Holocaust survivors were prominent members of 
other influential international Jewish organizations, as well, such as the renowned political 
theorist and director of the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc., Hannah Arendt, who left 
Germany when the Nazis came to power and then fled Europe altogether in 1941, and Paul 
Baerwald, a founder of the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee and honorary 
chairman of the organization from 1945 until 1961, who was born in Germany and lived there 
until he moved to London in 1890 at the age of 19 (Columbia University Libraries 2018). 
Although there were notable Jewish German reparations advocates who pressed for the cause 
from within Germany (Philipp Auerbach and Jakob Altmaier being prime examples), most 
Jewish victims –refugees, concentration camp survivors, relatives of people who did not survive, 
and so on– were agitating for reparations from abroad. 
Furthermore, unlike most of the other countries in my dataset, Germany’s human rights 
abuses were followed by years of foreign occupation and foreign rule. International forces, 
namely the Allied military governments in consultation with their home governments, created 
the first reparations laws. German historian and WWII reparations expert Constantin Goschler 
says that Allied control undeniably shaped the form of postwar reparations, although he points to 
multiple reparations initiatives started by non-Jewish German citizens, as well as the mostly 
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West German-run restitution process, as evidence that West Germany would have paid some sort 
of reparations even without Allied influence (2016). 
Although all historical events are unique, the precedent-setting nature of West German 
reparations payments and the magnitude of the horrors for which reparations had to be paid make 
this an undeniably distinct case. However, it is not so distinct as to be unable to provide insight 
into subsequent cases. The West German case does not buck my theory as much as a precedent-
setting case might be expected to, either. Even though West Germany’s subnational reparations 
were shaped by the efforts of foreign governments, federal reparations promises and payments 
were the direct result of a coalition between international Jewish organizations, whose leadership 
and membership included a large number of affected individuals and their relatives, and 
influential domestic advocates such as domestic victims’ groups and politicians who had 
themselves been persecuted by the Nazis. Although each genocide is unique, and the Holocaust 
in its totality presents an incomparable case, West Germany’s postwar reparations journey fits a 
pattern that can be instructive for other postwar and post-authoritarian societies, as we see 
victimized citizens (and ex-citizens) playing a central role in their country’s reparations story. 
3. Laying the Foundation for Reparations: 1943-1949 
 
a. Early Non-Jewish Efforts 
 
 Although reparations were still conceptualized as payments from one state to another in 
the 1940s, documents from the early 1940s show that non-victims were already discussing ideas 
about how to have the German government pay reparations to individuals. The United States 
government began debating reparations ideas in 1943, but it discarded the idea of having 
Germany pay reparations to the United States –the standard state to state reparations model that 
prevailed at the time– in favor of pursuing innovative government-to-individual reparations 
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policies that would bring about other economic and political desiderata. Under a reparations 
program that made demands that were by no means comprehensive, the United States could 
potentially ensure that individual Jewish Holocaust victims would receive reparations payments. 
Such a move, novel as it was, would be well-received by Jewish American voters and by the 
many Jewish organizations whose headquarters were based in the United States. Furthermore, it 
could also help to secure the stability, peace, democracy, and economic recovery of Europe, 
which would benefit the United States, too. (Goschler 1992, 52-8) 
The State Department’s desire to make government-to-individual reparations an 
important part of American postwar policy came to nothing, however, in part because of Henry 
Morgenthau, the United States Secretary of the Treasury from 1934-1945. Although Morgenthau 
was one of the Jewish American community’s few politically influential advocates, his position 
as Secretary of the Treasury led him to focus on West Germany’s economic status rather than its 
reparations obligations. Because Morgenthau feared that an economically strong West Germany 
would be a renewed threat to peace in Europe, he implemented measures to limit West 
Germany’s economic influence. These economic restraints made it impossible for West Germany 
to grow in the manner it needed to in order to acquire the funds for extensive reparations. The 
Morgenthau Plan, along with the complicated compromises that had to be made by the State 
Department, War Department, Treasury Department, and the President when creating a cohesive 
American approach to postwar West Germany, meant that reparations became a side issue of the 
postwar order, not a central theme. In the view of German historian and reparations expert 
Constantin Goschler, all of these decisions were motivated by political officials pursuing their 
respective departments’ interests in West Germany, not by political officials responding to 
victims’ organizations or interest groups. (Goschler 1992, 57-60) These American political 
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interests, in turn, dictated how the American High Commission designed reparations and 
restitution laws in the American Occupied Zone, which gave compensation and restored property 
to Holocaust victims, and these Zone laws had a long-lasting impact on the way West Germany 
designed its reparations laws once the occupation ended. 
Although Goschler says that interest groups were not playing an important role in 
influencing the Americans’ reparations plans at this stage, there were still plenty of non-
governmental reparations efforts. The main efforts were spearheaded by the two victim groups 
who were the most successful in receiving reparations promises and payments from the West 
German government: Social Democrats and Jews. German Social Democrats met together as 
early as December 2, 1944, to discuss the form that postwar reparations to individuals would 
take, as well as which victim groups would receive these reparations. Unsurprisingly, the Social 
Democrats’ main goals involved securing reparations for themselves. Consequently, they wanted 
to rehabilitate leftwing political organizations, ensure that political prisoners, exiles, and 
deportees, along with their families, would receive financial compensation for their suffering, 
and provide affected political victims with preferential employment, housing, and rehabilitative 
assistance. (Goschler 1992, 35) 
b. Early Jewish Efforts 
 Similarly, Jewish interest groups were mainly concerned with making sure that Jewish 
victims would be compensated once the war ended. Holocaust victims and their relatives were 
drafting their reparations demands even before WWII ended, and leading Jewish organizations 
got involved, too (Interview 22, 2016). International Jewish organizations, whose membership 
and leadership included a large number of European Jews whose hometowns and extended 
families had been destroyed by the Nazis, started their reparations efforts by finding out what 
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plans other groups were drafting. Nehemiah Robinson, a Lithuanian Jew who had fled the Nazis 
for America in 1940, who had been an involved member of the World Jewish Congress since 
1941, and who was the director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs from 1947 until his death in 
1964, surveyed the various reparations plans being suggested by different German opposition 
groups to see how Jewish interests aligned or diverged from these early reparations ideas 
(“Nehemiah Robinson” 1964). Even at this stage, when reparations to Holocaust victims were 
purely hypothetical, it was apparent to Robinson that a central theme in the German opposition 
party’s reparations plans was to keep the financial burden on Germany as low as possible. The 
hope was that, by keeping reparations payments to victims low, democratic postwar Germany 
would not crumble under the heavy weight of reparations payments the way the Weimar 
Republic had. Another common thread in the German plans was to create a distinction between 
the culpable Nazis and the rest of the German people, who were seen as being innocent of 
wrongdoing. (Goschler 1992, 37-8) 
 Jewish concerns lay elsewhere: while Jewish organizations did not want their reparations 
demands to ruin Germany financially, their primary objective was to secure reparations for the 
millions of Jewish victims and their surviving family members (Thonke 2004, 28). So, in 1944, 
the Jewish World Congress convened and drafted a resolution mandating reparations for Jews, 
and in October 1945, the Jewish World Congress, the Jewish Agency, and the American Jewish 
Conference created a committee whose sole aim was to press for reparations (Goschler 1992, 46, 
64). These organizational efforts were directed and supplemented by leading Jewish public 
figures, including three of particular importance (Goschler 1992, 64-65).  
The first of these was Chaim Weizmann, then the President of the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine and later the first President of Israel (1949-1952). Weizmann was a reparations 
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advocate from day one; in 1945, he wrote a letter to the American British, Soviet, and French 
governments outlining the Agency’s expectations for Jewish restitution and reparations and 
requesting that it be given an important role in overseeing and disbursing reparations payments 
to Jewish victims (Weizmann 1945). The second leading Jewish reparations advocate was 
Nahum Goldmann, who grew up in Germany but who, like Nehemiah Robinson, was forced to 
flee his country in 1934 in order to escape Nazi repression (“Nahum Goldmann” 1982). 
Goldmann helped to steer two of the main Jewish organizations working for Holocaust victims: 
He became the Chairman of the Jewish Agency’s Executive Committee in 1951, and he helped 
to found the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (or Claims Conference) 
that same year. The third and final notable Jewish leader I want to mention is Jacob Blaustein, a 
member of the American Jewish Committee who was independently wealthy and who had 
extensive political connections in Washington, up to and including the President (Goschler 1992, 
64-65). Although not a victim himself, he was a dedicated advocate for fellow Jews who had 
been persecuted by the Nazis. 
 The Jewish push for reparations benefited greatly from having these international 
organizations, a few well-connected individuals, and, eventually, the state of Israel behind it. 
Because international Jewish agencies –which were staffed and run in large part by European 
Jewish refugees and emigrants who, like Nehemiah Robinson and Nahum Goldmann, had lost 
their homes, livelihoods, and extended family members to the Nazis– had been planning a 
reparations strategy even before the war ended, they were able to immediately start pressuring 
key decision-makers for reparations and to present a cohesive set of demands as soon as 
hostilities ceased, right at the moment when the Allies were deciding how to establish the 
postwar order. Furthermore, these strategically-placed Jewish victims were well-educated, 
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oftentimes fluent in German, and, because many of them were lawyers, they were well-
acquainted with the German legal system, culture, and negotiating procedures, which prepared 
them well for postwar lobbying endeavors (Heuss 2016; Interview 22, 2016).  
In addition to the invaluable advocacy of these elite emigrant Jewish victims, Jewish 
survivors could count on the aid of financially stable, politically engaged religious kin in the 
United States and Israel. Many of these Jewish non-victims had extended families who had been 
murdered and/or displaced in the Holocaust and the war, and so they helped to organize and 
publicize the cause of reparations from abroad. Having a built-in group of already-mobilized 
Jewish victims and allies outside of Europe distinguished Jewish victims from most other victim 
groups, including Roma and Sinti, Poles, Slavs, resistance fighters, homosexuals,41 and people 
with disabilities, and it provided a distinct advantage in terms of requesting reparations. In the 
time period when Jewish survivors within Germany were focused on day-to-day survival rather 
than on demanding reparations, there were Jewish survivors living outside of Germany, along 
with dedicated Jewish allies (i.e. the Jewish community outside of war-torn Europe), who were 
already pressuring the Allies and the Germans for property restitution and various forms of 
compensation. It is unusual for a victim group to conduct its most effective pro-reparations 
lobbying from outside of the victims’ home state, but this peculiarity is due to the devastation 
within Europe and high rates of Jewish emigration from Europe from the 1930s to 1950s. These 
two factors made within-country organization exceedingly difficult and external organization 
relatively simple, and, as a result, the most influential victims in the Jewish reparations story the 
ones who had moved abroad.  
                                                        
41 Although this term is an outdated term used to refer to the LGBT+ community, I have decided 
to use it in this chapter for two reasons. First, it is the identifier under which individuals were 
persecuted, and second, it is the term used in German reparations legislation and documentation. 
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c. Making the Pitch for Individual Reparations to a Reluctant Public 
Another important piece of early Jewish mobilization was the quick—and 
groundbreaking—creation of a coherent, convincing trauma narrative about the Holocaust 
(Woolford and Wolejszo 2006). By framing WWII through the lens of Jewish suffering, it was 
easy for Jewish advocacy groups to make the case for why the West German government should 
pay reparations to Jews, even though this was not something that any state had ever done to help 
ameliorate the aftereffects of previous atrocities. Jewish innocence, German guilt, and the need 
to make good on a moral debt was a simple, convincing argument for reparations, and it has 
persisted and entrenched itself in Western historical memory in a way that no other victim 
group’s story has. This, too, was a resource in making reparations claims, both immediately after 
the war and in subsequent decades. (Woolford and Wolejszo 2006) 
The argument of a debt owed to innocent victims was not enough to persuade all German 
politicians of the necessity of reparations, but holdovers who were not swayed by morality could 
often be won over by money. Ironically, reparations advocates were able to use antisemitism to 
help their cause here. The pervasive, antisemitic myths that the United States government was 
controlled by a Jewish lobby and that Jews controlled the international finance system proved 
particularly useful (Heuss 2016). Although genuinely influential Jewish connections in 
Washington were few and far between in the 1950s, a large number of German politicians were 
still convinced that Jewish lobbyists were the most powerful lobbyists in Washington (Heuss 
2016). This gave rise to concerns that withholding reparations would cause Jewish lobbyists to 
persuade the American government to deny much-needed economic and military support to West 
Germany (Heuss 2016). 
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West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whom the Nazis had removed from office, 
imprisoned twice, and nearly deported, was well aware of this attitude amongst both his 
colleagues and society. Adenauer himself supported reparations, but he knew that, even though 
the SPD was on his side, most Germans who were not from ethnic minority groups and many 
West German politicians, including the overwhelming majority of his own party, did not share 
his view and were unlikely to be swayed by the moral arguments that are believed to have 
motivated Adenauer (Goschler 2016; Heuss 2016; Interview 22, 2016). Given Adenauer’s own 
persecution at the hands of the Nazis, he was more aware of the crimes of the Nazi era and more 
sympathetic to victims who had suffered far more than he had, and he repeatedly stated in both 
public and private interactions with Jewish representatives that he viewed reparations as a “moral 
duty,” once citing his own Christian beliefs—and those of his party42—as having helped shape 
this opinion (Adenauer 1949, 1952; Goschler 2016; Heuss 2016). Thus, for various reasons, 
Adenauer was inclined to serve as an ally to Jewish survivors and their advocates, and he was in 
a politically strategic position to do so.  
I want to make it clear that I am still arguing that Jewish survivors and their Jewish 
supporters (many of whom were indirect victims themselves) were the driving force behind 
reparations. They are the undisputed central actors of this story, and the reparations outcomes 
described in this chapter should be attributed to their own agency and advocacy, not to the 
actions of a benevolent Christian Chancellor. Adenauer’s actions and probable motivations merit 
discussion because he was in a key political office at a key moment in history, but this discussion 
                                                        
42 It is worth noting that many CDU members were vehemently opposed to reparations, 
indicating that, unlike Adenauer, they did not feel that the ostensibly Christian roots of the CDU 
or the tenets of their professed faith mandate support for reparations payments.  
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should in no way be misconstrued as an attempt to elevate his importance at the expense of 
Jewish reparations activists.  
Adenauer tended to reserve the moral rationale for Jewish or international audiences, well 
aware that the domestic population would be highly unreceptive to such arguments (Adenauer 
1949, 1951). A savvy politician, he decided to employ antisemitism as a persuasive tactic rather 
than banking on his colleagues’ moral compass. In an effort to persuade recalcitrant government 
officials to support reparations, Adenauer argued that West Germany could not afford to deny 
Jewish reparations claims, because ‘World Jewry’ would retaliate by using its influence, 
particularly its control of international financial systems, to cripple the West German economy 
(Goschler 2016; Heuss 2016; Thonke 2004, 44). This argument, though spurious and offensive, 
helped convince reluctant ministers that reparations must be paid.  
When Jewish reparations advocates realized that this argument was effective, they 
decided to use this rampant antisemitism to their advantage, too (Thonke 2004, 44). For example, 
representatives of the Claims Conference, an international Jewish organization that was set up 
specifically to negotiate with West Germany for reparations, would occasionally mention to 
West German negotiators that they had spoken with the United States about a particular issue, 
hoping that this knowledge would scare the West Germans into cooperating (Heuss 2016). They 
also made sure to mention ‘World Jewry’ in their writings to play on antisemitic fears (Goschler 
2016). In fact, leading member of the Claims Conference Nahum Goldmann even went so far as 
to communicate with the West Germans on stationery from fancy hotels to send the subtle signal 
that he and his organization had extensive wealth and influence (Goschler 2016). Jewish 
advocates reasoned that the one thing they could rely on in their interactions with the West 
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Germans was the antisemitic belief that Jews were powerful, and they saw no tactical reason to 
disabuse the West Germans of that absurd notion (Goschler 2016).  
d. Postwar Antisemitism in Germany and the Limits of Allied Assistance 
The international Jewish organizations needed whatever help they could get, because at 
this point, due to the chaos and trauma of the war, Jewish victims within Europe were unable to 
organize, and the Western Allies were initially fairly ambivalent about reparations. Instead of 
working to get reparations to all of the people Germany had persecuted, the Allies ordered that 
reparations were to be awarded to the neediest victims (Byrnes 1945). This is because 
reparations were not seen as a moral necessity, but rather as a way to keep the refugee crisis from 
growing and also as politically-motivated spoils to be awarded in the fight for scarce financial 
resources (Goschler 1992, 66-8, 89, 98; Thonke 2004, 30-1). Consequently, the American 
government was very concerned that providing extra assistance to Nazi victims, or even 
requiring the return of all stolen property, would provoke a negative reaction from the rest of 
German society, whose antisemitic attitudes were of course not magically erased by the fall of 
Hitler’s regime (Goschler 1992, 55, 81). Afraid of popular backlash within Germany, American 
officials decided not to permit full property restitution and not to pursue policies that could be 
perceived as privileging Nazi victims over the rest of the population (Goschler 1992, 55, 81). 
Furthermore, the United States was financially propping up West Germany at this point, so any 
reparations money that the United States ordered West Germany to pay would likely end up 
being paid by American taxpayers—not an easy sell to constituents back home (Goschler 2016). 
As frustrated as the Nazis’ victims were by the Americans’ actions in this instance, the 
United States had reason to be cautious. In late 1945, a survey of Germans in Berlin showed that 
while approximately 60% of respondents were amenable to returning stolen property, nearly 
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everyone opposed additional help for Nazi victims (Goschler 1992, 100-1). After all, German 
reasoning went, everyone had suffered under Hitler; why should one group receive more 
assistance than another? One of my interviewees, himself a Holocaust survivor, commented that 
“after liberation, to generalize very broadly, the majority of society was, overall, furious…. 
People wanted to forget what they had done and how they had been involved” (Interview 26, 
2016).  
It was much more comfortable to view oneself as a victim rather than a perpetrator, and, 
unsurprisingly, this self-perception of Germans who were not members of an ethnic minority as 
being equally needy and deserving victims of Hitler manifested itself in different ways. There 
was a particular backlash against restitution laws, which returned property and possessions to 
individuals who had been forced to sell their belongings at artificially low prices, or whose 
belongings had been unjustly confiscated or appropriated. These laws gave rise to protests that 
so-called “honest purchasers,” or loyale Erwerber,43 were not at fault for being in possession of 
unjustly acquired property, that having to return property that they had acquired in good faith 
was a breach of their rights, and that old injustices could not be corrected by committing new 
ones (Lillteicher 2007a, 210-2). Magazines sprang up, published by and for these loyale 
Erwerber, in which columnists railed against the injustices of having to return property, of losing 
their jobs after having been reliable and honest employees, and of having their reputations 
unfairly dragged through the mud (Erb 1990, 247-9; Köhrer 1951; Meng 2008, 50-1; “Wen 
wählen wir” 1953). Public reaction to the denazification process was similarly angry 
(“Koblenzer Landanzeiger” 1951; “BVN Landesverband Rheinland-Pfalz” 1951). Politicians 
were aware of these objections, and governmental communications cautioned against upsetting 
                                                        
43 Unless otherwise noted, translations from the original German are my own. 
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Germans who were not ethnic minorities who did not want to return property and possessions or 
who saw themselves as having been unjustly “denazified” (Rheinland Pfalz Ministry of Justice 
1949; Wunram 1950). While the open and blatant antisemitism of the 1930s and early 1940s was 
no longer as readily permitted in the public sphere, anti-Jewish sentiment was alive and well, and 
reparations and restitution provided a handy focal point for that prejudice. 
 Clearly, Jewish reparations advocates were operating in a difficult climate, and no matter 
how much pressure they put on the Allies to promulgate reparations laws in their respective 
occupation zones, their influence was not sufficient to persuade any of the Allied governments to 
place Jewish interests above their own national interests. Thus, it would be a mistake to try to 
explain reparations outcomes by looking to foreign governments. The Allies’ self-interested 
attitude toward reparations is evident in the variations between the reparations and restitution 
laws released by the military governments in the different occupation zones. The most glaring 
example is that of the British Zone, which lagged well behind the French and American Zones in 
issuing reparations laws. British officials consistently refused to cooperate with the Americans’ 
request to unify the reparations laws in the Western Allies’ zones, and they even failed to 
implement comprehensive laws for compensating damages to life and health. In fact, they were 
so immune to Jewish organizational pressure and so stubbornly disinterested in reparations that 
German historian Constantin Goschler calls this Zone the “problem child of the Federal 
Republic” with respect to its attitude towards reparations. (1992, 186-7).  
Jewish organizations were understandably upset with this state of affairs, but the British 
stance was driven by two major domestic political concerns that no amount of Jewish pressure 
could overcome. First of all, the UK’s own strained postwar finances made British officials 
reluctant to issue reparations laws that it might have to help finance, and secondly, continued 
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British involvement in Palestine meant that any assistance to the Jews would complicate the 
British situation in Palestine, either by angering the Arab world or by enabling more Jews to 
emigrate and pursue Zionist ideals (Goschler 1992, 187; Lillteicher 2007a, 57; Thonke 2004, 
32). These domestic political interests trumped all external lobbying and all considerations of 
reparations as a moral obligation, leaving many victims in the British Zone to wait, 
unrecompensed, in hopes that a federal reparations law would someday be released. Jewish 
organizations were not powerful enough to force the British to act in Jewish interests rather than 
British interests, but they continued to exert pressure anyway. 
 The Americans, on the other hand, quickly established themselves as the leaders in the 
field of reparations. Despite the Americans’ overriding concern with keeping the West German 
economy afloat, which necessarily limited the scope of reparations laws, the restitution and 
reparations laws created in the American Zone were issued fairly early and, in many respects, 
were more generous towards victims than the laws promulgated in other Zones (Byrnes 1945; 
Goschler 1992, 98-100; Lillteicher 2007a, 53-8, 2007b, 101-4). Although the Americans’ policy 
was focused on short-term assistance that was designed to reintegrate victims into society, not 
afford them a permanently privileged status, even this approach meant earlier and more 
comprehensive assistance for victims than in other occupation zones (Goschler 1992, 75). 
Although the Americans were unable to get the other zones to follow suit in copying their laws, 
their proclamations were seen as the gold standard in reparations, and they consistently pushed 
back against reluctant West German politicians to get reparations laws passed (Goschler 1992; 
Lillteicher 2007a).  
For example, when the Germans said that the Bavarian parliament would not pass a 
certain reparations law until it was revised to align with German interests, the Americans 
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responded by altering the political system so that the legislation no longer required parliamentary 
approval and pushed it through themselves (Goschler 1992, 112-3). Victims also got lucky in 
that the Deputy Secretary of the Civil Administration Division of the War Department, John J. 
McCloy, was motivated by his own personal beliefs to fight for victims’ reparations above and 
beyond the level requested by the US government (Goschler 1992). This was particularly evident 
in the early 1950s, when McCloy negotiated with West Germany to acquire much higher 
reparations payments to Israel than the American government would have deemed acceptable 
(Goschler 1992). 
However, no matter how influential the United States government and McCloy were, 
Jewish organizations were the driving force in the West German reparations story. As my theory 
predicts, Jewish organizations—and again, these organizations were staffed and steered in large 
part by victims and their relatives—were lobbying the Allied governments intensely, and Allied 
governments (particularly the American government) implemented reparations policies directly 
in response to this pressure. Groups such as the Jewish Agency, World Jewish Congress, and 
eventually the newly formed Claims Conference and Jewish Restitution Successor Organization 
(JRSO), started lobbying the Americans for reparations as early as possible, and they remained 
active over the years so as to influence as many areas of postwar reparations law as they could. 
One example of their lobbying success came in the area of property restitution, as the American 
Military Governor Lucius D. Clay, whose behavior was usually considerate of German interests, 
made significant concessions to international Jewish organizations on the issue of who should 
inherit and administer heirless Jewish property (Goschler 1992, 109, 111). Clay later wrote that 
these concessions did not correspond to his own views on the matter, but it seems that a personal 
meeting in Fall 1946 with representatives from the main five Jewish organizations persuaded 
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him that Washington agreed with the Jewish organizations (Goschler 1992, 111). There is likely 
more to the story, though, given that Washington wanted a quick resolution of the heirless 
property issue and was not informed about the details of Clay’s agreement (Goschler 1992, 111).  
e. Victims in Germany Start to Mobilize 
 The give-and-take between Jewish organizations and Allied governments described 
above makes it clear that, just as my theory predicts, Jewish victims played a leading role in 
shaping early postwar reparations policies. However, the victims driving the events mentioned 
above were emigrants—what of Jewish victims who remained in (or who returned to) Germany? 
Victims who had not emigrated were not as numerous or as organized as expatriate victims, but 
they were pushing for reparations, too. Although survivors who remained within Germany did 
not mobilize before emigrant Jewish victims and their influential allies (e.g. certain sympathetic 
individuals in the United States military and government) began moving on their behalf in 1943, 
they did mobilize after the war. This delay can be explained by the fact that these victims found 
themselves in circumstances that did not permit the construction of organizations prior to the 
war’s end. As discussed above, organizations made up of Jewish victims, European Jewish 
émigrés (many of whom had family who remained in Europe), and non-victim allies who lived 
outside of Nazi-occupied territory were able to discuss these matters during the war, but most of 
the victims were focused on day-to-day survival in concentration camps, in slave labor camps, or 
in hiding. However, once the war ended and victims had time to recover somewhat from the 
horrors of the concentration camps, they quickly began advocating for themselves. Thus, 
although they did not mobilize to press for reparations earlier than non-victims such as the 
United States government, they started making claims around the same time that international 
Jewish organizations, which, again, were staffed in part by victims, started pressuring the Allies 
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to implement reparations policies in the occupation zones. Considering the devastation all across 
Europe and the physical, mental, and emotional trauma that victims experienced, it is perhaps 
remarkable that individuals in Europe began mobilizing so quickly.  
Victim mobilization within Europe took many forms; survivors created organizations, 
held rallies and protests, published magazines that informed fellow survivors of developments in 
reparations and gave them instructions about how to contact West German politicians and 
pressure them to act in victims’ interests, and engaged in extensive letter-writing campaigns that 
urged West German politicians to consider victims and their needs. For example, in the monthly 
newsletter for political victims in Bavaria, a column on the first page discusses how the chairman 
of the Bavarian branch of one of the largest and most influential victims’ organizations, the 
Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes, or VVN (Organization of Individuals Persecuted 
by the Nazi Regime), the Vice President of the Bavarian Israeli Cultural Organization, and a 
Munich City Councilman (Stadtrat), spoke to an audience of over 2500 people about the future 
of reparations in Germany. The size and content of this rally demonstrates that, even within 
Germany, victims were meeting together to dicuss reparations policy and to advocate for 
themselves. (“Kundgebung der Verfolgten in München” 1948) 
My interviewees confirmed that victims within Germany were aware of two crucial 
points: First, that there was power in numbers, and second, that they had to present a united front 
if they were to convince the Germans that ignoring victims’ interests would be more politically 
costly than making societally unpopular reparations promises (Goschler 2016; Interview 22, 
2016; Interview 25, 2016). Despite being overwhelmingly outnumbered, they marshalled their 
resources and worked to change the political opportunity structure to their own benefit, which 
involved exactly the sort of behavior that social movement theory would predict: They got 
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organized, utilized groups as avenues for political expression rather than emphasizing voting as 
the way to achieve reparations, and sought to change politicians’ political calculus through 
targeted lobbying.   
4. Evolving West German Sovereignty and the BWGöD: 1949-1951 
 
a. The Allies Step Back, Victims’ Organizations Step Up 
 
In 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were 
founded. Although the Allies continued to monitor and administer certain areas of West German 
policy, they withdrew from other policy areas, and this threw the future of domestic reparations 
into question. The Allies, particularly the Americans, kept an eye on West Germany’s 
reparations progress, meaning that West German politicians could not dismantle the existing 
reparations framework without repercussions. However, because the Americans’ main interests 
lay elsewhere, this safeguard was not enough to reassure victims, many of whom had yet to 
receive any reparations at all (Goschler 1992).  
This placed victims –including those helping lead international Jewish organizations– in 
a situation where they would have to fight for reparations directly, rather than being able to 
lobby the occupying forces to push measures through. As a result, these next few years of history 
offer a clear demonstration of my theory in action. As international attention and influence 
waned, Jewish victims’ organizations were left without their main allies in the fight for 
reparations, and any future reparations developments would need to be propelled solely by them 
and any sympathetic individuals that their lobbying efforts could attract. This section shows that, 
even after the Allied governments withdrew from West German reparations politics, Jewish 
victims’ groups remained mobilized and continued to pressure the West German government. 
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This constant pressure kept the issue of reparations alive in a busy parliamentary period and 
ensured that a reparations law passed within the first parliamentary term.   
Jewish victims’ organizations were facing an uphill battle; although the West German 
federal government had signed international agreements guaranteeing that the American Zone’s 
reparations provisions would serve as a minimum standard for victims in all Western former 
occupation zones, there was no timeline on fulfilling this promise (AHK 1951; Goschler 1992; 
Schäffer 1952). Furthermore, the politicians in charge of the Länder with less generous 
reparations laws were not in any hurry to embark on the politically difficult path of expanding 
costly reparations provisions for a small percentage of the population in a time of economic 
hardship (Schäffer 1952; BA 136/1124 1951, 163-73). West Germany’s increasing sovereignty 
also meant that politicians could no longer avoid the displeasure of their constituents by saying 
that the Allies had implemented these measures over the Germans’ objections, making 
reparations a more politically fraught endeavor than it had been. Although West Germany’s 
party-list proportional representation electoral system meant that high-level politicians were 
practically guaranteed to remain in office whether or not they supported reparations,44 lower-
level politicians would not want to risk their recently-acquired political office by angering voters, 
nor did they want to put this issue first on the agenda (Goschler 2016; Interview 22, 2016).  
Even when West German politicians still had the political cover of being able to blame 
the Allies for reparations laws, many of them had actively tried to block or weaken reparations 
measures (Grüber “921”). Consequently, the Allies had generally had a heavy hand in drafting, 
                                                        
44 Indeed, West Germany’s notable reparations supporters in politics were members of their 





passing, and supervising the implementation of the reparations laws (Goschler 1992). Heinrich 
Grüber, a German Christian victim of the Nazis45 who was a leading figure in the West Berlin 
evangelical scene, documented some obstructionist political methods in the following excerpt 
from an essay on reparations in Berlin: “The American military government was the first to 
release a law about the restitution of property stolen by the Nazis (Military Government Law Nr. 
50)…. Even more shameful is the fact that, in three years, not one of the many German 
parliaments, which have cost a large amount of money to maintain, has been able to bring a 
reparations law to fruition. The former Berlin city council has not been able to bring anything 
about, either, despite much talk. By October 1948, an 18-person committee of the City 
Parliament had discussed only three of the twenty paragraphs presented. The meetings were 
often unable to make decisions, because some of the representatives did not show up” (Grüber 
“921”).46 
Now, these same politicians, who had already shown themselves reluctant to support 
reparations efforts, would be democratically accountable to a West German society that, in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, was prone to glossing over the horrors suffered by Nazi victims in 
favor of focusing on the hardships of Germans who did not belong to ethnic minorities during 
                                                        
45 Grüber writes that he had been imprisoned in a concentration camp due to his National 
Socialist-era advocacy work for individuals who were being racially persecuted as Jews but who 
were not religiously Jewish (Grüber 1949). 
 
46 “Als erste hat die amerikanische Militärregierung ein Gesetz über die Rückerestattung der von 
den Nazis geraubten Vermögenswerte (Militärregierungs-Gesetz Nr. 50) verkündet.... Umso 
beschämender aber ist, dass keines der vielen deutschen Parlamente, die wahrlich an 
Tagegeldern Erhebliches gekostet haben, in fast drei Jahren kein Wiedergutmachungsgesetz 
zustande bringen konnten. Auch die verflossene Berliner Stadtverwaltung hat trotz vielen Redens 
nichts zu Wege gebracht. Ein 18-köpfiger Ausschuss des Stadtparlamentes hatte bis Oktober 
1948 von den vorgelegten 20 Paragraphen drei beraten. Sehr häufig waren die Sitzungen 




and after the war (Ludi 2006, 434). These elected officials could be expected to cater to their 
West German constituents, who constituted a much larger voting bloc than did the Nazis’ 
victims, rather than to persecuted individuals and their unpopular demands (Interview 22, 2016). 
As if this were not concerning enough for victims and their supporters, Adenauer did not 
mention either reparations or Nazi victims in his first public statement of his goals as Chancellor 
(Regierungserklärung) in the fall of 1949 (“Die Gemeinschaft” 1953). 
However, domestic and international Jewish victims quickly moved to make their 
interests and demands known at the highest levels of West German government. Subsequent to 
Adenauer’s statement explaining his goals as Chancellor, representatives of Germany’s 
remaining Jewish community47 personally met with Federal President Professor Dr. Theodor 
Heuss to discuss this matter (among others), and he then publicly stated that he was committed to 
helping racially persecuted individuals obtain reparations (Grüber 1949). In 1951, Adenauer 
affirmed that the Germans owed Jews a “debt of honor,” and that reparations were an important 
step towards restoring West Germany’s honor (Grossmann 1964; von Jena 1986). Adenauer 
continued to insist on reparations, despite objections from members of his Cabinet and the 
unpopularity of this issue with the public.  
Other West German politicians were even more vehement in their support, including 
Adolf Arndt, Philipp Auerbach, Otto-Heinrich Greve, and Jakob Altmaier, to name a few. The 
potential electoral backlash that Germans who were not from ethnic minorities could unleash on 
politicians who favored reparations would not be offset by support from Jewish constituents; 
                                                        
47 Dr. Philipp Auerbach, a lawyer, public servant, and eventual head of the Bavarian Reparations 
Department (Wiedergutmachungsamt), who deliberately used his prominent position to assist 




there were too few Jews left in West Germany to be politically important. Why, then, did such 
prominent West German politicians express their unmistakable support for reparations? 
Foreign concerns—or, more accurately, perceptions of foreign concerns—certainly did 
play a role. It was commonly accepted that the US would not allow West Germany back into the 
community of Western nations unless it paid reparations, and, given the dangerous climate of the 
Cold War and the economic hardship that would result from continued pariah status, West 
Germany simply could not afford to ignore American demands (Interview 22, 1962). Jewish 
organizations did all they could to keep this belief alive, even though the Cold War context 
meant that the United States needed West Germany as an ally regardless of its reparations policy 
(Goschler 2003). Thus, it was up to victims’ organizations to maintain the illusion that the 
Western World would abandon West Germany unless reparations were paid.  
West German politicians did not frame their pro-reparations stances in terms of 
kowtowing to (perceived) international concerns, perhaps in order not to be seen as bowing to 
the United States so soon after sovereignty had been acquired. Instead, politicians of all stripes, 
many of them convinced that keeping West Germany out of the hands of the Soviets depended 
on American support, which in turn depended on paying reparations, began to echo the idea that 
reparations were a “moral duty” (229. Sitzung, 1952). Phrases calculated to appeal more directly 
to the West German populace were even more common; politicians emphasized that in order to 
restore West Germany’s reputation and the honor of the German people in the wake of atrocities 
committed by Nazis –certainly not in the wake of the guilt of ordinary Germans– reparations 
must be paid (130. Sitzung 1951; 131. Sitzung 1951; 271. Sitzung 1953). Some of these 
individuals may well have been motivated by a sense of honor, but politicians were concerned 
about about retaining Western support if reparations were not paid to Jewish victims, and Jewish 
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organizations were doing their best to maintain this concern (Jelinek 1990; Küster 1951; 
“Rückerstattung” 1951).  
The motives of the staunchest pro-reparations advocates in the West German political 
landscape are easier to discern, however; as victims themselves, they had a personal interest in 
the matter. A few of the most outspoken and committed pro-reparations politicians were 
exceptions to this rule, most notably President Theodor Heuss (FDP), Franz Böhm (CDU), and 
Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU)48 (Goschler 1992, 205). There were also prominent public 
intellectuals and lawyers who were motivated simply by moral convictions about the necessity of 
reparations, the two best examples here being Otto Küster and Walter Schwarz. However, most 
of the other politically powerful reparations advocates were either victims themselves or had 
personal ties to groups of victims by virtue of being either Jewish or belonging to the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) (99. Sitzung 1955).49 Prominent SPD advocates in the federal 
parliament (Bundestag) included Arndt, Greve, and Altmaier (who was also Jewish). Another 
critical reparations advocate was the Jewish head of the Bavarian reparations office, Philipp 
Auerbach.  
b. Competition Between Victims 
Although reparations payments were generally viewed as a limited resource that required 
different groups to compete against each other, the SPD and the Jews were better-suited to be 
allies in victims’ fight for reparations than any other combination of victims. This is because 
                                                        
48 Both Böhm and Gerstenmeier were active in the anti-Nazi Confessing Church. 
 
49 Social Democrats were persecuted by the Nazis, as were Communists. Politicians from other 





both of these groups were seen as innocent and deserving victims of the Nazis, whereas other 
groups were seen as having brought their own misfortunes on themselves (Blessin 1960, 71). At 
the time, the belief was that Roma and Sinti were asocial criminals, homosexuals were sexually 
perverse criminals, and communists were devoted to a totalitarian ideology that was bent on 
dismantling the democratic order, making them undeserving, or ‘bad,’ victims (International 
Refugee Organization 1951; Goschler 2003; Goschler 2005, 192; von dem Knesebeck 2011, 20; 
Winkler 2010). Certainly, paying reparations to these groups would have strained the political 
capital of any politician and caused backlash from the West German population.  
Consequently, Social Democrats and Jews were at pains to distance themselves from 
these other groups,50 particularly the Communists. Victims were aware of the political 
unpalatability of certain groups, and they hoped that by distinguishing themselves from the ‘bad’ 
victims, they could increase their chances of acquiring reparations for their own groups. This 
disavowal was so intense that in the early 50s there was a schism in the VVN. This organization 
had been set up to include all politically and racially persecuted Nazi victims and provide them 
with greater lobbying power, but its Communist membership and subsequent split between 
Communist and non-Communist factions left it politically impotent (Interview 25, 2016).  
Jewish victims benefited from this split. Instead of having a union of political victims 
against the racial victims, which might have been the most logical coalition, the SPD joined 
forces with Jewish victims to become the largest lobbying block. Persecuted SPD politicians and 
persecuted Jewish politicians (who were far less numerous than SPD politicians) supported one 
another (and sometimes overlapped in membership) when advocating reparations in 
                                                        
50 Once Jewish survivors were assured of their own reparations payments, they did indeed try to 
help Roma and Sinti survivors get reparations, too (Margalit 2002). 
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parliamentary discussions, in public statements, and in private letters. Because they had been 
personally affected by events and understood the dire circumstances facing most non-elite 
victims, they were committed reparations advocates, regardless of public opinion. Indeed, SPD 
members tended not to be advocating for reparations for themselves, but rather because they 
knew what ordinary victims needed and because many of the SPD’s constituents, who had been 
persecuted for their political beliefs, were eager to see prompt and generous reparations laws 
passed (Heuss 2016; Interview 22, 2016).  
The fact remained, however, that the SPD was in opposition, and CDU voters were more 
likely to be German expellees from other countries (Heimatvertriebenen), non-minority Germans 
who had suffered personal losses during the war (Kriegsgeschädigten), or even ex-Nazis, who 
wanted limited governmental resources to be used to help them recover from having lost homes, 
property, husbands, and jobs. Indeed, parliamentary discussions from this time period 
demonstrate that the fate of these groups was much more politically pressing than that of the 
Nazi victims (130. Sitzung 1951; 165. Sitzung 1951). However, Jewish organizations were 
continuing to keep the threat of international attention and international backlash alive and well, 
and so West German politicians were concerned about the negative optics of passing laws to 
compensate these constituencies before the Nazi victims (Hockerts 2001; Winkler 2010). 
Perceived foreign political and financial concerns meant that any measures to help German war 
victims, German expellees, or the people who had been adversely affected by denazification 
would have to be accompanied by measures helping the Nazis’ victims. This political calculus 
shows the importance of international victims’ organizations and their influential international 
allies in victims’ fight for reparations. Even though victims were represented in the parliament, 
were mobilized, and were portraying themselves in ways designed to make their claims 
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politically acceptable, international and domestic Jewish organizations had to work together to 
convince reluctant politicians that there would be prohibitive international economic and 
reputational costs if reparations were not paid. 
This combination of domestic and international considerations led to the nearly 
simultaneous creation of a law benefiting individuals who had been denazified, the so-called 
131ers (named after the Constitutional clause identifying them), and the Federal Compensation 
Law for Public Servants (Bundesgesetz zur Regelung der Wiedergutmachung im öffentlichen 
Dienst, or BWGöD), a law benefiting former state employees (Beamten) who had lost their jobs 
or been otherwise persecuted due to the Nazis’ policies. In fact, the 131er law was drafted and 
ready for approval well before its counterpart law benefiting Nazi victims, but the Cabinet and 
the Parliament delayed passing the 131er law until they had finished writing the BWGöD so that 
they could avoid negative international attention from Jewish organizations about having 
privileged former Nazis above former victims (Hockerts 2001; Winkler 2010). On May 11, 1951, 
the federal government passed both laws. 
5. Drafting the Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, 1951-1953 
 
c. The Federal Government Considers Drafting a Comprehensive Reparations Law 
 
The BWGöD remained the only reparations law passed at the federal level until 1953, 
however. This meant that victims were receiving wildly disparate benefits based on which 
occupation zone they had lived in before the war. Despite the federal government’s promises, 
both informally in press releases and speeches, and formally in Part IV of the Transition 
Agreement (Überleitungsvertrag), that it would guarantee the fair and equal treatment of the 
Nazis’ victims by making sure that all of the reparations laws at least met the standards set by the 
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American zone, no federal laws to this effect had been forthcoming (Bundesministerium der 
Finanzen 1952). 
In meetings with the state governments, the only states in favor of regulating reparations 
at the federal level were those in the British Zone. This was because they would be put under 
severe financial strain if the federal government required these states to meet the American 
Zone’s standards without providing federal assistance. In contrast, regulating reparations at the 
federal level would require the other states, particularly those in the American Zone, which had 
nearly finished making payments to certain victim groups, to reprocess claims to fit any 
adjustments the federal government made in reparations laws and to pay more taxes to help the 
states in the British Zone meet the increased standards. As a result, the state governments 
consistently voted against regulating reparations at the federal level, and the Adenauer 
government and CDU-controlled parliament were content to adopt a wait-and-see approach. 
They decided that British Zone states should be given time to catch up on their own, and if they 
did not, then maybe federal regulations would be in order. There was, however, no deadline after 
which British Zone noncompliance would no longer be tolerated, nor was there any effort made 
to assist or strong-arm these states into cooperating. (BArch 136/1124, 233-267; Goschler 1992) 
Although the federal government seemed perfectly happy to continue with this state of 
affairs, a constellation of factors—most of which, as predicted by my theory, consist of actions 
and circumstances created by victims and their organizations—combined to force the 
government’s hand. First, the outrage from victims’ groups was growing. Complaints about the 
long processing times, the zone to zone differences, the generous pensions being given to 
perpetrators, the dire poverty faced by many victims, and the deplorable treatment of victims at 
the hands of governmental officials began to mount. This can be seen simply in the number of 
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pro-reparations letters received by the federal government in this pre-BErG era. The Federal 
Archive in Koblenz, Germany, records three different victims’ organizations as having sent pro-
reparations letters to the government in 1950; in 1952 this number rose to five, and in 1953 it 
climbed to 29. Public protests were another frequent tactic. For example, in 1953, delegates of 
over 2000 racial and political victims met to protest the lack of a federal reparations law, 
complain that other groups had had their needs met first, and insist that a federal reparations law 
be passed in this parliamentary period (“KLN 8493” 1953). 
Second, victims voiced their discontent to the media, as well, and so the West German 
regime was placed under additional pressure by a spate of negative articles in the press, both 
domestically and abroad. Articles were published that discussed how perpetrators were receiving 
pensions and, in some cases, back pay, which contrasted with the “shameful” way that the West 
German government was treating the Nazis’ victims, who were waiting for miniscule pensions 
and living in poverty (“Zweierlei Recht” 1952). Victims and their organizations were not shy 
about sharing their experiences with the press, and the Jewish international organizations in 
particular made their opinions known internationally and within Germany by giving interviews, 
holding press conferences, disseminating press releases, writing op-eds, and meeting with 
governmental officials in West Germany, the US, Israel, Britain, and France. Grossman noted 
that while the popular press was unlikely to publish articles favorable towards Jews, they were 
no longer going to publish negative articles, either (1964). All of these victim-driven actions 
were slowly working to force the federal government’s hand. 
Third, the timing of this domestic and international media pressure, pressure that was 
generated by the victims themselves, was fortuitous in terms of the political opportunity 
structure. All of these pro-reparations pieces came at a time when the West German public had 
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recovered enough financially that reparations were no longer seen primarily as taking away 
limited funds from equally deserving and more popular groups of German expellees, war 
widows, orphans, denazified individuals, and those whose property or health had been harmed by 
the war. These improved financial circumstances had the effect of softening public attitudes 
towards Jewish reparations. While saying that public opinion was favorable towards Jews would 
be an overstatement, the public no longer had an actively hostile attitude towards paying 
reparations to Jews, and open antisemitism was also no longer socially acceptable.  
This shift in public opinion and the pressure exerted by victims’ organizations combined 
with two final developments to force the government to act. The first of these was a draft 
reparations law written by the Bundesrat (which represented the West German states in a federal 
body) in 1952,51 and the second was a request that the SPD faction in the Bundestag (West 
German federal parliament) submitted to Chancellor Adenauer’s government, soliciting the 
prompt release of a federal reparations law. Suddenly, avoidance was no longer a viable tactic 
for the CDU government. The Bundesrat’s draft required a counterproposal, because not only did 
it fail to incorporate West Germany’s reparations obligations as laid out in Part IV of the General 
Treaty (Deutschlandvertrag) or as agreed upon with the Claims Conference in the Hague, but 
also it put the entire financial burden of reparations on the federal government, which was 
unacceptable to the Cabinet (Schmidt 1952). Although dealing with the Bundesrat draft was 
more pressing, the SPD’s submission would require a response, too.  
                                                        
51 Although the individual states (aside from those in the British Zone) had been steadfastly 
against the creation of a federal reparations law, the Bundesrat’s version of the law passed the 
entire cost of reparations onto the federal government, making it a federal reparations law that all 
of the states could support. 
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For a while, the Cabinet still clung to the idea that it could expand existing reparations 
laws to fill coverage gaps instead of rewriting the laws entirely, but eventually it realized that 
there were too many discrepancies from state to state, and the only workable solution, 
particularly in light of the sudden time pressure, was writing an entirely new law 
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen 1952; Ludwig 1952; “Begründung” 1952; Begründung zum 
Entwurf 1953). This decision was made easier once discussions with the Jewish Claims 
Conference at the Hague—again, a Jewish victims’ organization—made it apparent that creating 
a BEG would not be any more expensive than creating gap laws to even out the reparations 
guarantees from state to state (Hartmann 1952). The government continued to insist that the 
West German government and the German people were making significant financial sacrifices to 
right the wrongs committed by the Nazis and to restore the damaged image of the German 
people, but the need for a comprehensive federal reparations law was unavoidable (“Wille zur 
Wiedergutmachung” 1953).  
The fact that the West German government felt such a need to continue reiterating that it 
was working towards a reparations law is a tribute to the sustained pressure that Jewish victims 
were placing on politicians. The majority of the German population was not interested in or in 
favor of reparations, yet West German politicians continued discussing this issue. This 
disconnect between the general public’s priorities, the international community’s general 
disinterest, and the West German government’s attention to reparations shows that, as my theory 
predicts, reparations policies are driven forward primarily by the victims themselves. In this case 
study, just as in the case studies I examine in Chapters 4 and 5, Jewish victims used reputational 




d. The Finance Ministry Objects; Victims Continue Exerting Pressure 
 Unsurprisingly, even as the majority of the Cabinet began to see the inevitability of 
reparations, the Federal Ministry of Finance, run by the second most powerful man in the 
Cabinet, Fritz Schäffer, remained concerned about the financial cost of such a program. Its 
approach to reparations was described at the time as consisting of “delay and sabotage tactics” 
(Goldmann 1952), and its constant refrain was to keep the financial burden in mind throughout 
the decision-making process (Finanzausschuss 1952). In March 1953, Arndt worried aloud that 
the Ministry of Finance would delay the reparations law so long that every victim would have 
died by the time it was passed (Harting 1953). The Ministry dragged its feet on the issue until the 
government found itself under even more time pressure to pass the law: the first parliamentary 
period was about to expire, and passing a reparations law prior to that was politically imperative. 
In addition, waiting to pass the reparations law until after the upcoming election would delay it 
even further than intended by putting it at the mercy of consultations, negotiations, and 
amendments from the new Bundestag (Heuss 2016). As the days ticked by, government officials 
began to request urgent meetings with each other to discuss the issue and expressed doubts that 
they could “solve these questions of reparations and restitution in this parliamentary period” 
(Dehler 1952a; Schäffer 1952b). Finally, the Federal Ministry of Justice urged the Ministry of 
Finance to please stop delaying reparations, because not only would there be foreign political 
consequences for failing to pass a reparations measure, but also because the rule of law required 
that reparations be paid (Dehler 1952b).  
Eventually, Adenauer used the antisemitic and false ‘World Jewry’ argument again, 
countering Schäffer’s constant refrain of ‘we cannot pay’ by saying that West Germany needed 
loans and international trade, which would not be possible unless ‘World Jewry’ were appeased 
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(Goschler 2016). This argument convinced Schäffer and his Ministry to relent, and, realizing the 
need to pass a federal reparations law during the first parliamentary period, the Ministry even 
began to urge for haste in passing the law (Schäffer 1953). However, this change of heart came 
so late that it seemed that West Germany would simply have to swallow the anticipated negative 
political repercussions of failing to pass a reparations law in the first four years of postwar 
sovereignty (Schäffer 1952b). Given the intense lobbying campaign that Jewish victims and their 
organizations (both international and domestic) had mounted to convince West Germany that the 
world’s eyes were watching the reparations debate, these repercussions were expected to be 
substantial: eight years of image rehabilitation would be tarnished, the substantial domestic and 
international rhetoric explaining how seriously West Germany took its debt of honor to victims 
would be seen as nothing more than politically expedient lies, and the financial fallout due to 
American disappointment could be disastrous (Platz 1954). In reality, although there would 
likely have been media reports and official disappointment from abroad, the Americans were too 
reliant on West Germany as a Cold War ally in order to be worried about reparations issues 
anymore.  
However, West German officials did not want to rely on this potentiality, nor did they 
want to risk the internal and international backlash that would certainly come from victims’ 
organizations, who had continued their intense lobbying efforts. During internal SPD 
discussions, the agreement was that “even if certain circles, maybe even broad circles in West 
Germany are inclined to place little value on these civil rights matters, our conviction speaks for 
a great political obligation… for our suggestion [of a reparations law]. We have to be aware that, 
if this draft fails in the Bundestag, an unheard-of campaign against West Germany will begin in 
circles outside of Israel—for we cannot ignore that there are still 13 million Jews, and according 
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to the last population count, on March 31 of this year the Israeli population was barely 2 million 
people” (Brill 1953).  
Furthermore, the SPD noted that, while Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was on his trip to 
America, he “had promised that the law would be passed. It does not require much imagination 
to envision what the Jews would say about Germany in [various magazines]. Even less 
imagination is required to picture how this would hurt us” (Brill 1953). It is interesting to note 
that there is no mention here of American governmental pressure—the concern is fully for the 
reputational damage that Jewish organizations and Jewish media could inflict on West Germany.  
Indeed, one of my interviewees commented that, by this point, “The decisive force came 
from within Germany. Adenauer was instrumental internally… It was not really about external 
pressure” (Interview 25, 2016). Having repeatedly utilized the antisemitic idea of Jewish 
economic domination to persuade his Cabinet to cooperate on reparations, Adenauer was 
certainly aware of the continued susceptibility of reluctant politicians to arguments about how 
Jewish disapproval could have negative consequences for the fledgling West German Republic. 
This ties directly to my theory, as it is unlikely that such arguments would have been credible, let 
alone motivating enough to force reluctant politicians to act promptly, had international Jewish 
organizations –whose leading members were largely European Jews or of European Jewish 
descent– not also deployed these arguments, maintained such consistent pro-reparations pressure, 
and remained so vocal.  
The SPD’s opinion on the political importance of passing the law in the first 
parliamentary period and the dire repercussions of failing to pass the law was widespread 
throughout the government, thanks in large part to the consistent lobbying efforts of Jewish 
organizations and their political allies within the West German government. Consequently, all 
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three readings for the BErG were held in a single day, and the Bundestag passed the law without 
any changes (“Entwurf einer Rede” 1953).52 The Cabinet approved it on August 25, 1953, and 
the law entered into force on October 1, 1953 (Goschler 1992, 298). The BErG was met with 
congratulations and praise from victims’ groups, media outlets, and foreign political entities, 
which had resounding positive political implications (“Entwurf einer Rede” 1953). One of the 
leading West German Jewish newspapers, the Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in 
Deutschland, published a piece commenting on how the BErG process showed that the 
government sincerely wanted to pass such a law, and that the necessary political will was there 
(Marx 1953). The General Secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Hendrik George 
van Dam, also wrote that the law was passed because the West German government did indeed 
possess the will to right the wrong done to the Jews (van Dam 1953). West Germany had 
fulfilled its treaty obligations, victims now had realistic hopes that they would live to receive 
their reparations payments, and the government was on its way to fulfilling its “debt of honor.” 
6. Revising the BErG: The Creation of the BEG, 1954-1956 
 
a. Victims Use Reputational Threats to Force Prompt Revisions 
 
 The adulation and enthusiasm about the BErG was short-lived, however. In 1953, Otto 
Küster told the Freiburg Society for Christian and Jewish cooperation that the BErG had been 
passed in spite of obvious deficits53 due to fears that any revisions would cause the Adenauer 
                                                        
52 Incidentally, certain Jewish lobbies had worked hard to persuade the Bundesrat to pass the 
Cabinet’s draft law without any changes, another potential sign of Jewish organizational 
influence (Kuschnitzky 1953). 
 
53 Because the law had been rushed through Parliament, it was imprecise and far from 
comprehensive (Grüber 1955). There were two main complaints. First, in order to qualify for 
reparations under this particular law, victims had to be able to demonstrate a prewar connection 
to the territory that was now West Germany. Second, the law did not provide compensation for 
abuses committed in what had been German territory but was now part of East Germany or 
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government to veto the law, seeing as out of the entire Cabinet, only Adenauer wanted the law to 
be passed (Küster 1953). He added that the BErG was passed not really because of governmental 
conviction but rather because the politicians felt there was no alternative (Küster 1953). Victims’ 
organizations demanded the quick revision of the BErG, and international Jewish organizations, 
notably the Claims Conference, demanded that the problems with the law be resolved quickly. 
However, this process took a while, because the Ministry of Finance was again at odds 
with victims’ advocates when it came to writing the 1956 BEG, which revised the 1953 BErG. In 
1954, a representative from the Ministry of Finance wrote that while it was necessary to revise 
the law, they would not be revising the amount of reparations to be paid (Bundesrat 
Sonderausschuss 1954). Another representative noted that victims’ organizations were asking for 
more than the country could afford to pay, and he advised the Ministry of Finance to be involved 
in the revision process in order to prevent a boundless expansion of benefit promises (Gruppe 
Wiedergutmachung 1954).  
This reluctant attitude towards reparations did not go unnoticed, either domestically or 
abroad. Otto-Heinrich Greve of the SPD, wrote that, in his opinion, financial considerations 
should not be of paramount importance when revising the BErG, and for that reason he regretted 
that the Ministry of Finance was in charge of leading the revision process (“Niederschrift” 1954). 
Another internal government memo noted that the American media was publishing negative 
stories about the way West Germany was handling reparations, and noted that “all Conference 
participants emphasized that, in the interest of maintaining a good political climate in the United 
States, the problem of reparations needed to be treated with particular care” (Pelekman 1954). 
                                                        
another Eastern Communist country. Victims were incensed by these stipulations, seeing them as 
arbitrary and exclusionary. (Goschler 2005, 201) 
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Similarly, the Committee for the Preparations of a Petition of the Members of Independent 
Careers to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany wrote to the Ministry of Finance 
to make the point that surely the ministry was aware that important foreign newspapers saw 
reparations delays as being due to a lack of willingness on the part of the Ministry of Finance 
(Aron and Weil 1956). For further emphasis, they enclosed an article from the Christian Science 
Monitor, noted that this newspaper “has particular foreign policy influence in the United States,” 
and commented that the Americans were getting impatient on this issue (Aron and Weil 1956).  
This example shows that victims were willing to get creative in their efforts to win 
reparations. They knew that they were not influential enough in terms of vote share or political 
stature to force the government’s hand, and so, like the Claims Conference and other 
international Jewish organizations, they utilized the threat of negative attention from a powerful 
international entity to nudge the government towards action. Whether or not the victim 
organization’s claim about the Christian Science Monitor’s foreign policy influence was correct, 
victims knew that the government would be more responsive to such a claim than to victims’ 
own, independent advocacy. Thus, we see that the West German government was, yet again, 
being moved to action by organized victims who, with the help of influential allies (who were 
sometimes simply implied, not real), were able to exert enough pressure to raise the reputational 
costs of avoiding reparations to an unacceptably high level. 
The West German government was not just worried about the Americans’ perceptions, 
either—officials were aware that these delays were causing people in the UK to doubt the 
sincerity of the West German government, too (Herwarth 1955). These international factors were 
not immediate or direct enough to force the West German government to make payments, but 
they did help speed up the process. West German politicians were truly worried that if the 
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reparations law revisions were delayed much longer, then the trust and reputation that West 
Germany had been working so hard to restore would be severely damaged, and they feared the 
results of these reputational costs (Herwarth 1955; 89. Sitzung 1955; 119. Sitzung 1955). 
 Domestic victims’ organizations and advocates, as well as their international 
counterparts, kept the specter of untenable reputational costs fresh in the mind of West German 
officials. In keeping with my theory, these groups exerted constant, strong pressure on the West 
German government to fix the deficits in the reparations law, and the historical record shows that 
these efforts kept reparations on the political agenda and ultimately forced the law’s revision. 
Some of this pro-reparations pressure took the form of press releases, press conferences, and 
publications that criticized the current laws and demanded quick revisions. One noticeable 
example of this is the 1954 resolution of the Claims Conference, which was released both in the 
US and West Germany and stated that not only was the reparations process lagging, but also that 
the BErG had decided deficits (“Mängel” 1954). These organizations kept themselves on the 
political radar by meeting regularly with West German politicians, and organizations who were 
excluded from consultations quickly caught wind of this and demanded to be included the next 
time. The letter-writing campaign spearheaded by victims’ organizations also intensified, to the 
point where, in 1954, the federal government created a directory of interest groups to keep all of 
the victims’ organizations straight (“Anschriftenverzeichnis”). Importantly, none of this pressure 
was coming from foreign governments, but rather from victims and their allies. 
Although international Jewish organizations were the most influential actors in this story, 
it is important to remember that they were staffed and lead largely by European Jews who were 
either victims themselves or related to victims. Still, victims’ organizations within Germany were 
exerting pressure, too, at both the federal and state levels—after the passage of the BErG, victims 
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within Germany began inundating state governments with letters demanding reparations and the 
prompt revision of the BErG. In 1954, Bavaria and the Rhineland Palatinate received 22,000 and 
150,000 reparations-related letters, respectively (“Niederschrift” 1954). By the end of the year, 
the Rhineland Palatinate had received 60,000 claims for reparations in 1954, and 100,000 claims 
overall (“Protokollentwurf” 1954). Processing these letters took up much of the time of the 
employees in the reparations offices, which were already severely understaffed –the office in the 
Rhineland Palatinate had about 100 employees–, leading to further delays in processing 
reparations claims and then still further letters of complaint (“Protokollentwurf” 1954). Although 
this domestic dissatisfaction was occurring among a comparatively small percentage of the West 
German population, these people, not the West Germans satisfied with or indifferent to the 
lagging reparations process, were the ones vocally and persistently expressing their feelings to 
the federal government and taking up politicians’ time and attention. 
The same politicians who had supported the 1953 law also came out in support of the 
1956 law, using the same moral and reputational arguments as before. For example, Böhm 
(CDU) stated that West Germany’s political reputation hinged on the success of its reparations 
politics, and even though he could understand why people did not want to think about or discuss 
the National Socialist era, such reluctance was dishonorable and portrayed West Germany in the 
wrong light to the outside world (“Neuer Auftrieb” 1955). By referencing international 
reputational costs, Böhm was appealing to politicians’ fear of losing the foreign economic, 
military, and moral support upon which the vulnerable Federal Republic relied. 
Similarly, in 1954 Adolf Arndt (SPD) expressed his displeasure at the slow pace of 
reparations payments and, when he asked how many people were working in the field of federal 
reparations payments to Nazi victims in comparison to people working on payments to the 
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131ers, the responsible minister responded that there were nine positions for the former and 10 ¾ 
for the latter (Pelekmann 1954). Arndt repeatedly brought this issue up in Parliament, asking 
why things were taking so long, emphasizing that resolving this issue was a debt of honor owed 
by the Germans, and questioning why the Ministry of Finance had been unable to field enough 
staff to handle the BErG, when other laws had been implemented and gotten enough personnel 
(Abteilung IV 1954). This reputational argument worked; even members of parliament who were 
against expanding the financial reach of the reparations law used the “debt of honor” idea to 
acknowledge that revisions must be made (“Vermerk” 1956).  
Finally, after much back and forth with the Ministry of Finance, consultations with 
countless victims’ organizations, and discussion between various branches of the government, 
the BEG was passed on June 29, 1956. Against all odds, Jewish victims and their allies had 
succeeded in setting an international precedent by motivating a government to pay reparations to 
its own citizens after having abused those citizens just a few years before. This sea change in the 
world of post-conflict and post-authoritarian transitions is due to the efforts of victims 
themselves—both those who mobilized internationally and those who remained within 
Germany—, who, with the help of influential West German political allies and occasional 
assistance from foreign governments, managed to forever transform the reparations landscape. 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have highlighted how the German federal government’s reparations 
payments to the Jews were motivated by pressure from organized victims’ groups and their 
allies. Although no federal government had ever before paid reparations to its own victims, West 
Germany was placed under strong pressure from international Jewish organizations, which 
comprised a significant number of Holocaust victims and their relatives, to set an international 
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precedent on this issue. Thanks to these Jewish organizations, their smaller counterparts within 
Germany, and the support of particular individuals within the West German political elite, 
Jewish victims and their allies were able to persistently, actively, and visibly lobby the German 
government for federal reparations laws. Given the international dependence of the German 
government, it was susceptible to the reputational threats made by mobilized victims’ advocates, 
even when it was unlikely that these threats had any chance of being fulfilled.  
The prospect of reputational costs resonated even with political parties whose 
constituents were less likely to be victims or members of victims’ organizations and therefore did 
not expect electoral backlash for failing to pass a reparations law. Regardless of political 
affiliation, victims and their allies had succeeded in getting politicians to worry about the 
potential negative financial and political consequences of ignoring victims’ pressure (which 
could then result in electoral backlash from the non-victimized German population). These 
internal and external pressures helped to speed up the process of promising and paying 
reparations to Jewish victims, as well as prompt revisions to the first reparations law. 
My theory predicts that in order to see reparations promises and payments, pressure from 
organized victims groups is imperative. Foreign governments and aid from non-victims can help 
amplify this pressure and raise the expected reputational and/or economic costs of failing to pay 
reparations, but engagement from victims themselves is fundamental to forcing reparations 
promises and payments to occur. The Jewish case supports these presumptions and demonstrates 
that, at heart, reparations are a social movements story. Governments are constantly being placed 
under pressure by different groups, oftentimes groups with competing interests, and so while 
governments may not respond immediately to pro-reparations pressure, sustained pro-reparations 
pressure from organized groups can eventually persuade governments to promise and then to pay 
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reparations. The Jewish case demonstrates that, even in a country whose antisemitism caused 
horrific human rights abuses, the long-term, concerted pro-reparations efforts of the victims 









DENIAL AND DELAY: THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT’S REPARATIONS 
PAYMENTS TO GERMAN ROMA AND SINTI 
 
1. Introduction 
Although Jews were the main targets of the Nazis’ racial ideology, they were not the only 
racial minority group that the Nazis persecuted. Roma and Sinti, whom the Nazis viewed as 
outsiders despite the fact that their documented presence in Germany dates back at least 600 
years, were also subjected to egregious human rights abuses during the Nazis’ rule (Rose 2015, 
9). In this chapter, I examine the lengthy, difficult path to reparations for German Roma and 
Sinti and show that, yet again, victims’ organizations were the decisive factor in motivating the 
West German government to make both a reparations promise and reparations payments for 
historical wrongs.  
Although Roma and Sinti suffered many of the same wartime abuses as Jews, the Jewish 
reparations trajectory was vastly different. The 1940s and 1950s incarnation of the Jewish 
campaign for reparations was highly successful, as it was marked by all of the agreed-upon 
hallmarks of successful social movements—strong organizations (large, vocal, and with the 
resources necessary to lobby persistently and effectively), influential allies, and openings in the 
economic and political climate. The Roma and Sinti faced incredibly different circumstances. In 
this chapter, I show how the Roma and Sinti’s lack of victims’ organizations, resources, and 
political opportunity contributed to a situation in which, until the 1980s, they were 
overwhelmingly blocked from receiving the reparations payments that had legally been promised 
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to them in the 1953 BErG law that Jewish victims had pushed so hard to acquire. When the 
Roma and Sinti did finally get uncontested reparations, it was the result of hard, grassroots work 
by the Roma and Sinti themselves: Approximately 30 years after the end of WWII, they stopped 
looking to outsiders to advocate for them, they organized by themselves, they gathered 
politically influential allies, and they seized a shift in the German social and political climate to 
push their reparations claim through Parliament.  
Thus, this case fits precisely with my theory. For decades, Romani victims were 
unorganized, and as a result they had extreme difficulties receiving the reparations that, as racial 
victims of the Nazis, they were legally entitled to. Without organizations, Sinti and Roma were 
unable to combat the anti-Roma prejudice that shut Roma out of most of the payments that the 
West German government had promised to “individuals persecuted for racial reasons.” This 
clause was meant to provide reparations to Jewish victims, who were highly mobilized in the 
postwar period, but Roma fell under its purview, as well, thus enabling Romani Germans to 
receive a reparations promise without being organized. Jewish advocacy for reparations was not 
as effective at helping Romani Germans receive reparations payments, however. Thus, just as my 
theory predicts, they were usually denied reparations payments up until the 1980s, when German 
Sinti and Roma got organized and pushed for reparations. In the face of substantial victim group 
pressure, which was bolstered by media attention and influential non-Roma allies to the 
movement, the West German government reconsidered its stance on reparations and agreed to 
establish a special fund for “non-Jewish victims” that was designed specifically with Romani 
victims in mind. This case therefore provides a clear picture of the value of victims’ 
organizations and the crucial role they play in forcing governments to pay reparations.  
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The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1, I discuss the data and methods I 
use in this chapter, including explaining my rationale for examining the Romani German case. In 
Section 2, I examine the situation of Romani Germans prior to WWII and explain how these 
circumstances enabled officials to easily deny Romani reparations claims after the war. In 
Section 3, I follow the trajectory of the German Roma and Sinti’s path to reparations from the 
end of WWII up through 1970, which was characterized by pervasive antiziganism, or anti-
Roma sentiment, in the West German bureaucracy, judiciary, and legislature. This antiziganism 
prevented most Romani survivors and their relatives from accessing the reparations they were 
entitled to under West German law. In Section 4, I trace how, from 1970 onwards, a burgeoning 
Romani civil rights movement began demanding reparations, garnering media attention, and 
attracting influential domestic and international allies. These efforts then led to a renewed round 
of reparations payments to many German Sinti and Roma. Finally, I conclude by discussing the 
main implications of this case study and how it helps illuminate the puzzle of why governments 
would ever decide to pay reparations to citizens who were so powerless and disliked as to be 
subjected to severe, long-term human rights abuses. 
2. Data and Methods 
Given the temporal sweep of this chapter, I analyze data from both historical and 
contemporary sources to support my theory. In addition to extensive secondary literature, I also 
present material from primary documents gathered at four different archives in Germany: The 
German Federal Archives in Koblenz, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Archive of Social 
Democracy in Bonn, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy 
in Sankt Augustin, and the Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation in 
Berlin. Other sources include transcripts of debates in the German Parliament, questions 
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submitted to the Government by the Parliamentary party factions, and German federal 
legislation, all of which are freely available online. These documents give insight into the public 
and private political maneuvering going on in the German government, show how organizations 
and allies pressured the government and how that pressure was received, and reveal individuals’ 
and ministries’ self-professed motives for their behavior. This gives me period-specific data that 
is unavailable in secondary literature and that cannot be acquired after the fact, even from 
eyewitnesses, because subsequent events always color the way we see the past. I also consulted 
numerous books and publications issued by Sinti civil rights advocates, their activist allies, and 
political supporters. 
Additionally, I draw on interviews with eleven experts on German Sinti and Roma. I 
conducted these semi-structured interviews in Germany between December 2015 and September 
2016. I held these interviews in German (the respondents’ native language) with seven scholars, 
one full-time activist, a journalist, and three professionals employed at or in charge of 
organizations connected to Roma and Sinti. Respondents were initially selected based on their 
relevant expertise, as judged by their publications or leadership roles in Roma & Sinti 
organizations, and further interview partners were added via the snowball method. With the 
exception of one telephone interview, the interviews were conducted in person in Berlin, 
Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Göttingen, Hamburg, and Heidelberg. Each interview generally lasted 
around an hour. 
By including case studies of both German Jews and German Roma and Sinti, I am able to 
hold many contextual variables constant and can focus on tracing how the variation on my 
independent variables leads to divergent reparations outcomes. Although each group’s tragedy 
was unique, horrific, and should never be minimized in any way, there are nonetheless 
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comparable elements in their histories that can provide useful information on reparations more 
generally. Both German Jews and German Sinti and Roma were minorities within Germany who 
were subject to societal prejudice and viewed as separate from German society, despite having 
been German residents and citizens for hundreds of years. Both groups were persecuted by the 
same government in the same time period, fired from their jobs, divested of their property, 
interned in ghettos, forced to submit to slave labor, deported to concentration camps,54 subjected 
to brutal medical experiments,55 and sent to the gas chambers, and both groups suffered the 
destruction of their families, language, culture, and way of life. These two groups were also the 
two largest groups of German citizens targeted for purely racial reasons,56 meaning that postwar 
legislation entitled them to reparations via the same legal clause. However, the resources, allies, 
and political opportunities available to these two groups differed greatly. Because these cases 
vary in their outcome despite the many contextual factors that are held constant across the cases, 
analyzing both of them in detail helps me to more clearly trace the causal path, reject alternative 
explanations, and present strong support for my theory.   
3. Laying the Groundwork for Postwar Discrimination: A History of Prejudice 
Part of the reason for why Sinti and Roma were denied reparations for the crimes 
committed by the Nazi government was because of enduring, widespread anti-Roma prejudice 
                                                        
54 The conditions in which they were held were also often different. This is not to say that one 
group endured worse conditions than another, simply that the circumstances were not identical. 
For example, in Auschwitz Sinti and Roma were held in the notorious “Gypsy Family Camp,” 
while Jewish families were separated and segregated by gender (Lewy 2000). 
 
55 The precise nature of these experiments often differed; Sinti and Roma were 
disproportionately subjected to forced sterilization experiments, for example (Brustad 2016). 
 
56 The Nazis also targeted Afro-Germans and other groups of non-German citizens for racial 
reasons, including Poles and Slavs.  
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that had pervaded German culture well prior to the rise of the Nazis. Antiziganist discrimination 
dates as far back as the presence of Roma in Germany. For example, in the 1490s, territory that 
would eventually become part of Germany passed a law that stripped Roma of their rights and 
made it legal to murder them (Engbring-Romang 2001, 39). Legal anti-Roma measures were not 
usually so extreme, but they were sustained (Opfermann 2015). Starting in 1899, Munich had a 
division of its police force dedicated to tackling “Gypsy crime.”57 This office was moved to 
Berlin in 1938 to form the Reich Central Office to Combat the Gypsy Menace (Reichszentrale 
zur Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens, or RZBZ), where it kept files on the local Roma 
population, including fingerprint records, and used these files to help draw up lists of people to 
deport to concentration camps (End “Dispositive”). In the early 1900s, German state and federal 
parliaments often debated the “Gypsy Question”58 and engaged in a systematic effort to exclude 
Sinti and Roma from economic, political, and social life within Germany (Bonillo 2015). These 
laws both reinforced and were driven by pernicious stereotypes that cast Roma as asocial,59 
                                                        
57 I have left the word “Gypsy” in historical quotations, book titles, and names of policies, 
departments, and places where the German word “Zigeuner” was used in the original text. 
However, this approach is meant to demonstrate the racism and conventions of the time, not as 
an endorsement of the word, which (as of this writing) Sinti and Roma generally regard as a 
highly offensive racial slur. Throughout this dissertation, I have done my best to use respectful 
language when describing and referring to the groups discussed in my research, but linguistic 
conventions are different across space, time, and language, and I have almost certainly selected 
the wrong phrases at times. These errors were unintentional, but I do apologize. 
 
58 It is no accident that this phrase calls to mind the term “Jewish Question”—a question that was 
also hotly debated by German politicians, and which the Nazis answered with the Final Solution. 
 
59 Attributing ‘asocial’ behavior to Roma was essentially tautological, because the phrase did not 
have any firm meaning, and nearly anything that Sinti and Roma did could be deemed ‘asocial’ 
simply because a Romani individual was the one doing it. However, some supposed ‘asocial’ 
behavior included being chronically unemployed, being a criminal, and not living in a fixed 
location. It should be noted that Sinti and Roma were often unemployed due to German 
prejudice, that there is no evidence that Romani citizens committed crimes at higher rates than 
 
 149 
criminal, and prone to espionage. Because such discrimination was normalized and legalized 
before the war, it was difficult for Sinti and Roma to dismantle it after the war, particularly after 
twelve years of Nazi rule.  
The Nazis persecuted Romani Germans in many of the same ways they did Jewish 
Germans. Roma were also affected by the Nuremberg Laws, and they were gradually pushed out 
of jobs, school, and the army, as well. The government confiscated their possessions. Some were 
interned in camps within Germany at first, where conditions often led to sickness and starvation. 
They were deported en masse, initially to Poland and then to concentration camps, where they 
were subjected to medical experiments (particularly sterilization), starvation, forced labor, and 
where most of them were ultimately murdered. (Engbring-Romang 2001) 
4. Postwar Bureaucratic Discrimination: 1945-1970 
a. The Immediate Postwar Period: 1945-1953 
 
The years immediately after the end of WWII were difficult for all Holocaust victims, of 
course, but Sinti and Roma had even less political opportunity than many other groups due to the 
central elements of my theory: They had no organizations and no prominent allies advocating 
specifically for them. To make things worse, prewar anti-Roma prejudices continued to be 
socially acceptable. These prewar and Nazi-era laws and stereotypes were often used to exclude 
Sinti and Roma from accessing reparations through the Zone-level reparations laws. At the heart 
of much of this exclusion was a debate over whether the Nazis’ treatment of Sinti and Roma was 
due to racial prejudice or a legitimate concern for state security. Even advocates for the latter 
position generally accepted that the Nazis’ actions toward Roma were motivated by racial 
                                                        
other citizens, and that nearly all German Sinti and Roma were sedentary, although some of them 
moved around for their jobs as traveling salesmen.  
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animus beginning on December 16, 1942, when Heinrich Himmler issued an infamous briefing 
known as the Auschwitz-Erlaß.60 In this decree, Himmler ordered that Sinti and Roma be 
deported to Auschwitz and gave specific racial criteria for deciding who should and should not 
be deported. Prior to that, though, many Germans insisted that the Nazi-era treatment of Sinti and 
Roma was due to a wide range of supposedly non-racial reasons, although all of these state 
security justifications rested on false racial stereotypes. For example, in April 1953, the regional 
appeals court in Neustadt, Rhineland-Palatinate, issued the following ruling:  
“Racial persecution of the Gypsies was not instituted until the order issued by the head of 
the SS on December 16, 1942… In as far as Gypsies were transported to a concentration 
camp prior to that date, this was, as a rule, a law-enforcement measure… for the 
preventative fight against career and habitual criminals, as well as other asocial persons, 
including work-shy individuals and those who refused to work.” (OLG Neustadt 1953, 
187-188). 
 
In May of 1953, the regional appeals court in Munich issued a similarly obtuse ruling in a case 
involving a Romani deportee:  
“It seems that the effects of the war and the concomitant general restrictions, as well as 
the increased difficulties of surveilling traveling people, and the danger of their being 
involved in espionage, were not without influence on issuing the directive for these 
measures. In accordance with this, the Senate is convinced that the decisive reasons for 
the plaintiff’s resettlement were certainly related to security, and potentially there were 
also military reasons, but racial reasons were in no way pivotal” (OLG München 1953). 
 
As seen in the justifications above, many legal professionals refused to believe or admit 
that Sinti and Roma had been persecuted for racial reasons prior to 1942, preferring instead to 
blame the victims for their own misfortunes. This view remained firmly rooted within the West 
German judiciary, bureaucracy, and political establishment for decades, even though there was 
an overabundance of clear evidence contradicting this position. For example, in 1935, Hans 
                                                        
60 Although no copies of the brief remain, it was quoted in an overnight letter from the Reich’s 
Criminal Police Department (Reichskriminalpolizeiamt, or RKPA) that does still exist 
(Engbring-Romang 2001).  
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Globke, who was later West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s chief of staff, coauthored 
the Nazi government’s Commentary on German Racial Legislation along with Wilhelm Stuckart, 
the Nazi Reich Minister of the Interior (who was later convicted of war crimes), and included the 
phrase “in Europe, only Jews and Gypsies have foreign blood” (Narr 1986). A decree issued on 
December 14, 1937, permitted the police to arrest anyone “who, without being a criminal or 
habitual criminal, endangers society through his asocial behavior,” which gave German security 
forces free license to arrest Sinti and Roma at any time, given that ‘asocial behavior’ was 
ascribed to Sinti and Roma as an innate racial characteristic (Frick 1937). In 1938, an ordinance 
issued by the head of the SS and the head of the German Police indicated that all Roma should 
soon be apprehended by the police in order to prevent racial mixing (Fings 2015, 106-7).  
However, there were also influential individuals who considered these facts and decided 
that, in contrast to the prevailing opinion at the time, Roma had indeed been racially persecuted 
before the end of 1942. Initially, a sizable portion of the staff in compensation offices were 
themselves former victims and/or otherwise anti-Nazi, which led to a more generous and 
understanding processing of compensation claims (Margalit 2002, 67). Two of the most notable 
were Dr. Philipp Auerbach,61 who led the Bavarian Reparations Department 
(Wiedergutmachungsamt) for five years, and Dr. Marcel Frenkel, who led the Reparations 
Department in North Rhine-Westphalia (“Philip Auerbach” 1952). Given that Frenkel and 
Auerbach were both Jewish Germans who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis,62 too, they 
could understand what had happened to Romani Germans better than most compensation 
                                                        
61 Some sources spell his name ‘Philip,’ others as ‘Philipp.’ 
 




officials. They generally used their high-level positions in the reparations system to aid Roma 
victims and, in most cases—though there were exceptions—held the opinion that Romani 
Germans had been persecuted for racial reasons (Margalit 2002, 103). Some of this early 
engagement from Auerbach, Frenkel, and other Jewish compensation officials was due to moral 
reasons, and some of it was driven by worry that if German officials were willing to take Nazi-
era and racist prewar laws at face value and use them to deny Romani reparations claims, then 
perhaps the same fate would befall Jewish victims, too (Margalit 2013, 122, 185).  
Regardless of their motives, their engagement was forceful and sustained. In 1948, likely 
after observing that his coworkers in the compensation offices in North Rhine-Westphalia were 
not treating Roma as victims of the Nazis’ racial policy, Frenkel wrote to the Presidents of the 
Administrative Headquarters in North Rhine-Westphalia to emphasize that “Gypsies and Gypsies 
of mixed blood fall under the category of racially persecuted and are to be treated according to 
those guidelines. The same rules apply to them as apply to Jews and half Jews” (von dem 
Knesebeck 2011, 80). In 1950, both Auerbach and Frenkel vehemently objected to the position 
held by other members of the Coordination Committee of Compensation Offices, which was that 
Roma had been persecuted due to their own asocial and/or criminal behavior, not for racial 
reasons (Margalit 2013, 185). The regional appeals court in Frankfurt concurred with Auerbach 
and Frenkel, as it issued a ruling in 1952 that stated that “It is correct that the laws of the Third 
Reich do not explicitly emphasize that Gypsies constitute a unique race. However, the legal and 
administrative practices of the Nazi state treated them as an inferior race from the very 
beginning” (OLG Frankfurt, 1953).  
However, such attitudes were rare, and Frenkel and Auerbach’s political clout was 
muffled by political opponents’ efforts to discredit and silence them (Margalit 2002, 118). As 
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Allied influence waned and West Germany regained sovereignty, long-term reparations 
bureaucrats—many of whom had been victims—were pushed out, and new, non-victim 
bureaucrats took their place (Margalit 2002, 89). Unlike the old guard of reparations bureaucrats, 
who had generally viewed their role as being an advocate for victims in general and for their own 
victim group in particular, these new bureaucrats considered themselves to be representatives of 
West German financial interests (Margalit 2002, 89). Thus, Sinti and Roma often had difficulty 
making successful reparations claims even in districts where favorable court decisions had been 
passed, because these bureaucrats, doctors, and so-called experts deciding on the merits of 
individual claims still had a great deal of discretion. In addition to having a financially 
conservative mindset, many of these gatekeepers were holdovers from the Nazi era. This meant 
that Sinti and Roma often had to have their reparations claims approved by the exact same 
people who, just a few years prior, had been actively engaged in drafting, interpreting, and 
implementing the Nazis’ genocidal policies (Reuter 2016, Interview 47, 2016).  
Unsurprisingly, antiziganist discrimination continued in other areas, as well. Although 
the Allies had officially dissolved the Nazis’ federal “Gypsy crime” police bureau, in reality the 
Nazi-era files, ideology, and many members of the personnel moved back to Munich. The office 
was then euphemistically renamed the “Vagrancy Unit” (Landfahrerstelle), and officials 
continued to use these files to profile, track, arrest, and convict Roma in the same way as before 
and during the war63 (End “Dispositive”). Perpetrators populated academia, with the most 
famous examples being Robert Ritter, a racial scientist, and his assistant Eva Justin, a nurse. 
Ritter and Justin were instrumental in gathering much of the Nazis’ documentation on the 
                                                        
63 This unit was not declared unconstitutional and dissolved until the 1970s (End “Dispositive”). 




Romani German population, publishing research that attested to the immutable criminal and 
asocial natures of Roma, and sending thousands of German citizens to their deaths. Justin was 
still working on her doctoral dissertation at that time, and so she kept a group of 39 Sinti children 
from being deported in order to observe them (Justin 1943; Reuter 2014, 159). Once her research 
was finished and her dissertation was printed, the children were sent to Auschwitz, where all but 
four of them were murdered (Reuter 2014, 159). Although Ritter committed suicide in 1950, 
Justin continued to work in Frankfurt am Main without censure—the Health Department in 
Frankfurt hired her on as a child psychologist even though she was never trained in this field, and 
she was also hired as an expert witness to assess Roma and Sinti applying for reparations (“Dr. 
Robert Ritter”; Interview 48, 2016; Reuter 2014, 159). 
Of course, Jewish victims also encountered perpetrators when submitting their claims, 
and they had to deal with extreme and demeaning prejudice throughout the lengthy reparations 
process, too.64 I am not arguing that Jewish victims had it easier than Sinti and Roma, that they 
encountered fewer obstacles, or that they faced less discrimination. They did, however, have 
resources that German Sinti and Roma simply did not, and these resources enabled Jewish 
victims to be much more successful in their reparations claims (Scharffenberg aus Tarp 2000; 
Opfermann 2016). Unlike German Jews, German Sinti and Roma had no international 
                                                        
64 There were certainly plenty of cases where antisemitic German officials used racist logic to 
deny a Jewish victim’s reparations claim. For example, Jewish victims of the Holocaust often 
reported suffering depression as a result of their experiences in the concentration camps, but 
doctors at the time disregarded these claims and refused to certify that these individuals deserved 
reparations for having suffered damage to their mental health. Because there was no way to 
definitively prove that patients were depressed because of their time in the concentration camp, 
most doctors dismissed survivors’ claims by saying that Jews were inclined to depression, and so 
these mental issues were due to the immutable Jewish personality, not years of imprisonment, 
brutality, and trauma (“Nervensache” 1956). However, comparatively speaking, Jewish victims 
were, overall, more likely to receive reparations than Romani victims.  
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organizations, no home state, and no domestic groups of non-Romani allies supporting them. 
They did not even have their own organizations. According to Ulrich Opfermann, a German 
historian and activist whom I interviewed, “organizations were a relatively foreign idea to the 
Sinti as a minority. They were organized via the extended family, but it was not standard for 
them to enter political parties, civic organizations, and so on” (2016). The family as an 
organizational structure was decimated by the Holocaust, so even this potential rallying point 
was unavailable. Opfermann continued, “Sinti had no organizational examples from the prewar 
period. If you look at the Weimar period, you can see that Jews had organizations, people who 
spoke for their issues who were very capable of asserting their will. The Sinti had to start almost 
from zero.”  
There was no internal impetus to begin organizing, either—Frank Reuter, a German 
historian, remarked that “very few people survived the persecution, they were traumatized, and 
they wanted to be as unnoticeable as possible. This was a survival tactic in the camps… and this 
was how people behaved after the war, as well—they do not want to be noticed, they do not want 
to stand out” (Reuter 2016). Just as most ordinary people do not join advocacy groups, not every 
survivor is going to join a victims’ rights organization. In the case of German Sinti and Roma, 
there were so few survivors to begin with—one of my interviewees estimated the number at 
20,000, while another historian put the number at about 5,000—that the number of potential 
activists was discouragingly small (Interview 14, 2016; Interview 45, 2016; Margalit 2002, 91; 
Olson 1965). This, in turn, reduced the chance that Sinti and Roma would be able to organize 
and pressure the West German government. The key question for postwar reparations, according 
to another historian, was “which groups have a lobby?” and the answer to that question was, put 
simply, not the Sinti and Roma (Interview 14, 2016, Verband Deutscher Sinti und Roma: 
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Landesverband Hessen 2016). The small size of this victim group, their trauma, their lack of 
education, and their hesitancy to interact with the German state all made it highly unlikely that 
they would get organized any time soon. As my theory predicts, this lack of organization was an 
important factor in preventing Romani Germans from accessing reparations in the immediate 
postwar period.  
To add to the problem, many Roma and Sinti were stripped of their German citizenship 
after the war,65 and, even though their ancestors had lived in Germany for 600 years, they were 
certainly not seen as German, making it even less likely that the state would take their claims 
seriously (Interview 44, 2016, Schulz 2016). These hurdles were further compounded by several 
other additional factors. Sinti and Roma were severely traumatized, many of them could not read 
and write because they “had been ripped out of school during the war,” and they had little to no 
trust in the bureaucracy (Reuter 2016, Interview 48, 2016, Opfermann 2016). “For these people, 
the state had been the enemy, and it was still viewed as such. State organs had been the 
persecutors, and the former persecutors were often still there after the war” in key positions 
(Reuter 2016). It was therefore nearly impossible for them to navigate the complex reparations 
bureaucracy and to parse an “uncontrolled, wild growth of [reparations] legislation” (Interview 
13, 2016). 
Nor did Roma and Sinti have politically powerful allies to assist them in this process. 
Frenkel and Auerbach made meaningful efforts in their spheres of influence, but Frenkel was 
pushed out due to his communist affiliations, and Auerbach was removed from his office in 1951 
                                                        
65 This was due to the racist belief that Sinti and Roma were not Germans. Understandably, 
victims who returned to their homes in Germany did so without identifying papers or the 
documents to prove their residency; this lack of documentation (which was due to Nazi 
persecution) was then used to argue that the individuals in question were postwar immigrants, 
not German citizens.  
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and committed suicide in 1952 (Opfermann 2016).66 This lack of support severely hindered the 
likelihood that Roma would receive reparations. “Every powerless minority needs a movement, 
needs powerful allies who can speak for them if they are to succeed, and in the 1950s the Roma 
and Sinti simply did not have this” (Reuter 2016). Furthermore, while the United States had 
explicitly told the West German government that it expected reparations to be paid to the Jews, 
this was not the case with Roma: “the Allies never explicitly made any statement about the status 
of the Sinti and Roma as victims, and so… what happened to these people was not on the radar” 
(Interview 14, 2016; Margalit 2002, 92). Israeli historian Gilad Margalit explains that “the 
military governments did regard the Nazi persecution of Gypsies as racist persecution, similar to 
the Nazi persecution of Jews,” but “Gypsies, in contrast to Jews, were not explicitly mentioned 
in documents of the Allies and of the International Refugees Organization as a special category 
of victims of Nazism” (2002, 92-3). 
Thus, in the immediate postwar years, German Sinti and Roma were in a disadvantageous 
position. In contrast to German Jewish survivors (writ large), Romani survivors did not have the 
emotional support and educational resources they needed to start advocating for themselves, they 
had no representatives in Parliament, and they had no emigrant survivors who were capable of 
taking on the responsibility of organizing and lobbying. Furthermore, Sinti and Roma had never 
received the protection of the Allied governments the way that Jewish victims had. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, because Allied governments—particularly the United States—had 
initially emphasized to West German politicians the importance of paying reparations (and the 
costs of failing to pay) to Jewish survivors, West German politicians continued to believe that the 
                                                        
66 A panel of five judges, three of whom had belonged to the Nazi Party, convicted Auerbach of 
embezzling funds by disbursing 3,000,000 Deutsch Marks to Jewish individuals for false 
reparations claims. Auerbach committed suicide a week later. (“Philip Auerbach” 1952) 
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Allies would inflict punishments if Jewish victims were not compensated. This belief persisted 
even though the American government quickly decided it cared far more about West Germany’s 
support in the Cold War than it did about ensuring West Germany made its reparations 
payments, and Jewish victims continued to be paid. Sinti and Roma, however, had never gotten 
Allied support, and so West German politicians had no external incentives—either real or 
imagined—to cater to this group’s interests. 
b. 1953-1956: Uneven Implementation of the BErG 
 
Despite all of these structural disadvantages, there was still reason to hope that 
reparations for German Roma and Sinti would be forthcoming once the BErG was passed on 
September 18, 1953. Although German Sinti and Roma remained unorganized due to the 
psychological, educational, and capacity reasons mentioned above, they did have a few 
politically influential allies in this time period. These allies, many of whom were Jewish 
bureaucrats in the West Germany compensation system, argued that, legally, Sinti and Roma had 
been promised reparations under the clause of the BErG that guaranteed reparations to victims 
who had been persecuted for racial reasons. This clause had been included in order to give 
reparations to Jewish victims, but, due to the language used in the law, the phrase entitled Sinti 
and Roma to reparations, too. As a result, Jewish Germans were motivated to protect Roma not 
just for moral reasons, but also because they feared that if Roma were blocked from receiving 
reparations due to discriminatory arguments, then the same thing could happen to Jewish victims 
(Margalit 2002). Thus, although highly organized and mobilized Jewish reparations advocates 
were the ones pushing the reparations process along, their work had positive externalities for 
Romani survivors, as well.  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the passage of the BErG was largely the result of Jewish 
organizations’ concerted efforts to pressure the West German federal government. However, the 
law was not limited to Jewish victims alone—it instead promised reparations to anyone “who, in 
the time from January 30, 1933, to May 8, 1945 (the period of persecution) was persecuted by 
violent national-socialist measures due to their anti-national-socialist political convictions, or for 
reasons of race, belief, or worldview (the reasons for persecution), and who as a result suffered 
damages to their life, body, health, freedom, property, assets, or their professional and economic 
advancement (persecuted individual)” (Bundesgesetzblatt 1953, 1388). 
Thus, Roma and Sinti were clearly eligible for reparations under the BErG. As racial 
victims, Roma and Sinti had an unassailable right to reparations under the law. In practice, 
however, the reparations claims made by Roma and Sinti continued to be overwhelmingly 
denied, just the way they had been prior to 1953, when the subnational reparations laws were in 
effect. Bureaucrats continued routinely refusing to disburse reparations, doctors continued to 
discount victims’ statements, and courts persisted in justifying the Nazis’ actions by arguing that 
individuals were not persecuted due to racial reasons, but rather because Roma and Sinti were 
asocial and criminal (Bamberger 1981; Margalit 2002, 123-4; von dem Knesebeck 2011, 10). 
This line of argumentation was particularly true for claims made for events that occurred prior to 
Himmler’s Auschwitz-Erlaß.  
Not everyone in positions of power took this exclusionary approach, however, and it soon 
became clear that subnational courts were interpreting the reparations eligibility of Sinti and 
Roma in very different ways. As a result, a federal law was being unevenly and unfairly applied 
from region to region. Thus, it fell to the highest court in the land, the Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof, or BGH), to decide at what point Sinti and Roma had been racially 
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persecuted rather than subjected to ‘necessary anti-criminal measures.’ On January 7, 1956, the 
BGH ruled that only Roma and Sinti who were interned or deported after March 1, 1943 were 
being held for the racial reasons that made them eligible for reparations (BGH, v. 7.1.1956 –IV 
ZR 211/55; Dokumentations- und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und Roma 2015). Actions 
taken prior to that were simply measures necessary to combat the “Gypsy plague,” because the 
“asocial” and “criminal” characteristics of these people had long made it necessary to place 
restrictions on them. This dealt a crushing blow to the reparations hopes of Roma and Sinti, 
because this ruling gave official approval to bureaucrats’ routine refusal to pay reparations to 
victims who were legally entitled to reparations.  
Political scientist Wolf-Dieter Narr gave the following explanation of this ruling. After 
noting that part of the BGH’s justification was that it was necessary to imprison Sinti and Roma 
in order to prevent the possibility that these individuals would engage in espionage, he said, 
“One could also have used this hardly-believable justification to deny Jewish claims, in as far as 
this assertion was relevant to the actual facts before their deportation to Auschwitz. Such judicial 
injustice cannot be dared in deference to public opinion, however, because a worldwide 
chastisement of the judges would have been the result. In any case, Sinti had no press and no 
personal public opinion. For that reason, it was less dangerous to restrict their claims” (1986).  
Some courts did dare to issue subsequent rulings that directly referenced and contradicted 
the BGH ruling, but even these ‘friendly’ rulings often perpetuated racist stereotypes. For 
example, in 1957, the Regional Court in Cologne rebutted the BGH’s decision that Roma and 
Sinti were subjected to racially-motivated persecution only after Himmler’s Auschwitz Decree of 
December 16, 1942. After reading the relevant governmental communications, “and with due 
simultaneous consideration of the overall conditions at the time,” the court ruled “that the [1940 
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deportation of 2500 Sinti and Roma to occupied Poland] is to be seen, above all, as a national-
socialist measure arising from racial motives.” However, the court then added that “the chamber 
does not overlook the fact that the Gypsy Question occupied and placed difficult questions 
before the police and security forces even prior to 1933, and not just in Germany. This was due 
in part to the Gypsies’ own peculiarities and inherited behaviors” (LG Köln 1957, 318).  
At this point in time, Sinti and Roma still lacked the resources and allies necessary to 
mount a push for reparations. They were a numerically negligible group—even in the mid-1960s, 
there were estimated to be no more than 30,000 Roma in Germany (Formanek and Oxenknecht 
1979). As previously stated, many survivors could neither read nor write, due to having been 
removed from school due to the war or, in the case of many members of the older generation, 
never having been allowed in school in the first place (Opfermann 2016). They encountered 
severe discrimination from judges and doctors, individuals who could have been allies in the 
reparations process but were largely hindrances (Bamberger 1981). Nazi holdovers in the 
bureaucracy and elsewhere served to keep many Romani victims from even submitting their 
reparations paperwork, let alone mobilizing for their rights, and these same holdovers pushed out 
many of the officials and allies who were sympathetic to the Roma’s claims (Reuter 2016; 
Margalit 2002). Jewish victims experienced bureaucratic discrimination, too, but they were often 
better equipped with the emotional and legal resources they needed to push back against such 
racism. Furthermore, even antisemitic officials were aware of the international backlash that 
would occur if it were discovered that Jewish victims were being systematically denied 
reparations. There was no such backlash to fear with Romani survivors; as one of my 
interviewees put it, “There was no pressure to pay the Sinti and Roma, because what happens if 
you do not pay them? Nothing” (Interview 14, 2016). As a result of this constellation of adverse 
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factors, and in contrast to the highly mobilized example of Jewish victims, there was no 
concerted effort working to counter the anti-Roma stereotypes and unjust legal practices that 
were warping the German reparations system.  
c. January 1956-December 1963: German Courts Debate 
 
Romani survivors had reason to hope anew, however, when lower-level courts released a 
rash of decisions that contradicted the BGH’s ruling. As was the case in the early 1950s, Romani 
survivors remained unorganized, but they did have a few politically influential allies fighting for 
their right to reparations. From 1956 to 1963 many of those allies were lawyers and judges, who 
exerted pressure that forced the BGH to alter its exclusionary ruling. However, my theory 
predicts that victims themselves need to be involved in pushing for reparations if that campaign 
is to succeed, and that was simply not the case for Sinti and Roma during this time period. 
Accordingly, Sinti and Roma still remained largely overlooked and discriminated against when it 
came to reparations. Nevertheless, the number of Sinti and Roma whose reparations claims 
would be given due consideration did expand during this time period, due to the help of various 
regional courts and legal professionals.  
The June 18, 1957 ruling of the Regional Appeals Court in Cologne, mentioned briefly 
above, rebuked the BGH by name, saying, “The adjudicating court is unable to follow the BGH 
when it comes to its fundamental decision of January 7, 1956 (RzW 56, 111 [114])” (LG Köln 
1957, 318). The Regional Appeals Court in Hamburg issued its own dissenting ruling in 1958, 
with the Regional Court in Kiel and the Regional Appeals Court in Frankfurt following along in 
1960 and 1961, respectively (OLG Frankfurt 1961, 544; OLG Hamburg 1959, 121; LG Kiel 
1961, 59). Frankfurt courts in particular had a strong track record of issuing rulings that directly 
rebutted the BGH’s decision, which Julia von dem Knesebeck explains by saying that, in all 
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likelihood, influential personalities in the Frankfurt legal system fostered a more progressive 
legal climate (Interview 14, 2016; 2011, 127-8). She mentions two men as having been 
particularly instrumental: Franz Calvelli-Adorno, who was the President of the Compensation 
Senate in the Frankfurt am Main Higher District Court, and Fritz Bauer, who was the Attorney 
General in the state of Hessen from 1956-1968 (2011, 127-8). Although Calvelli-Adorno and 
Bauer were not able to issue legal rulings on their own, their powerful positions did allow them 
to shape the tone and direction of legal rulings on this issue to at least a certain extent (von dem 
Knesebeck 2011, 127-8).  
Prominent legal experts also raised their voices in opposition to the BGH, with many of 
them publishing dissenting commentary in the periodical Reparations Case-Law 
(Rechtsprechung zum Wiedergutmachungsrecht, or RzW). This publication, which published 
summaries of court decisions on reparations cases, as well as the legal justifications for those 
decisions, scholars’ reactions to the decisions, and occasional essays on special topics in 
reparations case-law, was well-known in both the legal field and in compensation offices 
throughout West Germany (von dem Knesebeck 2011, 127). It published reactions to the BGH’s 
decision that could be quite sharp, as was the case with an essay written by Dr. Alfred Schüler 
from Frankfurt am Main, where he wrote: “In light of the Nuremberg Laws and the measures 
described, can—objectively—the racial persecution of the Gypsies really be denied?” He 
continued this trenchant critique by saying,  
“If the BGH were justified in its opinion that the Gypsies’ racial persecution, which was 
ultimately intended to annihilate, did not start before 1943, then how do we understand 
the secret report of First Lieutenant Walther from November 1, 1941 (Poliakov-Wulf, Das 
Dritte Reich und seine Diener, 1956, p. 353), which—in terrifying dispassion—tells of 
‘shooting Jews and Gypsies,’ which ‘goes very quickly (100 men in 40 minutes),’—i.e. 
tells of the destruction of people who had committed no crimes and were ‘selected’ only 
because they were Jews and Gypsies? Is that not a racially-motivated persecution long 
before the date to which the BGH holds fast? One cannot resist the impression that the 
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BGH would have been able to corroborate the concordant judgments of the lower courts 
if it had kept in mind the first clause of the preamble of the BEG and its still-unforgotten 
thesis from November 22, 1954 (RzW 55, 57)” (Schüler 1959, 135).  
 
These contradictory rulings of some lower courts forced the BGH to continue defending 
its earlier ruling. In May 1959, it issued a ruling saying that the court would “abide by” the ruling 
“that the measures utilized against Gypsies prior to March 1, 1943, were not based on racial 
reasons,” and any individual case in which a Romani claimant tried to argue that they had been 
racially persecuted before this date would need to present extraordinary decisive evidence to 
prove their assertions (BGH 1959). It repeated this assertion five months later, arguing that 
actions taken towards Roma prior to the Auschwitz-Erlaß were due to Roma’s own 
“predominantly asocial behavior” (BGH 1960). Other courts fell in line with the BGH, using 
twisted logic to defend the position that Roma and Sinti were not always persecuted for racial 
reasons and extending that logic to Austria, saying that there, too, the racially-motivated 
persecution of Roma had not begun until March 1, 1943 (OLG München 1959). 
These rulings and others led many Sinti and Roma to disengage from the reparations 
debate altogether. Given the near-certainty that their claims would be denied, they saw little 
point in subjecting themselves to the retraumatizing process of drafting their personal narratives, 
undergoing medical assessments, having their claims investigated by former perpetrators, and 
potentially fighting through a lengthy court case, only to be told that their own asocial and 
criminal behavior justified the Nazis’ actions (Stanicki 1968). It is hard to overstate how 
devastating this ruling was to Roma’s chances for compensation. Writing years later, District 
Court Counselor Henning Stanicki of Karlsruhe said that “the BGH has seldom determined the 
course of a group of persecuted people as definitively as it did in its earlier ruling that Gypsies as 
a group were not persecuted for racial reasons prior to March 1, 1943,” adding that 
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“Unfortunately, it is usually difficult to avoid the impression that Gypsies are subjected to 
particularly close scrutiny” (1968, 529, 535).  
Still, despite this scrutiny and the BGH’s rebuttals, there were still courts and individuals, 
many of them Jewish judges and lawyers with moral motivations to help fellow survivors, who 
persisted in speaking up about the injustice of the BGH ruling and its continued attempts to 
defend its position (Interview 14, 2016; Margalit 2002, 127). The force of these objections took 
on added weight in the early 1960s when Kurt May, a Jewish German who was the director of 
the United Restitution Organization, asked Calvelli-Adorno to write and publish an opinion piece 
critiquing the BGH decision (Interview 14, 2016; Margalit 2002, 126). May had been a staunch 
and active critic of this ruling for years. He corresponded and met with politicians, members of 
the judiciary, and compensation authorities to discuss the issue; he pushed historian Hans 
Buchheim at the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich to research the 1940 deportation 
of German Sinti and Roma to Poland; and he even aided Buchheim in his work, which he hoped 
would help prove that Romani Germans had been persecuted for racial reasons well before the 
Auschwitz-Erlaß (Margalit 2002, 126). May’s next step was to find a prominent member of the 
judiciary, one whose opinion would not be seen as biased, to refute the BGH’s logic, and 
Calvelli-Adorno was the perfect candidate67 (Interview 14, 2016; Margalit 2002, 126). 
In 1961, Rechtsprechung zum Wiedergutmachung published Calvelli-Adorno’s scathing 
critique of the BGH’s ruling, and the piece caused such a stir that the BGH was forced to 
acknowledge that it had failed to consider all of the relevant evidence when it issued its 1956 
ruling on the Roma’s status as racial victims (von deem Knesebeck 2011, 123). Using the 
                                                        
67 Calvelli-Adorno’s mother was Jewish, and although this meant that he was not allowed to 
remain Frankfurt’s district court administrator during the Nazi era, he was not sent to a 
concentration camp; he was a private music tutor throughout the war (Adorno 2001, 216).  
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extensive documentation that May and the United Restitution Organization had collected on 
Roma in the Third Reich, Calvelli-Adorno argued that the racially-motivated persecution began 
well before the Auschwitz-Erlaß, and he gave the evidence to prove it (Calvelli-Adorno 1961; 
Interview 14, 2016). He also indicated his frustration at the racial prejudice that had resulted in 
the late 1943 cutoff in the first place, saying, 
“The injustice and the nameless suffering that was inflicted upon Gypsies (men, women, 
and children) via characteristic national-socialist methods obligates everyone who deals 
with their compensation in accordance with the BEG, whether in lawmaking, 
administration, or jurisprudence, to utilize self-control in regard to their personal, internal 
opinions and to soberly weigh the different possible motives of the Nazis’ actions 
towards the Gypsies. … Emotionally-motivated decisions must be avoided… It would be 
a crass and collective injustice to ask if Gypsies are ‘worthy’ of reparations” (1961, 529). 
 
Although Calvelli-Adorno was far from the first to object so vehemently to the ruling, his 
piece was the one that tipped the scales (Narr 1986). Julia von dem Knesebeck explains that this 
is likely because the essay was “published both by the United Restitution Organisation, which 
had enormous international backing, and by the legal journal Rechtsprechung zum 
Wiedergutmachungsrecht, which reached the entire West German legal community and 
eventually the compensation authorities” (2011, 127). Finally, on December 18, 1963, the 
BGH—whose membership had changed in the intervening years, with only two judges from the 
original decision remained on the bench—revised its ruling, writing that the racial persecution of 
the Roma had begun in 1938, and possibly as early as 1935 (BGH 1964, 209; Margalit 2002, 
128). 
The practical effects of this ruling were limited to a select number of victims and their 
heirs. Although Roma now had a better chance of making a successful reparations claim, the 
burden was still on victims themselves to submit these claims in the first place (von dem 
Knesebeck 2011, 129). Survivors were not always paying attention to or aware of legal 
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developments such as the BGH revision, and even for those who were, reparations legislation 
remained a dense tangle of legal jargon that was difficult for oftentimes illiterate survivors to 
interpret. Additionally, societal opinion remained firmly antiziganist, and discrimination 
persisted.  
Furthermore, although it was now possible to receive reparations for deportations and 
internments that had occurred prior to the Auschwitz-Erlaß, this opportunity was not open to all 
Roma. In order to be eligible for reparations for harm suffered prior to 1943, claimants had to 
have submitted their reparations claims on time for the original set of deadlines all the way back 
in the 1950s. Additionally, these claims had to have been rejected due to the then-prevailing—
and now discredited—legal judgment that Sinti and Roma had not been subjected to racial 
persecution prior to 1943, not for other reasons. Thus, Roma who decided not to submit claims 
because they knew these claims would just be rejected could not now submit new claims, and 
Roma whose claims for post-1943 abuses had been denied could resubmit claims only for the 
pre-1943 period of their persecution. All claimants were still subject to a rigorous confirmation 
process that asked them to recount details and present corroborating documents that had long-
since been lost to time. (Stanicki 1968) 
The 1965 Final Compensation Law (BEG-Schlussgesetz), which was passed when there 
was renewed societal interest in these topics and a more sympathetic attitude towards victims, 
was supposed to address some of these deficiencies (BEG Schlußgesetz 1965; Narr 1986; von 
dem Knesebeck 2011, 126). By this point, however, many survivors had died, and those who had 
not—and their heirs—remained reluctant to submit claims due to previous negative experiences 
with the West German government (Narr 1986). Julia von dem Knesebeck explains: “Most often 
it was those Roma who employed lawyers that re-opened their cases; probably because these 
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lawyers, many of whom specialized in compensation claims, were more aware of the adjusted 
legal situation. Those cases which were most successful were predominantly the result of a 
decades-long struggle, during which the prevailing prejudices often had to be endured” (2011, 
123, 129). Understandably, a minority of survivors were willing to put themselves through such 
an exhausting process for a small amount of money68 they might not live to see.  
For decades, the Roma and Sinti went without the organizations, allies, and political 
openings necessary to launch a successful, large-scale reparations bid. Any and all progress on 
the reparations front was due not to victims themselves, but to the efforts of sympathetic 
outsiders who were instrumental in ensuring that Sinti and Roma received some of the 
reparations they had been legally entitled to since 1953. Even these efforts were unable to spark 
meaningful change, however. The reparations laws had not been designed with the unique needs 
of Roma in mind, and so Romani survivors often found themselves battling a system that 
understood neither their present circumstances nor their past suffering. All of this began to 
change in the 1970s, when German Sinti and Roma began to organize and push for their rights. 
As my theory predicts, this self-organization made all the difference in the push for reparations.  
5. 1970-1981: From Mobilization to Reparation 
In the mid-1970s, the children of Roma and Sinti Holocaust survivors started coming of 
age (Verband Deutscher Sinti und Roma: Landesverband Hessen 2016). These children were 
better educated and had not experienced their parents’ trauma, which made it easier for them to 
consider public action (Schulz 2016). Many of them were also much more assertive than their 
                                                        
68 For example, in 1955, ten years after a three-year-old Sintezza named Inge starved to death 
after her family was deported and held in inhumane conditions, it was judged that Inge had 
indeed been persecuted according to the reasons listed in §1 of the BEG and was therefore 
entitled to “compensation for harms to freedom.” Her father received 150 Deutsche Marks. 
(Dambrowski 1981, 73) 
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parents, whose very survival had depended on remaining as unnoticeable as possible, and they 
were tired of being subjected to appallingly blatant discrimination, which, even thirty years after 
the end of WWII, remained socially acceptable. The younger generation believed that their best 
chance to change this state of affairs lay in self-organization. Even early on in the movement, 
Roma activists expressed their belief that the reason Sinti and Roma had never received the 
reparations they were due was because they had had neither a national or international lobbying 
organization (Verband Deutscher Sinti e.V. 1980). By this logic, they would not receive 
reparations, political influence, and public recognition for having been the targets of genocide 
until Sinti and Roma got organized and began lobbying for themselves. This is indeed what 
happened with the young generation, which formed Sinti organizations, sought out the 
professional advocacy advice and the media attention necessary for attracting domestic and 
international attention, and placed high levels of pro-reparations pressure on the West German 
government. 
Anton Franz, one of the early members of the movement that came to be known as the 
Bürgerrechtsbewegung der Sinti und Roma, or the Sinti and Roma Civil Rights Movement, 
expressed the attitude of the younger generation in a 1981 essay:  
“We must ensure that our ranks swell with ever more people who know how to interact 
with public authorities and politicians and who are ready to grapple with their state-
decreed prejudices. Only when we ourselves decide to prove and introduce the non-Sinti, 
our fellow German citizens, to our cultural values, our love for our children, and our 
familial solidarity will we give them the chance to dismantle their stereotypes about us. 
For oftentimes these stereotypes are simply ignorance and stupidity, and in public offices 
it is usually brainless short-sightedness. However, we must summon up the will to do this 
work ourselves. We cannot allow this work to once more be taken up by others; not by 
“scholars,” not by “gypsyologists,” not by the church, and not by the Federal Ministry for 
Family Affairs, who look down on us and think that they stand above us spiritually and 
culturally, or, in the best-case scenario, who have sympathy and pious sayings leftover 




The need for self-advocacy was acute partly because, even thirty years after the end of 
WWII, supposed Roma advocates were still continuing to treat Sinti and Roma with paternalistic 
condescension. For example, Silvia Sobeck, who was engaged by the Catholic Church to work 
with German Sinti and Roma, was viewed as an expert on the community and often consulted by 
local governments and ministries for advice on interaction with the Romani German community. 
A select few of her offensive statements include: “due to the Gypsy’s mentality, he does not 
want to be spoken to in a logical and rational way, but rather via his feelings,” “Because Gypsies 
understand their existence as mystical/mythological, they cannot think progressively,” and “ 
‘Gypsies’ are inherently designed as children. Without in-person contact to their kin, they are 
nearly incapable of living and are usually disturbed” (BArch B 168/807 Zentralrat 1982).  
Thus, in the 1970s, the Sinti and Roma stopped looking to outsiders to advocate for them 
and started organizing on their own (Meyer 2013). This was a difficult process, because “a civil 
rights movement means that you are confidently going out into the public realm, and you are 
very visible. Survivors did not want to do this. The younger generation of activists had a tough 
time persuading the older people and engaging in their political work against the fears of the 
older generation” (Reuter 2016). However, one Sinto in particular, Romani Rose, a child of 
Holocaust survivors whose extended family had largely perished in the Holocaust, became a 
committed activist. He also succeeded in rallying other Sinti, including Holocaust survivors, to 
his cause. He founded the Organization of German Sinti in the early 1970s, which eventually 
became the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, the premier organization for Roma and 
Sinti affairs in Germany today. In its earliest incarnation, this organization was laying a 
foundation for attracting allies, and it started requesting a private interview with the Chancellor 
as early as 1978 (Interview 17, 2016; BArch B 136/28310).  
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The Organization was not without growing pains, as some Sinti were initially quite vocal 
about the fact that it did not speak for them and that they disagreed with both its methods and its 
aims (Jochum 1979). Rose’s organization was also a regional organization to start with, not a 
national one, and it took time for both the Romani German community and German politicians to 
accept the eventual Central Council as a representative negotiating partner (Höver 1981). 
However, many Sinti who had initially been upset with or leery of Rose’s efforts did eventually 
decide to join his organization, and, by July 1981, the Verband Deutscher Sinti was writing to 
the head of the Office of the Federal President to note that, in terms of the percentage of the 
population, nearly ten times as many Sinti were members of the Verband Deutscher Sinti as there 
were German citizens who were members of the political parties represented in the Bundestag 
(Interview 17, 2016; Rose 1981b). Mere days later, a government lawyer advised Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt in an internal memo that it would be mutually advantageous to speak with 
Romani Rose and recognize his Verband Deutscher Sinti e.V. as the legitimate representative of 
German Sinti and Roma (Brantner 1981; Höver 1981). After this, the negotiation process sped up 
considerably, and it was not long before the government began discussing a one-time 
compensation fund for survivors. 
Clearly, having an organization run by and for Roma was critical to moving the 
reparations process forward. This minority group still faced significant societal prejudice, but, in 
my interviews, respondents repeatedly said that something about the zeitgeist of the 1970s and 
1980s made it much easier for Sinti and Roma to organize, mobilize, and seek recognition and 
reparations (Interview 14, 2016). First, the Roma and Sinti had observed the Civil Rights 
movement in the United States, and the parallels they saw between their situation and that of 
African Americans galvanized the young Sinti and Roma to fight for their own civil rights 
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(Reuter 2016). Second, the time was ripe—according to one historian, “the civil rights movement 
for the Sinti and Roma was also part of a movement towards openness that was part of a broader 
historical trend at the time within West Germany” (Interview 16, 2016). By 1980, most old Nazis 
had died or retired from public life, which ushered in a climate of openness towards minorities 
and a generational change that brought new blood into politics, the bureaucracy, and society 
(Reuter 2016). Perhaps most importantly, it created space and opportunity for new forms of 
protest and new claims on the government. 
This generational change also allowed for a national reexamination of the Holocaust, 
prompted in part by an American miniseries, Holocaust, that sympathetically portrayed a Jewish 
family’s wartime experiences and aired on West German TV in 1979. This miniseries helped to 
prompt a shift in perspective, as one of my interviewees explained: “Before, the focus of the 
processing had been on the perpetrators, but now it switched from them to the victims and to 
helping the victims” (Interview 17, 2016). German historian Ulrich Opfermann concurred, 
saying, “the 70s was a time of paradigm shift in society and academics. The younger generation 
questioned what had happened before” (2016). This questioning and reexamination of history led 
to an interest in so-called “forgotten victims,”69 which included Sinti and Roma (Axster 2016). 
Sinti and Roma were far from being the focus of the movement, however, and so if they were 
going to benefit from this unexpected societal opening, they needed to continue to mobilize, 
attract influential allies, and place pressure on the West German government (Axster 2016).  
The nascent civil rights movement of German Sinti and Roma found just such an ally in 
Tilman Zülch, the head and founder of a human rights organization called the Society for 
                                                        
69 Scholars—and, increasingly, other individuals—often note that this term is a misnomer, 
because Sinti and Roma were never forgotten victims of the Holocaust; they were deliberately 
and systematically excluded from the historical narrative (Interview 14, 2016).  
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Threatened Peoples (GfbV). Just as was the case in Peru, victims were taking advantage of an 
opportune political moment, and they quickly located the allies they needed to help them 
professionalize and launch a more visible human rights campaign. Having been expelled from 
the Sudetenland at age five during the postwar expulsions of ethnic Germans, Zülch says he had 
always had a heart for the downtrodden, and after learning about the situation of the Roma and 
Sinti, he pledged his help (Zülch 2016). Zülch then contacted the most knowledgeable 
researchers on Roma at the time, British academics Grattan Puxon and Donald Kenrick, and 
requested their help in holding a memorial service at Bergen Belsen for the Sinti and Roma who 
had been murdered there (Zülch 2016). The goal was to invite potential allies to the ceremony 
and send a signal to the German government that this movement needed to be taken seriously.  
The 1979 memorial service was a huge success, with an impressive list of political 
figures in attendance: Simone Veil, a Jewish Holocaust survivor and Member of the European 
Parliament, whose “appearance and support was an important political signal;” Heinz Galinski, 
the head of the Central Council of German Jews; and representatives sent by Indira Gandhi, the 
Prime Minister of India (Interview 14, 2016; Zülch 2016). 200,000 people attended the service, 
including West German politicians, and domestic and international media covered the event, 
which attracted a great deal of public attention (Narr 1986; Zülch 2016).  
Soon afterwards, Zülch contacted world-renowned Jewish Holocaust survivor Simon 
Wiesenthal, who agreed to lend his support (Zülch 2016). Wiesenthal often appeared at press 
conferences for the Roma and Sinti to raise awareness and used his reputation and visibility to 
help the Romani German movement (Interview 14, 2016). The public support of Veil, Galinski, 
and Wiesenthal was key, because it established a link between the Jews, long recognized as 
“legitimate” and “deserving” Holocaust victims, and the Sinti and Roma, who had been 
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systematically and intentionally excluded from West Germany’s Holocaust memory (Interview 
12, 2016; Interview 14, 2016). When I asked one of the organizers at the time how important 
Jewish support was to the Sinti and Roma’s movement, they replied, “getting the support of the 
Jews was critical. I said, ‘if we get the Jews, then the rest of German society will all kiss our 
asses.’ And Galinski came” (Interview 44, 2016).  
Jewish allies surfaced again and again in my interviews, as well as in secondary and 
primary literature; in fact, one interviewee freely mentioned that in her own work she “kept 
stumbling across Jewish individuals who helped the Sinti and Roma” (Interview 12, 2016; 
Interview 14, 2016). This is not to say that all Jewish people supported the Roma and Sinti, but 
many of them did, particularly leading liberal intellectuals (Reuter, 2016). Many of them lent 
support in the way that Ernst Tugendhat did in a foreword to the 1979 book Gassed in Auschwitz, 
Still Persecuted Today: On the Situation of Roma (Gypsies) in Germany and Europe, where he 
wrote that these groups’ fates made them “siblings” and stated that the Nazis’ racial ideology 
slated both groups for “the final solution of physical destruction” (9). This publication came in 
the early years of the Sinti and Roma Civil Rights movement, making Tugendhat’s explicit 
connection between Jewish Germans and Romani Germans particularly eye-catching—and 
particularly helpful.   
Sinti civil rights activists were well aware of the respect and influence that Jewish victims 
held in German society. As a result, they did everything they could to learn from the Jews’ 
organizational example and to frame their Holocaust experiences as being analogous to those of 
European Jews (Interview 17, 2016). For example, the name of the Central Council of German 
Sinti and Roma is a deliberate reference to the Central Council of German Jews (Reuter 2016; 
Opfermann 2016). They also referenced Jewish victims and Jewish reparations outcomes in 
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communications with governmental officials, as when Tilman Zülch sent a letter containing the 
following paragraph to the Social Minister of Hessen in February 1981: “In contrast to the Jews, 
who were able to claim the rights they were entitled to after 1945 thanks to their various 
organizations, the Sinti and Roma, who lacked corresponding organizations, were unable to put 
their own claims forward in public. Thus, the suffering of their people remained largely 
unknown, and this has contributed to the fact that today they are still discriminated against and 
repressed in many different ways.” 
This logic of using the Jewish reference point to help people understand the history of 
German Sinti and Roma continues to this day, as representatives of the Central Council 
consistently emphasize that, just like German Jews, Sinti and Roma were persecuted and 
murdered “from the youngest child up to the elderly;” that they, too, were in the death camps; 
and that they, too, were victims of genocide. By reiterating the parallels between the Jewish 
experience and the Roma’s own persecution at the hands of the Nazis, Sinti and Roma sought to 
draw on the same moral imperative that forced the government’s hand in the 1950s and that 
drove antisemitism to the edge of German society. Although the Jewish frame has not been as 
effective for the Roma and Sinti as for its originators, it still proved a convicting point of 
comparison for politicians and engaged citizens and helped propel the 1980s reparations efforts 
(Interview 14, 2016). 
German Sinti also utilized West German politicians’ sensitivity on these issues to their 
advantage. One of my respondents said that “if the federal government said no to a given 
demand, then the Roma and Sinti responded by saying ‘these are the same tactics the Nazis 
used,’ by pointing out the parallels between the Nazi era and the current era, and by making the 
German politicians’ actions seem scandalous” (Interview 17, 2016). This tactic did not endear 
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them to German politicians, but it did point out the many continuities in official German policy 
that had unfairly targeted Roma since even before the Nazi period, and it garnered attention, too.  
The next step was the Sinti’s first solo activist event and the turning point in the 
movement: a 1980 hunger strike at Dachau led by Rose, whose actions here firmly established 
him as “the central and leading figure of the Sinti and Roma movement” (Interview 17, 2016). 
The strikers demanded that the West German government acknowledge that it had committed 
genocide against the Romani people, take racist police records on Sinti and Roma out of use and 
put them in the Federal Archives, and pay reparations. Understandably, the optics of aging 
Holocaust survivors on hunger strike at a concentration camp—while wearing their 
concentration camp uniforms, no less—were not ideal for the West German government, and the 
strike attracted global media attention and societal sympathy (Georg 1981; Peritore 2015).  
The strike also succeeded in its goal of grabbing the attention of the Catholic Church. 
Most German Sinti are Catholic, but the Church had not helped them during the war, and its 
postwar assistance was generally provided in a condescending and insensitive fashion, as shown 
by the Sobeck quotes above (Interview 1, 2015). However, after a yearlong exchange of letters, 
Sinti representatives were able to meet with with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, then the Archbishop 
of Munich and Freising (and the eventual Pope), where they discussed reparations, hiring a Sinto 
to serve as the Church’s liaison to the Sinti community, and other matters. The meeting also 
resulted in two important developments that point to how, by organizing and speaking for 
themselves, Sinti were finally acquiring the voice and respect they sought: The Cardinal agreed 
that the Church would stop using the offensive word “Gypsy” and would instead switch to using 
the word “Sinti,” and he promised that the Church would support the Sinti and Roma’s Civil 
Rights movement. (Editor’s Note 1981, 163). 
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This was an important development for the community, and it took place shortly before 
the next decisive event in the Sinti and Roma’s Civil Rights movement: the Third Romani World 
Congress, which was held from May 16-20, 1981, in Göttingen, Germany. Rose’s organization 
worked with the GfbV to put on the event, which ended up having a large turnout of international 
representatives. Congress attendees were varied; Zülch recalls mingling with “Simon 
Wiesenthal, a delegation from India made up of three to four members of the Indian Parliament 
who were members of ethnic groups related to the Roma and Sinti…. Six to eight scholarly 
historians…. a popular Romanian violinist, a singer from Russia, three buses of full of young 
people from the Roma Theater of Skopje…. Sinti from Flensburg to Frankfurt…. There were 
fifteen to twenty countries represented at the Congress… [and] a Spanish Member of the 
European Parliament, a Duke.” The General Secretary of the Congress, Grattan Puxon, wrote 
afterwards that there were “more than 300 representatives from 80 organizations from 28 
countries,” and Romani Rose, writing for the Verband Deutscher Sinti, expressed his thanks to 
“many German journalists, who have contributed to the fact that the injustices done to us in the 
Third Reich and the postwar years has finally become known in our country” (Puxon 1981; Rose 
1981a). German politicians from both the regional and federal levels attended, as well, with SPD 
member of the Bundestag Klaus Thüsing giving a speech about how enduring antiziganist 
stereotypes were, and how part of the reason that the Roma genocide had been so overlooked 
was because Sinti and Roma “had neither a state nor a lobby” in the immediate postwar years 
(Evangelischer Pressedienst 1981, 10).  
The situation was clearly different now, however, as the Verband Deutscher Sinti 
continued to grow in membership, garner both national and international attention, and win non-
Roma allies to its cause. Indeed, the movement’s efforts, led by the Verband Deutscher Sinti, 
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ended up bearing fruit almost immediately after the World Congress. Three months after the end 
of the Congress, on August 26, 1981, the German government set up a Hardship Fund to 
compensate non-Jewish Holocaust survivors who, for whatever reason, had not received 
reparations before (Narr 1986; Wissenschaftliche Dienste 2016). Although this fund was open to 
multiple types of victims “of non-Jewish background,” it was clearly designed to support the 
Roma and Sinti in particular.  
These reparations were the result of a long and focused reparations campaign in which 
the vocal and public reparations demands of the Verband Deutscher Sinti, supporting 
organizations such as the GfbV, and internationally visible Holocaust survivors such as Simon 
Wiesenthal and Simone Veil had all combined to create the threat of a long-lasting public 
relations nightmare for the West German government. In a context where the progressive left 
was rising, any perceived sympathy for or commonalities with Nazism would be reputationally 
damning and politically untenable, and German Sinti used this to their advantage, explicitly 
pointing out the continuity of persecution from the Nazi era up through the 1980s and accusing 
unsympathetic politicians of behaving like Nazis. Faced with the prospect of having Holocaust 
survivors and their relatives continuing to publicly equate them with Nazis in the media, the 
West German government decided that the best course of action would be to pay reparations. 
Thus, thirty-seven years after WWII, the German government was finally giving Sinti and Roma 
the reparations they were owed, an event that never would have happened without the 
mobilization of the Sinti and Roma themselves.  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I show how, just as my theory predicts, the absence of a victims’ 
organization in the early postwar years left Sinti and Roma unable to force a reluctant 
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government to pay reparations to the overwhelming majority of Romani Germans. Even though 
Sinti and Roma were entitled to reparations via the same legal clause as Jewish victims, 
prejudice caused Romani survivors’ claims to be subjected to unusual scrutiny and, more often 
than not, denied. These denials were even given federal legal sanction by the BGH in 1956, a 
misruling that took years to revise, which had lasting effects on survivors’ willingness to push 
for reparations. Sympathetic elite allies in the 1950s and 1960s did try to ensure that Sinti and 
Roma received reparations, but these efforts were of limited effect, as the West German 
government was well aware that failing to pay these reparations would not have any 
consequences (Interview 14, 2016). 
This landscape shifted in the 1970s, however, when Sinti and Roma created their own 
organizations and began pushing for reparations. Again, just as my theory predicts, this self-
organization and sustained pro-reparations push from victims themselves made all the difference. 
Despite being a numerically small minority that was still subjected to severe discrimination, even 
from people who believed they were helping Sinti and Roma, the younger generation worked 
hard to win in-group legitimacy and out-group respect. They accomplished this by staging 
attention-grabbing events such as the Dachau hunger strike, and they continued to win influential 
allies to their side, including Jewish Holocaust survivors, who used their own political cachet to 
advocate for Romani survivors. Just like the Jewish and Peruvian victims in my other case 
studies, German Sinti and Roma used their organizations to take advantage of an opportune 
political moment, to attract politically influential allies, and to garner media attention that could 
be used to make credible reputational threats.  
In accordance with my theory, the West German government quickly responded to this 
pressure, realizing that, this time, the Sinti and Roma were not going away. Politicians were well 
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aware of the negative press that would ensue if Sinti and Roma continued to accuse the West 
German government of applying Nazi-era prejudices to Holocaust survivors, and they were 
anxious to avoid the resultant reputational stain. For decades, West German governments had 
mistreated Sinti and Roma without repercussions, but now, in keeping with my theory, organized 
Sinti and Roma were forcing the government to behave differently. The narrative that Romani 
Germans were crafting at their public events, in their interviews with the press, and through their 
influential and internationally-respected allies had the potential to inflict lasting damage on West 
Germany’s reputation, and so West German politicians decided that reparations had to be paid. 
In sum, there can be no doubt that these 1981 reparations were paid due to the bottom-up 
efforts of the Roma and Sinti. One of my interviewees explained this development in the 
following way: “The 1980s change was due to two things: for the first time the S&R had self-
organized, and they held spectacular initiatives and organizations that made aware of their plight 
in regard to reparations issues—the Dachau and Bergen-Belsen events, for example” (Interview 
14, 2016). Historian and activist Ulrich Opfermann agreed, saying to me that the Hardship Fund 
“was created because the Roma and Sinti showed up and said here we are, we want you to do 
something.” In other words, the Sinti and Roma Civil Rights movement accomplished precisely 
what a social movement aims to do. And, just as my theory predicts, the changes in 
governmental reparations policy towards German Sinti and Roma did not occur until the Sinti 
and Roma formed organizations, attracted allies, and placed sustained pressure on the 











REPARATIONS TO THE INDIVIDUALS AFFECTED BY PERU’S 1980-2000 ARMED 
INTERNAL CONFLICT  
 
1. Introduction 
The case of the Peruvian government’s reparations payments to victims of its Internal 
Armed Conflict (Conflicto Armado Interno, or CAI),70 which lasted from 1980 to 2000, 
demonstrates yet again that victim organization is critical to forcing both reparations promises 
and reparations payments. Although most of the victims of the conflict faced significant barriers 
to entering onto the political scene, due to the fact that they were overwhelmingly poor, rural, 
and ethnic minorities, they began organizing for justice as early as 1983. By the time Alberto 
Fujimori, Peru’s president and strongman dictator since 1990, lost power in 2000, victims had 
spent over a decade learning how to organize and attract the support of human rights activists 
with the financial, political, and educational resources necessary to force political movement in 
the area of human rights.  
Working alongside Peru’s growing human rights sector, which in turn enlisted the help of 
important international actors such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
European Union, victims were able to take advantage of the political opening provided by 
Fujimori’s fall and Valentín Paniagua’s interim government. The breathing room given to human 
                                                        
70 Many different terms are used to refer to the 1980-2000 violence in Peru, and they vary based 
on someone’s political viewpoint. I have chosen to use the term Internal Armed Conflict not just 
because it is the term most commonly used in academic work, but also because it neither blames 
nor exonerates any group involved in the violence.  
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rights supporters allowed for the creation in June 2001 of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, or CVR), which was tasked with 
documenting the abuses of the government, the military, and the revolutionary groups; 
establishing the underlying causes of the conflict; and recording the stories and experiences of 
survivors. Then, the CVR’s final report, which was released in 2003, advised the government to 
pay reparations to victims of the internal conflict. Victims and their supporters latched onto this 
mandate and continued to exert pressure on the government to fulfill the CVR’s non-binding 
recommendation.  
Eventually, after a series of bureaucratic and political delays, the Peruvian government 
began paying communal reparations to victims of the CAI in 2006, and individual reparations in 
2011. Although there are significant problems with the reparations program, the payments have 
continued under multiple presidents, and the program itself continues to be revised to better fit 
survivors’ needs. The disbursement, continuation, expansion, and alteration of these payments 
are all direct results of victims’ engagement on this issue and the persistent efforts of victims and 
supportive sectors of civil society to make sure that the government fulfilled its reparations 
promise. The Peruvian case provides yet another example in which reparations promises and 
reparations payments are the result of a bottom-up movement for human rights and justice. 
Consistent with my theory, in the Peruvian case reparations do not hinge on finances, they are 
not a result of governmental largesse, and they are not initiated and driven primarily by the 
international community. Instead, reparations are the fruit of intense and sustained pro-
reparations lobbying by victims themselves. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the Peruvian government ended up promising and 
paying reparations as a direct result of victims’ getting organized, joining forces with human 
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rights activists and the international community, and combining their own drive with outside 
clout and expertise to demand and receive reparations. Due to the pro-reparations momentum 
generated and sustained by survivors and their supporters, victims of the CAI managed to extract 
a reparations promise and reparations payments from a largely unenthused government with 
largely indifferent constituents. I start by providing a brief background on the CAI and the fall of 
Fujimori before drawing on personal interviews, primary sources, and secondary literature to 
track the reparations movement in Peru.  
2. 1980 – 2000: A Short History of the Internal Armed Conflict 
 The CAI began in 1980, when a marginal Maoist revolutionary group, the Shining Path 
(Sendero Luminoso), launched its insurgency by burning ballot boxes in Cuschi, a town in the 
largely rural province of Ayacucho. By disrupting Peru’s first democratic election since 1963, 
the guerrillas were announcing their opposition to the current political order. However, the 
Shining Path’s victims tended not to be pillars of the establishment, but rather members of Peru’s 
most vulnerable sectors of society—poor, rural peasants, most of whom had very little education, 
spoke little to no Spanish, and were members of disadvantaged indigenous ethnic groups. For the 
next twelve years, these communities were ravaged not just by the Shining Path, whose brutal 
methods of attempting to spread their radical brand of Maoist communism prompted entire 
villages to take up arms to defend themselves, but also by the government’s military and security 
services, which imprisoned, disappeared, sexually violated, and executed everyone from children 
to members of the Shining Path.  
As a would-be proletarian movement, the Shining Path attempted to start its communist 
revolution from the countryside. Consequently, rural Peruvians, including entire villages, tended 
to be caught in the crossfire. For example, a group of Shining Path members would requisition 
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food from a village, which provided the food under threat of execution. In turn, government 
forces would brand the entire village as being Shining Path sympathizers and massacre the 
inhabitants. This script played out the other way, as well, as entire communities were wiped out 
due to suspicions that they had helped the opposite side. Efforts at self-defense could also 
backfire; for example, after a rural self-defense-group71 killed a local Shining Path leader in 
Lucanamarca, the Shining Path swept through and massacred 69 people in five area villages as a 
retaliatory measure (CVR 2003b). Eighteen of the victims were between six months and ten 
years of age (CVR 2003b). Although the casualty numbers continue to be revised upwards, the 
CVR initially estimated that, between 1980 and 2000, 69,280 Peruvians were killed or 
disappeared, more than 25,000 of them in the rural region of Ayacucho alone, and more than 
500,000 Peruvians were displaced (Grupo de Análisis 2003; Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Center 2013). 
By the time the police captured the leader of the Shining Path, former philosophy 
professor Abimael Guzmán, in September 1992, thousands of Peruvians had been murdered, 
tortured, imprisoned, raped, and/or displaced. Although Guzmán’s capture in September 1992 
severely hobbled the Shining Path, the remains of the insurgency and the dictatorial hand of 
President Fujimori kept the country in a state of constant repression and fairly constant low-level 
conflict up until a corruption scandal –not public outcry over his abysmal human rights record– 
toppled Fujimori in 2000. Once Fujimori was deposed, there was a window of opportunity for 
the country’s democratic forces to retake control of the government and pursue the three 
desiderata of transitional justice: truth, justice, and reconciliation.   
                                                        
71 Miguel La Serna notes that some of these so-called ‘self-defense’ groups were actually used as 
ways for villagers to solve long-held intercommunal grudges that had nothing to do with either 
the federal government or the Shining Path (2012).  
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Although victims and their supporters did organize during the period of violence, with the 
most notable examples being the National Association of the Families of the Kidnapped, 
Detained, and Disappeared of Peru (Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, 
Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú, or ANFASEP) and the Association for Human Rights 
(Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, or APRODEH), both of which were founded in 1983, these 
organizations and others like them were unable to effect much change. Miluska Rojas of the 
organization Para Que Se No Repita (So That It Never Happens Again) described the early 
incarnations of victims’ and human rights organizations in this way: “…these groups were just 
groups of neighbors…. It was informal, small numbers of people” (2017). The national context 
of conflict and then dictatorship helped to keep the numbers small, as anyone working for 
victims’ rights and against insurgent and governmental abuses was risking public ridicule, pay 
cuts, a damaged reputation, or even formal charges of supporting terrorism, an accusation that 
could result in imprisonment or worse (Solano 2017).  
Although these organizations had no impact on national policy during the dictatorship, 
the fact that they existed well before the democratic transition had important implications for 
reparations when Fujimori was eventually removed from power. By 2000, the oldest human 
rights organizations in the country had seventeen years of experience and were ready, willing, 
and able to step onto the national human rights scene when the moment presented itself. This 
track record of organization, visible advocacy work, and persistence had strengthened victims’ 
groups and human rights organizations run by non-victims, enabling them to quickly exert pro-
reparations pressure on Peruvian governments after Fujimori’s fall.   
Even though it was virtually impossible for these groups to have any impact on national 
policy in the war-torn Peru of the 1980s, much less in the repressive Fujimori dictatorship of the 
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1990s, which viewed human rights advocates as threats to national security, committed 
individuals continued defending human rights despite these dangers. Examples of this abound. 
APRODEH engaged in awareness and protest campaigns with the support of national and 
international organizations, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the 
United Nations, Human Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 
the Washington Office on Latin America, the Center for Justice and International Law, Amnesty 
International, and the International Commission of Jurists (Soberón 2017). Starting in 1983, the 
Institute of Legal Defense (Instituto de Defensa Legal, IDL) provided legal counsel and defense 
for innocent victims of governmental abuses. In 1985, human rights activists began coordinating 
their activities and sharing knowledge through an organization they created called the National 
Coordinator for Human Rights (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDDHH), 
which, in the words of Francisco Soberón, the founder of APRODEH and a former head of the 
CNDDHH, “is an organization made up of organizations, which provides the space to discuss 
human rights issues together and work together” (2017).  In 1995, Paz y Esperanza (Peace and 
Hope), an evangelical organization, was founded as a way for the Protestant church to provide 
services to individuals affected by the conflict (Vargas 2017). In 1996, the Public Ombudsman 
put together a database on the disappeared and began investigating cases of torture (Joo 2017). 
Although these efforts were unable to influence Peruvian society on a broad scale given the 
repressive context of the 1980s and 1990s and widespread societal antipathy towards victims of 
the conflict and human rights activists, they did serve an important function by training up a 
devoted cadre of human rights activists. After having persevered in a highly repressive context, 
these activists were ready to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by Fujimori’s fall and 
begin pushing immediately for democracy, justice, and, eventually, reparations. Thus, they 
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entered Peru’s democratic transition period already organized, strong, and ready to lobby the 
government. 
3. November 2000 – July 2001: Paniagua’s Interim Government 
After Fujimori’s ouster, the presidency fell to Valentín Paniagua, the head of the 
opposition-led Congress and a member of the center-right Acción Popular (AP) party (Lopez 
2006). Paniagua resolved to restore Peruvian democracy, and, after governing for eight months, 
Peru held free and fair elections, which resulted in Alejandro Toledo’s presidency. This 
transitional moment was critical for the future of transitional justice and human rights in Peru. 
However, the country’s attention was on corruption, not human rights. Furthermore, victims’ 
rights had been a dirty topic for decades, victims were traumatized societal pariahs, and human 
rights organizations were still stigmatized as being defenders of terrorists (Rojas 2017; Rubio 
2017). Reparations would be a social and political nonstarter unless all of this started to change, 
and it would be up to victims’ organizations and their allies to make this happen. 
Changing these cultural perceptions was not an easy task. Peruvian civil society had been 
decimated by the Shining Path’s campaign against local collective organizations, by the 
government’s restrictions on freedom assembly, and by the Fujimori-era discourse of labeling 
victims’ rights organizations, human rights organizations, and left-leaning individuals as 
terrorists (Rojas 2017). Fujimori and his supporters were able to shape public perceptions so that 
the Shining Path, progressive leftists, and supporters of Western values were seen as being cut 
from the same dangerous cloth. Even merely talking about human rights and equality was seen as 
“subversive, [Shining Path] discourse, and the same was true of protests—these things were 
linked to the Shining Path and therefore a threat to capitalism and security” (Uccelli Labarthe 
2017). This demonization caused ordinary Peruvians to view human rights as something liberal 
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and Western, not as an integral part of society (Macher 2017). Indeed, building and reinforcing 
this perception was deliberate on Fujimori’s part, as he enacted reparations laws in the 1990s 
that, in the words of Sofia Macher, a former commissioner for Peru’s eventual truth and 
reconciliation commission, were designed to “shore up the view that victims were victims of 
terrorism and not to acknowledge the victims of the armed forces” (2017). By paying reparations 
only to victims of terrorism,72 Fujimori sent the message that all other victims were terrorists 
aligned with Sendero Luminoso or another radical revolutionary group, Túpac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), who deserved what had happened to them. 
This prejudice also prevented many victims from mobilizing, because, even beyond the 
obstacles presented by their trauma and poverty, they did not have the vocabulary to realize that 
they had human rights that had been violated (Miraval 2017; Rubio 2017). Monica Miraval, of 
the civil society organization Movimiento Jatarishun, illustrates this with an example from her 
work in the region of Huánuco, where she and her colleagues worked mostly with rural women. 
These women—some of whom were still children during the conflict—had been subjected to 
severe human rights abuses, including being raped by their neighbors, gang raped by soldiers, 
and forced to marry members of Sendero Luminoso. As Miraval explains,   
“These women had not talked about their experiences before because they hadn’t known 
about their rights. They didn’t know their rights had been violated because they didn’t 
know [their physical integrity] was a right…. When they started to get information on 
their rights, they started to talk about these things, experiences they had never talked 
about before to anyone” (2017).  
 
Thus, there were significant obstacles for the pro-justice segments of civil society to overcome in 
order to campaign for and acquire reparations. However, by meeting with victims, remaining 
                                                        
72 That is, to explicit victims of Sendero Luminoso, namely the church, public officials who were 
attacked by Sendero Luminoso, displaced people, and people who were injured while 
participating in self-defense committees. 
 
 189 
visible and vocal in the Peruvian media, and coordinating with each other, human rights activists 
began to organize into a more cohesive force for justice and slowly started to change victims’ 
perceptions of themselves and society’s perception of the CAI.   
These developments were a direct result of the change in Peru’s political opportunity 
structure: Fujimori’s fall created the space for victims’ organizations and human rights 
organizations to shed their terrorist label and begin educating the population on the importance 
and inviolability of human rights. While Fujimori was still in power, victims’ organizations and 
human rights activists (some of whom were victims, many of whom were not) were able to 
accomplish very little at the national political level. Access to political officials was restricted, 
the regime was repressive, and themes of human rights were politically toxic. This meant that 
victims and their advocates were simply not able to credibly threaten anti-justice politicians with 
electoral, reputational, or economic costs. Indeed, the reverse was the case; vocal support for 
human rights would inflict a high cost on a politician’s career, reputation, and financial situation. 
However, Paniagua’s interim presidency and the accompanying transition to democracy 
changed all of that. Although there is debate as to how supportive Paniagua himself was of 
Peru’s blossoming human rights movement, Peru did make major strides towards transitional 
justice and, by extension, towards reparations, during his 2000-2001 tenure (Macher 2017; 
Soberón 2017). This progress was not made by holdover politicians, but rather by human rights 
activists who were victims themselves or who had been victims’ allies for years. According to 
Gabriela Joo, a lawyer and human rights activist from the Legal Defense Institute in Lima, the 
progress made during Paniagua’s term was “spearheaded by civil society,” particularly members 
of the middle class who “had been involved in the human rights campaign before the transition. 
These people assumed power during the transition, and now many of the people who were in 
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power were the same people who had already been fighting for human rights for years” (2017). 
Given their history of working to protect and promote human rights under extremely challenging 
circumstances, these individuals had the intellectual, professional, and experiential resources 
needed to mount an organized campaign to develop human rights norms in Peru. These 
individuals did not constitute a majority of the population by any means, as most of civil society 
was indifferent to or simply not aware of the fight for reparations and human rights, but the 
human rights campaigners were vocal, organized, and active for their cause, and they did 
outnumber the segment of society that was actively against the push for human rights.  
The human rights activists’ most important accomplishment during the immediate post-
transition period was the establishment of the CVR, Peru’s truth and reconciliation commission. 
Inspired by other Truth and Reconciliation Commissions around the world, the CVR investigated 
what happened in Peru from 1980-2000, what factors caused these events, and who was 
responsible for them. Joo notes that the CVR “was something that civil society asked for; it 
wasn’t on the political agenda” (2017). The fact that the CVR was the direct result of demands 
from Peru’s established human rights organizations was echoed by other interviewees, including 
Sofía Macher, a former commissioner of the CVR; Raquel Reynoso, the director of the 
Association for Rural Educational Services (La Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales, or 
SER), a representative of the CNDDHH to the High Level Multi-Sectorial Commission 
(Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel, CMAN); and Eduardo Toche, a historian who also 
helped implement the CVR. In Toche’s words, “The transition created the space to have a 
CVR… [but] the idea of the CVR didn’t come from the people who were in power at the time of 
the transition. It was an idea from before that, from around 1996 or so, when the idea of a truth 
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and reconciliation commission was something that was developing in the international human 
rights community” (2017).  
Macher confirmed this, saying that, in the run-up to Fujimori’s ouster and the subsequent 
creation of the CVR, the human rights organizations coalesced into a movement the likes of 
which she had “never seen anywhere, before or since.” Towards the end of Fujimori’s reign, 
activists launched a massive human rights awareness campaign where, despite not having “so 
much as a sol to fund this,” they traveled from country to country all across the region, staying 
with friends who helped them hold press conferences, making contacts with people, trying to 
draw attention to Fujimori’s crimes and pressure the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR) into convicting Fujimori of wrongdoing. In Macher’s words, these individuals worked 
tirelessly, “and they won; it was spectacular.” Although these initial efforts were taking place 
outside of Peru, the conversation about human rights began to spread within Peru, as well, as 
activists “called politicians and held roundtables, people at the universities spoke and educated 
others on the topic, and the CNDDHH called people one by one to organize everyone.”  
Thus, by the end of Paniagua’s presidency in 2001, circumstances in Peru were much 
different than they had been a mere seven months earlier when Fujimori fell. Not everyone in 
Peru was supportive of or interested in the push for human rights that victims and their allies had 
launched, but Peruvians in human rights circles and the political sphere could not deny the 
energy, attention, and power behind this movement. Nor was it possible to deny that the 
movement had already had some notable successes: There was now a highly mobilized segment 
of civil society pushing for human rights, there were international organizations paying attention 
to human rights developments in Peru, and a truth and reconciliation commission had been 
established to address the crimes of the past. Despite the societal aversion to human rights 
 
 192 
present in 2000, Fujimori’s ouster gave human rights organizations a political opening, and 
activists jumped to take advantage of this shift in the political opportunity structure. By using the 
resources at their disposal –namely organizational talent, international backing, and media 
visibility– they were able to make the most of the moment and establish a truth and 
reconciliation commission (Macher 2017).   
4. July 2001 – July 2006: Toledo Government 
 
Although the CVR was developed during Paniagua’s tenure, it operated under Paniagua’s 
successor, Alejandro Toledo. The CVR, which operated from June 2001 to August 2003, played 
a critical role in shifting the public’s historical memory from one of the good government vs. the 
bad terrorists to one that permitted more nuance. To quote Gabriela Joo of the IDL, “the CVR 
widened the space to talk about the conflict, and it showed the responsibility of other actors.” By 
documenting the truth of the past through extensive interviews with eyewitnesses, public 
hearings, careful forensic work, and more, the CVR was able to move beyond the prevailing 
perception of the army as the nation’s heroes and defenders and the rural communities of Peru as 
breeding grounds for evil terrorists. In fact, the CVR’s final tally attributes 46% of the conflict’s 
deaths and disappearances to the Shining Path, 30% to the state, and the remaining 24% to other 
groups, including rural defense committees, paramilitary groups, and MRTA (Grupo de Análisis 
2003).  
Although the military did not take kindly to this report, according to Sofía Macher, a 
former CVR commissioner, “The CVR had tremendous legitimacy in society” (2017). Its 
findings and its recommendations carried political weight, and it created an opening in political 
opportunity structure that human rights advocates eagerly utilized. Given the CVR’s national and 
international legitimacy, victims’ rights organizations and human rights organizations knew that 
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if the CVR were to advocate something, the chances of its finding political and societal 
resonance would be much higher than if a human rights civil society group were to advocate the 
same idea on its own. Consequently, the CVR presented an excellent opportunity for pro-
reparations activists. Francisco Soberón, the founder of APRODEH and the then-head of the 
CNDDHH, said that “APRODEH and others pressured the CVR to include reparations as part of 
its recommendations” (2017). This was echoed by Germán Vargas, the director of public 
outreach at Paz y Esperanza, who said that ANFASEP, one of the most famous and influential 
victims’ organizations in Peru, and one that is run by victims for victims, came to Paz y 
Esperanza to ask for help organizing and submitting their reparations demands, which were then 
sent to the CVR (2017). In this context, the human rights movement, which had been developing 
for over twenty years, switched its focus from offering legal assistance to victims to offering 
support for victims and their desires, which included reparations (Toche 2017). 
All of this fits in line with resource mobilization theory, which posits that organizations 
can help people accomplish their political goals more easily and cheaply than other forms of 
political engagement. Victims did not look to elections to help them acquire reparations; they 
looked to organizations. Rather than trying to elect pro-justice candidates who would then 
hopefully advocate for reparations, victims were hoping to exert more direct political influence 
through pre-existing organizations. By working through groups that could lobby for reparations 
at the CVR, a new, justice-oriented institution that had attention and legitimacy at both the 
domestic and international levels, victims were bypassing the ballot box in favor of an obviously 
sympathetic and much more immediately influential political entity. The CVR represented an 




These efforts were effective, as victims’ demands were heard. The CVR consulted 
experts from a wide range of fields; listened to presentations from two of the most prominent 
victims’ organizations, ANFASEP and the National Committee of Relatives of the Detained, 
Disappeared, and Displaced (Comité Nacional de Familares Detenidos, Desaparecidos y 
Refugiados, or COFADER); and ended up soliciting and considering several different reparations 
plans before accepting a detailed, technical plan that APRODEH had developed in consultation 
with other countries (Macher 2017; Toche 2017). This plan was included in the CVR’s final 
report, which was released in August 2003. Although the CVR’s recommendation that the 
government pay reparations—to victims of government atrocities as well as victims of 
revolutionary groups—was not binding, it gave added legitimacy to the reparations demands of 
victims’ organizations and the human rights’ organizations supporting the victims. This chain of 
events also fits in with social movement theory; thus far in the Peruvian case, it is clear that 
progress towards reparations was made through mobilization and via openings in the political 
opportunity structure, and that, in keeping with my theory, victims themselves were integral to 
this process. 
However, even with the CVR’s recommendations, actually acquiring reparations 
remained a faraway goal. A recommendation was not the same thing as a reparations law, and a 
reparations law was not the same thing as reparations payments. Toledo’s presidency presented 
an opportunity for victims and human rights groups, though, and they jumped to take advantage 
of it by starting “a series of campaigns and lobbying” to push the government to pass a 
reparations law (Ortíz 2017; Reynoso 2017). Because Toledo had not been involved in 
committing the crimes of 1980-2000, activists believed he might be more willing to pay 
reparations. Many of my interviewees emphasized that Toledo’s presidency was a key period— 
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“This was a moment when human rights were important” (Macher 2017), “The political context 
helped” (Ortíz 2017), “We couldn’t demand reparations within Peru until Toledo” (Soberón 
2017). Victims and their allies recognized the political opening presented by Toledo’s 
presidency, and they marshaled their forces. Indeed, Toledo sent an important pro-reparations 
signal mere months after CVR’s final report was published, when, in November 2003, he gave a 
speech in which he said he would follow the CVR’s recommendations (Correa 2013, 5). 
During this time period, victims took note of the validation of their experiences offered 
by CVR’s eyewitness hearings, the security offered by an increasingly democratic society, and 
the commonalities between themselves and other victims, and more of them began to test the 
waters of political activism. The most basic obstacles to this were geographic and 
socioeconomic. Most victims lived in the countryside, far away from Lima, and so provincial 
victims’ organizations sometimes had to choose between buying food and traveling to Lima to 
make their claims heard (Huerta 2017; Rubio 2017). The cost of activism was far from the 
victims’ only barrier to entry, however. In addition to being poor, most victims were some 
combination of rural, of limited education, unable to speak Spanish, unfamiliar with bureaucratic 
and political protocols, and severely traumatized. Consequently, as was the case when 
ANFASEP and other organizations began formulating their reparations demands for the CVR, 
middle class members of human rights organizations stepped in to help victims organize, learn 
how to interact with politicians and bureaucrats, provide technical assistance, access the 
resources they needed, and frame their claims effectively (Huerta 2017; Joo 2017; Ortíz 2017).  
As Gisela Ortíz, the director of the Peruvian Team of Forensic Anthropology (Equipo 
Peruano de Antropología Forense, EPAF), explained:  
“The problem was that most of the victims were rural, so what they did was lost. If your 
activity is not in the center [Lima] or in the media, then it’s not generating political 
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pressure. You can be out there every day, but it won’t matter…. So you need other 
networks. Civil society organizations were fundamental, because they became the voices 
of the victims, and they served as link between the victims and how the victims could 
access their rights…. It’s not ideal to have civil society organizations speak for the 
victims, but the victims had to learn how to be activists, and they needed money” (2017). 
 
There was some initial pushback from victims to having middle class individuals step in, 
but it was also a critical development in the campaign for reparations. According to Eduardo 
Toche, “It would have been nearly impossible and highly improbable for these excluded people 
to have any influence without organizations. Organizations supported [affected individuals] and 
helped these people create their own organizations so that they could form their own voice” 
(2017). By way of public audiences, information campaigns, and outreach programs, 
organizations were able to establish genuine relationships with affected individuals and embark 
on a more collaborative relationship (Joo 2017).  
One of the first steps for seasoned activists – and for victims who were learning how to 
be activists – was attacking the stigma attached to victims. This was done by way of using press 
conferences, the CVR, and the support of independent public intellectuals such as Peruvian 
author and Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa to convince the public, Congress, and the 
President that victims deserved justice (Ortíz 2017). Personalizing the victims also helped—it 
was difficult not to be moved by stories of women searching tirelessly for their disappeared 
children (Miraval 2017). Although there is still strong antipathy towards certain categories of 
victims,73 there were enough “pure” victims to arouse public and political sympathy, and this 
meant that a carefully crafted reparations law was politically feasible (Miraval 2017; Ortíz 2017).  
                                                        
73 This antipathy was directly responsible for shutting two categories of affected individuals out 
of receiving reparations. The first category comprises anyone who belonged to the Shining Path, 
no matter what egregious abuses they suffered at the hands of the government. The second 
category consists of innocent people who were wrongfully accused of terrorism and then 
subjected to abuses ranging from decades of imprisonment to torture to murder. 
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Although this public relations campaign did not increase the electoral clout of victims, 
who did not represent a large enough unified voting bloc to sway an election one way or another, 
it did increase the reputational costs to politicians who failed to support reparations for the 
categories victims who were perceived as innocent. By organizing, articulating their demands, 
attracting influential allies, and maintaining a sustained level of pressure, victims and their 
supporters managed to change the political calculus on reparations. Supporting reparations no 
longer meant supporting giving money to terrorists; instead, it meant helping deserving 
Peruvians whose human rights had been violated. Politicians may not have depended on victims’ 
votes in order to get elected, but they did depend on public opinion. In the face of constant pro-
reparations lobbying from victims and their allies, the knowledge that the public supported 
reparations for “pure” victims, and a changing political environment that was more favorably 
inclined towards justice, the reputational costs of denying reparations became too high for most 
politicians to risk. 
As victims gained the knowledge and experience to begin advocating for themselves, 
they continued to push for reparations by using the three-pronged strategy of maintaining 
visibility, attracting public sympathy, and meeting personally with lawmakers. Victims’ 
increasing professionalization did change the composition of the pro-justice social movement, 
however, in that it allowed victims to take more ownership over the reparations campaign. 
Starting a few years after Fujimori’s fall, new victims’ organizations began to proliferate, and 
older organizations reduced their dependence on non-victim allies. This shift from professional 
activists to victim-activists was a direct result of the aforementioned educational efforts that the 
CVR and its supporters had led from 2000 to 2003, which helped victims realize that they 
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possessed human rights, that the government had violated those rights, and that they could 
demand redress.  
Sinthya Rubio, a transitional justice scholar and practitioner, noted that when the CVR 
began sending representatives out into the provinces to interview affected individuals, “people 
started learning about their rights… this caused people to realize that they had rights and that 
they could and should organize for them” (2017). Although it was imperative that victims be 
aware of their rights, because they would not demand reparations for violations that they did not 
perceive as violations, that knowledge by no means ensured a successful victims’ rights 
movement. Miluska Rojas explained that  
“We worked very hard to strengthen victims’ organizations. At the start the victims didn’t 
view themselves as a group—it was town against town. It was very hard to get them to 
work together because they had no trust or confidence in each other…. They needed 
psychological help, a space to talk at the local level, and also meetings at the national 
level to get them to know each other and talk about commonalities, create their own 
voice, empower them, and overcome barriers. We helped finance these meetings and 
informed them how the government works…. There’s a form of speaking with authority 
so that you don’t end up in tears or feel more excluded than ever” (2017).   
 
Most of the activists and experts I talked to agreed that non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and civil society organizations saw themselves as filling a technical and advisory role to 
be relinquished –or at least reduced– as soon as the victims themselves were ready to take over 
(Huerta 2017; Ortiz 2017; Vargas 2017). “People wanted to be their own protagonists, to have 
more agency,” said Germán Vargas of Paz y Esperanza (2017). And as victims’ confidence 
grew, so did their involvement in the push for reparations. 
As the movement progressed and victims continued to play a larger role in the push for 
justice, victims and their allies were strategic in their approach to pressuring the government for 
a reparations law. Again, in keeping with the idea that social movements provide power and 
influence for underprivileged groups in ways that elections do not, pro-reparations activists 
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continued to emphasize the importance of public visibility. Edgar Rivadeneyra Macedo, the head 
of the Reflection Association of Innocent Liberated Prisoners (Asociacón Reflexión de Inocentes 
Liberados, ARIL) described how in 2004, “thousands of people went out onto the streets, all 
different groups together,” to march for reparations (2017). Although the marches in the center 
of Lima were the most influential, reparations advocates held such marches all across the 
country, too (Ortíz 2017; Rivadeneyra 2017). Such public efforts strengthened the movement’s 
external image and its members’ confidence. Peruvian society was observing these marches, 
politicians were observing these marches, and victims were becoming aware of their political 
clout. “We got a reparations law by empowering the families of the victims,” said Gisela Ortíz. 
The fight for reparations was just as active in politicians’ office as it was in front of the 
TV cameras. As Gino Huerta of the IDL explained,  
“It’s important to form personal relationships with politicians… then you can ask for help 
with this, ask them to look at that, and so on…. You start with links to people, such as 
bureaucrats, who are already interested in the topic of human rights and what happened 
during the conflict. That’s how you establish the groundwork. ….You have to do the 
dirty work of talking to people and negotiating—it’s an art. It’s rare to have everyone 
interested in your cause, but if you have five to six people, that’s enough.”  
 
He described working towards reparations as an iterative process of offers and 
counteroffers, in which it was critical to remain visible and present to politicians. This sustained 
presence was paramount, because it is impossible to predict when the right political opening will 
materialize. “You go to a politician with a proposal, you see if it fits their agenda, and sometimes 
it will fit someone’s agenda, and sometimes it doesn’t fit anyone’s; you have to form 
relationships so that you can be there at the right moment for an open door and political will.” He 
also said that it helped to visit these politicians with appropriate company, for example with the 
CNDDHH or a governmental minister, and to give politicians the details: “It’s best to make 
things easy for them so that they will do it. Otherwise, time passes, and politicians hem and haw. 
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It is a long process…. Public politics created the space for this, but it’s also about luck and 
timing and convincing people to do things, one by one.” (2017)  
Huerta’s words point to the importance of identifying and taking advantage of an opening 
in the political opportunity structure—in this case, the increased (and largely positive) societal 
attention to victims and their demands raised the political cost of denying reparations, 
particularly when visible and influential members of Peruvian society were meeting personally 
with politicians to request reparations, monitoring their follow-through, and willing to publicly 
express disappointment at broken promises. However, even though the political circumstances 
made reparations possible, it was still important for victims to remain mobilized so that 
politicians would keep reparations on their to-do list instead of kicking it to the backburner.  
Francisco Soberón, the founder of APRODEH and former head of the CNDDHH, said 
that APRODEH approached reparations “The way you would when you’re trying to achieve 
anything big. We tried to get many different kinds of reparations—reparations in the form of 
housing, health care, money, education—although only a few of these programs materialized.” 
He explained that while the political parties as a whole were not supportive of reparations, the 
movement was eventually able to succeed due mainly to the “force of non-governmental 
organizations and victims’ organizations,” supplemented by friendly members of the media, 
campaigns and marches, and a handful of international organizations, such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, FIDH, and the European Union (2017).  
Even in the face of resistance on the part of political parties, which were not convinced of 
the utility of making reparations a part of their official agenda, Soberón’s words show that 
victims were able to use sway enough individual politicians to their side to get a reparations law 
promised, passed, and, eventually, implemented. This story is a classic social movement saga: 
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victims and their allies were aware that the ballot box was not the best path to achieving their 
reparations goals, and so they used a social movement to capture public attention, attract 
influential allies such as the international organizations named above, and give them a platform 
and status that would allow them to meet with politicians one-on-one. 
It is important to reiterate that, although the support of allies absolutely contributed to the 
timeline and extent of the reparations movement’s success, victims themselves were the driving 
force behind the push for reparations. Middle-class human rights advocates were unable to 
capture societal attention in the same way that victims did, and it was victims’ highly personal 
stories that generated the sympathy necessary to transform reparations from political suicide to a 
political possibility. Sinthya Rubio stated that “victims’ organizations are fundamental in getting 
reparations in all places—participation on their part is fundamental” (2017). She explained that 
“there are cases in the world where there has been more political will than in other cases, but if 
victims’ organizations aren’t leading the way, then progress on reparations won’t continue” 
(2017). Gisela Ortíz described the process of pressuring the government to implement a 
reparations law as “the families’ own movement—they exercised pressure, were very organized, 
put pressure on politicians, and had a political presence” (2017). Germán Vargas of Paz y 
Esperanza agreed, saying that “The CNDDHH creates space for organizations to help, and this is 
the same with NGOs—they provide technical help to victims’ organizations, but victims make 
their own demands…. They pay visits to officials, and they are very active. The authorities know 
who these people are and what their demands are” (2017). 
All of these efforts helped move the government closer to promising and paying 
reparations. The first post-CVR breakthrough came in 2004, when Toledo issued an executive 
order creating the CMAN, whose mission is to “comply with the objectives of reparation, peace, 
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and national reconciliation after the harms inflicted by the violence the country experienced 
between 1980 and 2000 (“Quienes Somos” 2004).  Then, in July 2005, Congress passed a 
reparations law that established a reparations plan (Plan Integral de Reparaciones, or PIR) with 
five components: The restitution of citizens’ rights, educational reparations, health reparations, 
collective reparations, and symbolic reparations (Flores-Araoz et al. 2005). Sofia Macher noted 
that, even after all of the work that victims and their allies had done to win over politicians and 
the general population, “Politically, no one wanted to pay reparations, but the state couldn’t say 
that” (2017). Clearly, this law was not the product of political generosity, but rather the result of 
concerted efforts on the part of the pro-justice segments of civil society.  
The path to the PIR was not simple; it involved years of lobbying, the sweeping demands 
of organizations such as APRODEH, and the advice of a working group formed to educate 
Congress and Toledo about what needed to be in the reparations law (Rojas 2017; Soberón 
2017). Still, as the political opportunity structure in Peru changed, as human rights activists with 
resources continued to advocate for and empower victims, and as victims themselves mobilized, 
a vibrant social movement was able to raise the political costs of opposing justice and convince a 
majority of Peruvian congresspeople that denying reparations would be politically untenable. 
Thus, in 2005, twenty-two years after ANFASEP, APRODEH, IDL, and other human 
rights/victims’ rights organizations were founded, and five years after Peru’s return to 
democracy, the pro-justice segment of civil society –led by victims themselves– had finally 
succeeded in pressuring the Peruvian government into openly and officially committing to pay 
reparations. 
Despite all of this momentum, – and Sinthya Rubio notes that Peruvian victims’ 
organizations were at their strongest and most focused from 2000-2005/2006 – President Toledo 
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implemented only collective reparations, not individual reparations, and even the collective 
reparations were not paid until the very end of his term (Macher 2017; Rubio 2017). I was told 
that Toledo did meet with victims, victims’ families, and human rights organizations, that he 
listened to them, and that he even invited them to speak about the effects that a reparations law 
would have on their lives (Ortíz 2017; Rivadeneyra 2017), but, in the words of Edgar 
Rivadeneyra Macedo, “The government didn’t act on its own initiative; people had to ask for 
what they wanted” (2017). This is evident in the incremental nature of Toledo’s steps towards 
justice. Each subsequent development – the creation of the CVR in 2001, the ratification of its 
final report in 2003, the creation of the CMAN in 2004, the passage of the PIR in 2005, the 
initiation of collective reparations in 2006 – required continued pressure from victims and their 
allies. Even these concerted efforts were almost not enough to force the Toledo government to 
fulfill its reparations promise; Toledo ended up delaying the start of the collective reparations 
program for as long as possible. By kick-starting it just before the end of his term, he was able to 
take credit for starting the program and garner the goodwill associated with it without having to 
pay for it or deal with the hiccups that such a complicated initiative inevitably experiences (Ortiz 
2017; Reynoso 2017). 
The argument could be made that the delay between the PIR’s passage in July 2005 and 
the start of its implementation in 2006 was due to financial reasons. Toledo’s term was marked 
by frugality (Joo 2017); perhaps paying the reparations that his government had promised would 
have strained the national budget. This explanation does not fit the facts, however. For one thing, 
Toledo did not alter the already-approved budget or expand it to accommodate the money needed 
for reparations payments. Instead, he instructed each relevant sector of the government to devote 
a portion of their already-created budget to fund reparations initiatives (Macher 2017; Reynoso 
 
 204 
2017). Furthermore, Toledo instructed the governmental sectors to label any public development 
projects in areas affected by the conflict as reparations, regardless of the fact that these projects 
had been planned and scheduled prior to the creation of the collective reparations plan (Macher 
2017; Reynoso 2017). This approach to reparations74 required no extra financial commitment on 
the part of the government; therefore, financial difficulties cannot account for Toledo’s delay. 
Another nail in the coffin of the finances argument comes courtesy of an interaction 
between Toledo and the President of the CVR, Salomón Lerner;75 the President of the German 
Bundestag, Wolfgang Thierse; and the German Federal Minister of Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul. A month or two after the CVR finished in 2003, 
Lerner traveled to Europe to discuss Peru’s future with leading politicians and practitioners, 
including Thierse and Wieczorek-Zeul. A few months after that, the German ambassador 
delivered a letter to Lerner in which Thierse and Wieczorek-Zeul discussed Lerner’s visit and 
agreed that they would offer Peru a yearlong moratorium on paying its debts to Germany. The 
express purpose of this moratorium was to help Peru finance its reparations program. However, 
despite repeated entreaties from the members of the CVR, the Toledo government did not accept 
the offer. Toledo had another opportunity to utilize Germany’s largesse when, in 2005, he visited 
Germany, met with Thierse, and was offered the debt moratorium in person. Yet again, Toledo 
said no. (Lerner 2017) When asked why Toledo had refused Germany’s proposal, Lerner said, “I 
don’t know why he didn’t accept, but we lost a big chance to receive a great deal of monetary 
                                                        
74 Calling these projects ‘reparations’ is a misuse of the term, because the way they were 
conceived and implemented completely nullified the moral and symbolic point of paying 
reparations. It also resulted in dissatisfied victims who were unable to distinguish between 
‘development projects’ and ‘reparations’—an unsurprising outcome, given the fact that, in this 
case, there was no difference. 
 
75 Salomón Lerner Febres, the professor, not Peruvian politician Salomón Lerner Ghitis. 
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assistance” (2017). Clearly, finances were not the reason for the Peruvian government’s delayed 
reparations payments; rather, a lack of political will is to blame. 
5. July 2006 - July 2011: García Government 
 
Victims and their allies were uncertain what to expect in mid-2006 when President 
Toledo’s tenure ended and President Alán García took office. Toledo, Peru’s first Amerindian 
president,76 had won a tight 2001 presidential race against García by promising to “clean up 
government corruption, improve health care and education, stimulate job creation in the 
impoverished provinces and raise the self-esteem of indigenous peoples” (Faiola 2001; Krauss 
2001). He had at least a passing interest in human rights, as, according to Peruvian human rights 
advocates, his administration worked “toward strengthening government-civil society relations,” 
and several influential employees at the Ministry of the Interior were known for their dedication 
to human rights work, including the Minister of the Interior himself (Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor 2003, 13).  
García’s reputation was much different. He had been the president of Peru from 1985-
1990 and, despite a campaign promise to improve the country’s human rights situation, under his 
watch the conflict escalated to its peak year of violence in 1984 (Lerner 2017). Furthermore, his 
tenure coincided with over a third of the 4,414 cases of forced disappearances that the CVR 
attributed to state agents (CVR 2003a, 74), the massacres that state security forces committed at 
                                                        





Accomarca and Cayara (Human Rights Watch 2006), and the notorious El Frontón77 prison 
massacre (Lerner 2017).  
García promised to govern as a moderate in his second term, but not everyone was 
convinced by this campaign promise. A 2006 Congressional Research Service report on the 
election results reported that “Some human rights observers express concern that Garcia will use 
the presidency to further embed impunity for human rights violations that occurred during his 
earlier administration” (6). The extent to which García knew about and endorsed the abuses that 
occurred during his first term is uncertain, but there were good reasons for concern. Even if he 
wanted to plead ignorance for the crimes of 1985-1990, his political party certainly could not—
“during Garcia’s [first] tenure as President, his party ran at least one, and perhaps several, secret 
paramilitary organizations, and that his Deputy Interior Minister supervised a secret police force” 
(Congressional Research Service 2006, 4). Still, his abysmal human rights record did not worry 
mainstream voters, who were more concerned about widespread poverty and economic growth. 
García also benefited from the support of upper- and middle-class voters, who were concerned 
that García’s opponent, Ollanta Humala, would expropriate private property (Congressional 
Research Service 2006).  
Although it is impossible to ‘make things right’ when ‘things’ includes thousands of 
murders, disappearances, and other egregious human rights violations, García’s second term 
gave him a chance to at least try to make amends for the abuses that occurred during his first 
presidential term. However, his attitude towards human rights in general, and towards finally 
implementing individual economic reparations in particular, could be described as disinterested 
                                                        
77 On June 18 and 19, Peruvian authorities executed over 250 inmates at three separate prisons, 
including El Frontón, in response to prison riots demanding the release of political prisoners who 
were linked to the Shining Path. Most, if not all, of these killings were extrajudicial. (USIP 2008) 
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at best. As Miluska Rojas put it, “With Toledo you would knock and three months later 
something would come out; with García you would knock and get nothing” (Rojas 2017). “It was 
hard for García to manage this topic,” she added, while Gisela Ortíz expressed the same 
sentiment in other words: “Alan García was not a friend of human rights” (2017). Indeed, six 
years after the end of García’s second term, the brutality of his first term as president, coupled 
with the inaction and recalcitrance of his second, prompted the head of the CVR, Salomón 
Lerner Febres, to say that “García had a responsibility that has not been cleared” (2017). 
Unfortunately for potential reparations recipients, García’s term also coincided with a 
period of waning effort on the part of the pro-justice elements of civil society. Francisco Soberón 
noted that, “After the transition and up until García, civil society had a lot of vigor,” but “things 
got harder under García” (2017). This is not to say that victims and their allies disappeared from 
view, because that was absolutely not the case. However, the fight for reparations had waned 
some in the wake of the initiation of communal reparations and the passage of the PIR, and the 
election of García was surely a discouraging signal to individuals whose lives had been upended 
as a result of the policies and actions of his first tenure. 
The general trepidation about the future of human rights in Peru during another term of 
García turned out to be somewhat warranted, although not entirely so (Correa 2013, 9). He did 
continue the communal reparations program, although, as Miluska Rojas of Para Que Se No 
Repita said, “This was all implemented very slowly, because the García presidency was going 
on, and García presided over massacres; groups finally pushed him to pay communal 
reparations” (2017). When it came to implementing the PIR’s economic reparations to 
individuals, his administration moved even more slowly. There was some hope for reparations 
advocates in that meetings were held to discuss how to register victims, how much to pay for 
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each violation, and how to implement the next part of the reparations program. Creating a 
victims’ registry is a critical part of setting up a reparations program, because, simply put, no one 
will receive reparations until the government has agreed on the definition of a victim and 
assessed who meets the qualifications. Thus, it is perhaps surprising that García permitted the 
registry to be created at all. As Salomón Lerner put it: “The RUV [Registro Único de Victimas, 
or Registry of Victims] is very special because it was created under Alan García.” However, it 
was not a uniformly positive development, as Lerner explained: “Curiously, the president set a 
deadline on registering, which did something that was unacceptable—it denied people victim 
status based on missed deadlines” (2017).  
This exclusionary decision was not the only move García made that baffled and/or 
frustrated reparations advocates. For example, many of interviewees expressed disappointment in 
how nonreceptive the government was in this period. “Alan García didn’t listen to the organized 
families,” said Gisela Ortíz, the director of EPAF. She expanded on this point by saying that 
“Rural people were asked how much they should be paid, but they had no concept of money, or 
they weren’t organized and so were not in on the discussion, and people in the center and the 
cities weren’t ever consulted” (2017). Miluska Rojas remembered this period the same way, 
saying that “Under García, we were in the press, trying to get international attention. We tried to 
put this on the [political] agenda, and we tried to form groups with the government, but we were 
always denied.” Add to this the standard objections from the Finance Ministry, which, as Raquel 
Reynoso said, “Is always tough, because it’s an issue of resources, and there is no money for 
matters they are not interested in; they say ‘There’s no money, there’s no money, there’s no 
money, there’s no money,’” and it is clear that victims and their middle-class allies were facing 
an uphill battle under García (2017). 
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However, despite the difficulties of García’s administration and a general lack of interest 
on the part of the public, victims continued to press for the reparations they had been promised. 
It certainly helped that, even though Peruvians elected García and several congresspeople who 
were Fujimori supporters, most of society was not actively against reparations. As Germán 
Vargas of Paz y Esperanza explained, public awareness of reparations is generally low.  
“It’s not really a topic that interests the general population. It’s not a topic that’ll get 
votes—politicians do it purely because they’re committed to the issue… It’s a minority of 
people who are interested in and who care about these issues. There’s no opposition to 
reparations, but there is opposition to justice—people believe the message that the 
military has been judged unfairly and say it’s thanks to [the military] that we have peace” 
(2017). 
 
Given the victims’ lack of electoral clout and the overwhelming disinterest on the part of 
society, how is it that victims were able to push an uncooperative administration to pay 
reparations? Cristián Correa, a reparations expert and a Senior Associate in the Reparative 
Justice Program at the International Center for Transitional Justice, explained it this way: “These 
[reparations] policies, though led by the government, were induced in part by a strong coalition 
of civil society organizations, victims’ groups, and independent state institutions that pressured 
the government to meet its commitments by providing a material form of justice to victims” 
(2013, 9). Again, victims’ organizations were key, as organizations allowed victims to identify 
and make a bigger impression on domestic politicians who were sympathetic to reparations, as 
well as attract (or continue holding) the attention of international NGOs that could exercise a 
persuasive effect on unsympathetic domestic officials.  
Aiding in the effort to maintain visibility and international support was the fact that a new 
crop of rural victims’ organizations sprang up during this time period. “Rural areas realized that 
in order to get reparations you have to organize, and communal reparations awakened these 
small organizations in small communities—it’s a chain effect” (Rubio 2017). These newer 
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organizations joined forces with established victims’ organizations and “international 
organizations, including the EU, the Red Cross, and FIDH” (Reynoso 2017), to remain on the 
radar of sympathetic politicians, to garner public sympathy, and, ultimately, to push a reluctant 
administration to pay reparations. Victims engaged in measures that included “vigils in front of 
embassies” (Cardoza 2017) to attract attention for various forms of reparations, to generate 
reputational costs for the García government if it continued to withhold individual economic 
reparations, and to demonstrate that they were not going to give up. Finally, mere weeks before 
García left office, their efforts bore fruit in the form of the first set of individual reparations 
payments, which were issued to 1,021 individuals in the summer of 2011 (Correa 2013, 16). 
In the end, García essentially copied Toledo’s approach to reparations. Eleven months 
after his July 2010 announcement that the government would soon begin implementing the 
individual economic reparations part of the PIR, he passed an executive decree announcing the 
form of the individual economic reparations program (Correa 2013, 15). The timing of this was 
almost certainly not coincidental, as this executive decree took place five days after Ollanta 
Humala won the 2011 presidential contest (on a platform that supported human rights) and 
merely five weeks before Humala’s inauguration (Correa 2013, 15-16; Rojas 2017). With the 
end of the García government looming, officials rushed to disburse at least a little money to 
individuals before Humala took over so that, just as Toledo did, García could get credit for the 
program without having to shoulder its financial burden or weather backlash over the missteps 
that are almost an inevitable part of implementing a complex program (Correa 2013, 16; Macher 
2017; Reynoso 2017). Even this reluctant disbursement would not have happened without the 
efforts of victims themselves, however, whose organized push for reparations attracted domestic 
political allies, support from international NGOs, and the attention of foreign governments.  
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Today, Peru continues to pay reparations to victims of the Armed Internal Conflict. 
Humala continued the reparations programs, as did his successor, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who 
resigned in March 2018 to avoid being impeached for corruption. Statistics on how much has 
been paid and to whom are unavailable, but, as of April 2018, the Reparations Council, which is 
in charge of implementing Peru’s reparations program, reports that 141,540 individuals are on 
the official victims’ registry and therefore eligible for reparations (Ministerio de Justicia y 
Derechos Humanos 2018). The registry also includes 5,712 communities and 127 groups of 
people who were displaced by the conflict, who are eligible for communal reparations 
(Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos 2018). The reparations programs still leave much to 
be desired, however. Victims are often unaware that certain development projects are intended to 
function as reparations, reparations payments are disbursed in highly impersonal ways that dilute 
their reparative effect, and many categories of victims are still barred from access to assistance 
for the horrific abuses they suffered between 1980 and 2000 (Interview 17, 2017; Laplante 2007; 
Macher 2017). These inadequacies are simply an introductory list; victims have levied many 
other valid complaints at the structure, regulations, and implementation procedure that govern 
Peru’s reparations programs. Nevertheless, the fact that reparations have been paid at all 
represents a striking victory for victims of the CAI, who helped build Peru’s human rights 
movement from the ground up. 
6. Conclusion 
 
 As this chapter has shown, victims’ organizations were critical in each and every step of 
the Peruvian reparations process. They did not launch or succeed in this campaign on their own, 
to be sure—both domestic and international allies were important in helping victims make their 
claims, learn how to advocate for themselves, and garner the attention and support they needed 
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in order to raise the reputational costs of denying reparations. However, their presence and 
pressure were fundamental. They were involved in every stage of the campaign—putting 
reparations on the political agenda after Fujimori’s fall, ensuring that the CVR recommended 
reparations in its 2003 Final Report, motivating Toledo’s promise to follow the CVR’s 
recommendations, pushing for a reparations law (which, in 2005, took the form of the PIR), 
initiating the implementation of communal reparations in 2006, and weathering the adversity of a 
former perpetrator’s administration to force the inception of individual economic reparations in 
2011. Their willingness to share their stories helped to change the stigma around human rights 
and victimhood in a way that enabled their reparations campaign to be socially acceptable, their 
persistent presence in politicians’ offices kept the issue of reparations alive despite a general lack 
of public interest in the topic, and their refusal to give in to apathetic administrations enabled 
them to retain the aid of domestic and international actors that placed additional pressure on 
recalcitrant political actors. Ultimately, the trajectory of the Peruvian case follows the same 
pattern as the two prior case studies in this dissertation and yields the following conclusion: 
Victims’ organizations may not be a sufficient cause to motivate governments to make 












 Why, after governments commit severe human rights abuses against their own citizens, 
would these governments—or their successors—ever voluntarily decide to give reparations to 
those individuals? Governments mistreat the powerless, not the powerful. They commit 
systematic human rights abuses against people that society does not care enough to protect, not 
against people with electoral clout. Governments feel free to murder, torture, and imprison 
people who lack public support and political influence, not people who are capable of forcing a 
government to submit to their demands. So why, when faced with finite federal funds and an 
infinite to-do list, would a government ever decide to allocate some of that money to these same 
survivors of government-sanctioned, -sponsored, or -permitted human rights abuses?  
My dissertation provides an answer to this question by developing the first generalizable 
theory about what motivates governments to promise and pay reparations: When victims 
organize and place high levels of sustained, pro-reparations pressure on a government, that 
government will eventually promise and pay reparations. This argument, which is probabilistic 
rather than deterministic, posits that although victims’ organizations are not a sufficient cause of 
reparations promises and reparations payments, the likelihood of a reparations promise or 
payment is more likely when such victims’ organizations exist. Governments promise and pay 
reparations in response to victims’ demands, and if victims’ organizations are not central to the 
push for reparations, then reparations are highly unlikely to be forthcoming.  
My theory holds across a wide range of contexts, as seen in my three in-depth case 
studies of the West German government’s reparations payments to Jewish German victims of the 
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Nazis, the West German government’s reparations payments to Romani German victims of the 
Nazis, and the Peruvian government’s reparations payments to victims of Peru’s Armed Internal 
Conflict. By using process tracing to track each of these victim groups on their path to 
reparations, I show that my theory applies in a variety of geographic, temporal, and cultural 
settings. The evidence that I present in these case studies strongly supports my theory that 
government’s reparations decisions are motivated primarily by the sustained, pro-reparations 
pressure that victims exert on governments, and it also points to the value of continuing to study 
how victims affect and are affected by reparations policies. My reparations theory constitutes a 
major contribution to the literature, because even though domestic reparations have been used by 
governments worldwide for seventy years, no one has yet suggested a theory to explain why 
governments pay them at all. By offering a generalizable theory to explain this phenomenon, I 
add to the literature on transitional justice and provide a direction for future scholars to 
investigate when they conduct their own work on the nexus between political imperatives, 
victims’ demands, and transitional justice mechanisms.  
The second major contribution of my dissertation is a new dataset on reparations, which, 
in addition to being the second dataset focused solely on reparations, is currently the only dataset 
to differentiate between reparations promises and reparations payments and to include data on 
both. By distinguishing between reparations promises and reparations payments, I am able to 
present a fuller picture of the universe of post-conflict and post-dictatorship cases, which 
includes countries where governments have promised but never paid reparations. By not 
conflating promises and payments, I—and, eventually, other users of my dataset—can avoid 
drawing incorrect inferences about the timing, context, and frequency of reparations, therefore 
leading to a better and more accurate understanding of this commonly-used policy.  
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My dataset introduces a new independent variable, as well: Victim group strength. 
Despite the limitations of this measure, it is the discipline’s first—and at this point the 
discipline’s only—attempt at a quantitative representation of how hard victims are pushing for a 
transitional justice policy that directly affects them. Although my measure is far from perfect, 
there is currently very little quantitative work on reparations, and in order for that to change, 
scholars must be willing to gather, code, and use new data. This willingness goes hand in hand 
with the understanding that new measures will need to be corrected in the future, just as new 
datasets will need to be amended and expanded to incorporate new cases and new information. I 
freely acknowledge that there is always room for improvement when developing the first 
measure of an abstract concept, and I look forward to conducting that work in the future. 
That said, given the corroboration between my quantitative results and all three of my 
detailed case studies, the measure shows promise as a rough guide to victim group strength. By 
creating and including this measure in my own work, I am able to both test my theory 
quantitatively and enable other researchers to conduct analyses that were previously impossible. 
By permitting the quantitative examination of how the actions of victims/survivors influence the 
timing and implementation of reparations promises and reparations programs across both time 
and space, my dataset will allow researchers to utilize quantitative methods to answer questions 
that were previously answerable only through detailed, fine-grained case study work. I will, of 
course, refine and improve this measure as new data becomes available for victims’ responses to 
current (and, unfortunately, future) governmental abuses, and I hope that, upon the release of the 
dataset, country experts will help me identify and correct any miscoded cases.  
It may take victims a while to get organized and respond vocally to governmental abuses, 
but once they do, they can begin to attract the attention and assistance they need to get the 
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government’s attention. The temporal length of this process varies, as evidenced by my three 
case studies. Jewish victims of the Nazis who had successfully escaped occupied Europe were 
able to begin organizing for reparations even before the Nazi dictatorship fell, and they acquired 
federal reparations only four years after West Germany became independent. Jewish victims 
benefited from a number of factors that enabled them to organize so quickly, including their 
comparative safety while living abroad, the fact that there were a number of highly educated 
legal experts among the victim population, and their fluency in the language of the majority 
population. Victims of Peru’s Armed Internal Conflict took a little longer to organize; some of 
them formed victims’ organizations before the end of the CAI, but even these early organizers 
did not demand reparations at first. As victims realized that they possessed rights that the 
government had violated, organizational efforts swelled, and a reparations promise was not far 
behind, coming only four years after Peru’s democratic transition. The trajectory of German Sinti 
and Roma was much longer. As was the case in Peru, these victims were poorly educated, of a 
lower socioeconomic status, and subjected to severe and ongoing discrimination, which made it 
not only difficult, but also retraumatizing, to attempt to access the reparations they were owed. 
Clearly, contextual factors matter, and trauma presents a substantial obstacle to victim 
mobilization. 
Traumatized survivors may find it easier to organize if they have encouragement and 
advice from educated outsiders on how to interact with bureaucrats, politicians, and the media, 
and finding allies willing to provide this support is an important first step towards reparations. 
Then, as victims become increasingly able to advocate for themselves and share their stories with 
the media, domestic—and sometimes international—attention begins to mount. This swell of 
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awareness and attention almost inevitably attracts new allies, who can put their resources to work 
for victims’ organizations.  
These resources can be financial, but they need not be. German Sinti and Roma benefited 
from German Jewish leaders’ public support because the majority of West German politicians 
were highly sensitive to charges of antisemitism. Jewish German Holocaust survivors benefited 
from having the sympathy of the US High Commissioner for Germany, who emphasized the 
importance of reparations to West Germany’s reluctant political establishment, and victims of 
Peru’s Armed Internal Conflict benefited from the pressure that Peruvian author Mario Vargas 
Llosa was able to bring to bear on the government due to his status as a Nobel Prize Winner. 
Whether allies bring domestic political connections, international clout, media attention, or 
something else altogether, their support helps victims raise the political risk of denying 
reparations. 
The reason that governments respond to victims’ demands is not because they fear being 
voted out of office by a highly organized victims’ rights movement. Despite sharing a common 
history of persecution, victims are rarely homogenous in their political opinions, and as a result 
they do not constitute a large or particularly cohesive voting bloc. When I interviewed 
politicians, they denied supporting reparations initiatives for electoral reasons, saying that victim 
voters were not numerous or reliable enough to factor into their reelection calculations. Victims 
and their advocates agreed, saying that their goal had never been to make reparations a key 
campaign issue; they knew they had a slim to nonexistent chance of acquiring reparations by 
electoral means. 
However, a strong victims’ rights organization can pose a reputational threat to a 
government, particularly if the organization—or, more likely, organizations—have attracted the 
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support of politically influential elites, the attention of the media, and domestic and/or 
international sympathy. As seen in all three of my case studies, organized victim groups worked 
hard to press politicians to pay reparations via private and public lobbying efforts, and along the 
way they gathered politically influential allies, positive media coverage, and the means to 
credibly threaten a government’s reputation. Politicians are not in any immediate electoral 
danger when subjected to international reputational costs, but these costs can still be so high as to 
be prohibitive, particularly if politicians believe that a good international reputation is important 
to maintaining economic relationships and security guarantees. For example, in Chapter 3 I show 
how German Jews were able to use the antisemitic beliefs of West German politicians to their 
advantage by hinting that, if reparations were not paid, Jews would block West Germany’s 
access to international financial markets and ruin the fledgling country’s fragile reputation, 
thereby blocking them from participating in the Western world. This would have been 
impossible, of course, but Jewish organizations had enough media attention and the perceived 
backing of enough influential allies that, when these threats were made in a sustained manner of 
a period of years, West German politicians believed them to be serious.  
Domestic reputational costs incentivize politicians in different ways. A disgruntled 
domestic population cannot shut its government out of the international community or sever 
trade links, but it can vote politicians out of office. Thus, politicians will try to avoid opposing 
reparations for victims who have attracted societal attention and sympathy. Similarly, politicians 
whose reputations and/or party platforms incorporate human rights, compassion, or support for a 
group of victimized individuals may not want to risk tarnishing their reputations –and thus 
potentially losing votes– by opposing reparations. An example of this can be seen in Croatia, 
where, in 2015, the government passed a law guaranteeing reparations to citizens who were 
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raped as part of the 1990s Balkans Wars. Although reparations are usually highly politically 
fraught in Croatia, this particular law passed with minimal fuss. Reputational incentives played a 
role in the law’s unusually swift passage, as became clear in my interview with Milena Čalić-
Jelić, a lawyer and the legal expert for Documenta.78 According to her, “There was public 
support for this law because no one wanted to be seen as going against it” (2016). The level of 
societal sympathy for rape victims was such that denying them reparations would have been 
politically risky, and politicians knew this (Teršelić 2016). This strategy of utilizing reputational 
threats to induce reparations payments was repeated in my other two case studies, as well, 
showing that although vocal, persistent victims’ organizations may never pose a credible 
electoral threat, they can nonetheless achieve their aims by raising the reputational costs of 
avoiding reparations.  
The importance of victim group strength is a robust finding: It holds across three case 
studies in two separate continents and seventy years of history, and it is also bolstered by the 
results of my quantitative work. Although measuring social phenomena quantitatively is tricky 
and incapable of proving causality, both of my statistical models –which I run using data from 
my own original dataset– indicate that victim group strength is indeed closely linked to 
reparations outcomes. Interestingly, these results hold regardless of whether or not a regime is 
democratic, indicating that victim groups can and do influence governments’ reparations 
decisions even in contexts where social movements are generally less able to form and succeed 
in achieving their aims.  
                                                        
78 Documenta is a Croatian NGO whose work aims to help Croatia reckon truthfully with its 
violent history.  
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Another revealing result from my quantitative chapter is that a strong economy does not 
make governments more likely to either promise or pay reparations. When coupled with the 
findings from my qualitative work, where in all three cases it is quite obvious that the timing of 
reparations promises and reparations payments is not at all due to either strong or weak 
economic circumstances, it becomes clear that using finances as an excuse to avoid paying 
reparations is just that: an excuse. West Germany paid substantial sums of reparations in the 
1950s, when the West German Economic Miracle, or Wirtschaftswunder, was getting under way, 
but it also promised reparations again in 1981, when the country was experiencing economic 
turmoil. In Peru, then-President Toledo promised to pay reparations in 2003, turned down 
Germany’s offer of financial assistance to help pay those reparations just a few months later, 
turned down the offer again in 2005, and did not start paying (collective) reparations until 2006.  
These results stand in direct contrast to the common—but almost completely 
unresearched—assumption that reparations can be explained by saying that rich states pay 
reparations, and poor states do not.79 Indeed, simply finding robust qualitative and quantitative 
evidence that counters this prevailing belief about reparations constitutes an important 
contribution to the literature.  
Given the relative scarcity of reparations research, there are a number of ways for me to 
broaden my research agenda in the future, as well. One of the most compelling next steps 
involves exploring how the nature of the abuses that were committed influences governments’ 
reparations decisions. Building on the central finding of my dissertation, which is that 
                                                        
79 Incidentally, this expectation has been explicitly tested by only one study (Powers and Proctor 
2015), which included measures of economic development and whether or not the UN gave 
money to a country to fund transitional justice measures. Kathy Powers and Kim Proctor found 
that more developed states are more likely to pay reparations than less developed states and that 
states are more likely to pay reparations if they had received UN funding for transitional justice. 
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governments give reparations to victims who demand reparations, I expect that some crimes will 
be more likely to be included in reparations laws than others. For example, victims who have 
suffered abuses that are societally taboo, such as rape, should be less likely to talk about their 
experiences and mobilize to demand reparations for what they have suffered. This should reduce 
their chances of receiving reparations. In contrast, victims of violations with less stigma, such as 
physical injury, will be more likely to mobilize and discuss what happened to them. This, in turn, 
should make them more likely to be included in reparations promises and reparations payments. I 
have the data I need to study these relationships, and my preliminary analysis indicates that there 
are indeed stable patterns behind who receives reparations and for which particular crimes.  
Ultimately, my dissertation provides a springboard for future work and indicates a 
promising direction for that work by highlighting the relevance and power of victims’ 
movements in post-abusive contexts.  Indeed, in recent years the field of transitional justice has 
begun to emphasize victims’ agency and to promote conducting victim-oriented research, two 
trends whose value my dissertation can only affirm. Given the comparative newness of 
transitional justice as an area of study, the limited amount of quantitative data on transitional 
justice mechanisms, implementation, and outcomes, and the clear global and human relevance of 
the topic, there is still a great deal of valuable foundational work that remains to be done in this 
field. Thus, my dissertation is far from the final word on reparations, and it is my hope that it 






APPENDIX: UNIVERSE OF CASES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Universe of Cases 
In order to avoid confusion, I tried to align the terms in my dataset with the terms used sources I 
consulted to create this dataset. Consequently, victim group names are the names used in an 
abusive period and/or given country’s reparations legislation, if such legislation was issued. As 
such, they may not be precise or politically correct. Victim groups are listed only in cases where 
legislation distinguished between the benefits given to particular victim groups or where 
particular groups had distinctive experiences of persecution. 
 
Albania: Communism 
Argentina: Dirty War, Dictatorships 1955-1983 
Armenia: Communism 
Austria: Holocaust  
Victim groups: Jews, Sinti and Roma, political victims, Slovenes, resistance fighters, 
homosexuals,80 forcibly sterilized, disabled, forced laborers. 
Azerbaijan: Communism, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Black January (Jan 20 1990) 
Belarus: Communism, Post-Communist Dictatorship 1991-present 
Belgium: Holocaust 
 Victim groups: Jews and non-Jews  
Bolivia: Dictatorship 1964-1982 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Balkan War (1990s), Communism, Holocaust 
Brazil: Dictatorship 1964-1985 
Bulgaria: Holocaust, Communism 
Chile: Pinochet Dictatorship 
Colombia: Internal Conflict (1964-2016), La Violencia (1948-1958) 
Costa Rica: Civil War 1948 
Croatia: Balkan War (1990s), Communism, Holocaust 
Cuba: Batista Dictatorship (1952-1959), Cuban Revolution, Communism 
Cyprus: Coup 1974 and Violence 1960s-70s 
Czech Republic: Holocaust, Communism 
 Victim groups for the Holocaust: Jews, Roma, Sudeten Germans, Hungarians, Resistance 
fighters 
 Victim groups for communism: Czechs, Roma 
Czechoslovakia: Holocaust, Communism 
 Victim groups for the Holocaust: Jews, Roma, Sudeten Germans, Hungarians, Resistance 
fighters 
 Victim groups for communism: Czechs, Roma, Jews 
Denmark: Holocaust 
 Victim groups: Jews, Roma, Danes, homosexuals, asocials 
Ecuador: León Febres Cordero Dictatorship 1984-1988 (note: Dictatorships and Juntas from 
1960-1979 not included due to insufficient documentation) 
                                                        
80 Although this word is no longer the respectful word used today to refer to many members of 
the LGBT+ community, I use this term because it was the historical term under which many 
LGBT+ individuals were persecuted, promised reparations, and paid reparations. 
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El Salvador: Military Rule 1939-1979, Civil War 1980-1992 
Estonia: Holocaust, Communism 
France: Holocaust 
 Victim groups: Resisters/combatants, Non-resisters/non-combatants 
Georgia: Communism, Internal Conflict 1991-1993, Abkhazia Conflict, South Ossetia Conflict, 
Shevardnadze Dictatorship 
 Victim groups for South Ossetia Conflict: Georgians, Ossetians 
Germany (West and Reunified): Holocaust, Communism 
 Victim Groups for Holocaust: Jews, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, political victims, 
forcibly sterilized, euthanasia victims, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
East Germany: Holocaust, Communism 
 Victim groups for the Holocaust: Jews, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, political victims, 
forcibly sterilized, euthanasia victims, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Greece: Civil War, Military Junta 1967-1974 
 Victim groups for Civil War: Greeks, Macedonians 
Guatemala: Civil War 1960-1996, Chixoy Dam 1980-1982 
Guyana: Burnham and Hoyte Dictatorship 1980-1992 
Honduras: 1980s Cold War Conflict 
Hungary: Holocaust, Communism 
 Victim groups for the Holocaust: Jews, Roma, Germans, Hungarians 
Italy: Holocaust, Fascism 1922-1945 
Kazakhstan: Communism, Dictatorship 1991-present, Semipalatinsk Nuclear Tests 
Kyrgyzstan: Communism, Authoritarian Rule 1991-present 
Latvia: Holocaust, Communism 
Lithuania: Holocaust, Communism 
Macedonia: Holocaust, Communism, 2001 War vs. UCK 
Mexico: Chiapas and Zapatistas Conflict, Dictatorship 1969-1993, Dirty War 
Moldova: Communism, Transnistria Conflict 
Netherlands: Holocaust 
 Victim groups: Jews, Roma, Dutch, resistance fighters, homosexuals 
Nicaragua: Pre-Sandinista Dictatorship 1969-1978, Sandinista Rebellion 1978-1979, Contras 
Conflict 1982-1990 
Norway: Holocaust 
 Victim groups: Jews, Roma 
Panama: Torrijos Dictatorship 1968-1981, Noriega Dictatorship 1983-1989 
Paraguay: Morínigo Dictatorship 1940-1948, Paraguayan Civil War 1947, Stroessner 
Dictatorship 1954-1989 
Peru: Ochenio (1948-1956), Military Rule 1968-1980, Internal Armed Conflict 1980-2000 
Poland: Holocaust, Communism 
 Victim groups for the Holocaust: Jews, Partisans 
Portugal: Salazar Dictatorship 
Romania: Holocaust, Communism, 1989 Revolution 
Russia: Communism, Chechen Wars, War in Dagestan, other internal conflicts omitted due to 
lack of data 
Serbia & Montenegro: Communism, Balkan Wars (1990s) 
Slovakia: Holocaust, Communism 
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 Victim groups for the Holocaust: Jews, Hungarians, political victims 
Slovenia: Communism, Balkan Wars (1990s) 
Spain: Spanish Civil War, Franco Dictatorship 
 Victim groups for the Spanish Civil War: Republicans, Nationalists 
Tajikistan: Communism, Dictatorship 1992-present, Civil War 1992-1997 
Turkey: 1960 Coup and Violence, 1971 Coup and Violence, 1980 Coup and Violence, Kurdistan 
Conflict 
Turkmenistan: Communism, Dictatorship (1991-present) 
Ukraine: Communism 
United Kingdom: Northern Ireland Conflict (1968-1998) 
Uruguay: Dictatorship 1973-1985 
USSR: Omitted due to lack of data availability 
Uzbekistan: Communism, Dictatorship 1991-present 
Venezuela: Military Dictatorship 1948-1958, Fourth Republic (1959-1998), Caracazo (1989) 
Yugoslavia: Omitted due to lack of data 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: DEMOCRACIES (POLITY SCORE > 0 ) PROMISE RATES BY 
WHETHER THE ABUSIVE EPISODE WAS A CONFLICT OR A DICTATORSHIP 
 Conflict Dictatorship Total 
Not Promised 24 25 49 
Promised 67 33 100 
Total 91 58 149 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 2: NON-DEMOCRACIES (POLITY SCORE < 0 ) PROMISE 
RATES BY WHETHER THE ABUSIVE EPISODE WAS A CONFLICT OR A 
DICTATORSHIP 
 Conflict Dictatorship Total 
Not Promised 1 0 1 
Promised 8 4 12 
Total 9 5 13 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 3: DEMOCRACIES (POLITY SCORE > 0) PAYMENT RATES BY 
WHETHER THE ABUSIVE EPISODE WAS A CONFLICT OR A DICTATORSHIP 
 Conflict Dictatorship Total 
Not Paid 34 28 62 
Paid 57 29 86 
Total 91 57 148 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 4: NON-DEMOCRACIES (POLITY SCORE < 0) PAYMENT 
RATES BY WHETHER THE ABUSIVE EPISODE WAS A CONFLICT OR A 
DICTATORSHIP 
 Post-Conflict Post-Dictatorship Total 
Not Paid 2 0 2 
Paid 7 4 11 
Total 9 4 13 
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Victim 
Strength 1           
Polity 
Score 0.2857 1          
Interaction 0.865 0.4554 1         
Region 0.0171 0.3286 0.0597 1        
Ethnic 
Minority 0.203 0.1317 0.2274 -0.1263 1       
GDP 
Growth 
(lagged) 0.063 0.1549 0.0434 0.1229 0.0529 1      
GDP per 
capita 
(logged) 0.2495 0.4799 0.301 0.4732 0.2162 0.2436 1     
Post-
Dictatorshi
p -0.1495 -0.1023 -0.0815 0.1259 -0.7063 -0.1041 -0.0994 1    
Transition 
Year 0.0844 0.0382 0.0723 0.022 -0.0293 -0.0795 -0.0677 0.0414 1   
Years 
Since 
Abuse 0.2875 0.2605 0.3534 0.0546 0.4768 0.0586 0.4271 -0.4602 -.029 1  
Years 
Since 
Abuse^2 0.2913 0.2657 0.3694 0.0555 0.5145 0.0437 0.4459 -0.4983 -.029 0.9796 1 
Logged 
Population 0.015 0.0281 -0.051 0.1954 0.0103 0.1098 0.262 0.0228 -0.09 -0.044 -.048 
Years Left 
in the Term -0.0642 -0.1145 -0.0781 -0.0202 -0.0844 -0.0969 -0.0701 0.0684 -.034 -.1159 -.100 
Independen
t Judiciary 0.2543 0.4841 0.3607 0.1652 0.2282 0.081 0.5223 -0.2081 
-




l Units 0.0244 0.1733 0.063 0.3965 -0.0704 0.0335 0.2809 0.051 -.024 0.1145 .1276 
Cultural 
Diversity 0.0054 -0.2297 -0.0246 -0.2293 0.1466 -0.1025 -0.3559 -0.0184 -.006 -.1651 -.162 
Ethnic 
Fractionali




(logged) 0.2423 0.3649 0.2552 0.3778 0.2602 0.2456 0.7773 -0.1801 
-
.0968 0.3953 .4015 
Corrupt 
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Abuse^2 1           
Population 
(Logged) 0.0141 1          
Years Left 
in the Term 0.1045 -0.1445 1         
Independen




l Units -0.0867 -0.0301 -0.3378 -0.1271 1       
Cultural 
Diversity -0.0286 0.0655 -0.338 0.0708 0.6474 1      
Ethnic 
Fractionali




(logged) -0.0639 -0.08 0.5272 0.2854 -0.3433 -0.176 0.3819 1    
Corrupt 
Media 0.0336 -0.0785 0.3868 0.2655 -0.1435 -0.194 0.3912 0.3386 1   
 
APPENDIX TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES IN THE PAID 
EQUATION 

























           
Victim 
Strength 1          
Polity Score 0.122 1         
Interaction 0.977 0.196 1        
Region 0.023 0.2994 0.0393 1       
Ethnic 
Minority 0.148 0.0493 0.1836 -0.05 1      
GDP Growth 
(lagged) 0.053 0.0979 0.0277 0.143 -0.02 1     
GDP per 
capita 
(logged) 0.029 0.457 0.0635 0.512 0.124 0.1926 1    
Post-
Dictatorship -0.056 0.0227 -0.056 0.068 -0.66 -0.083 -0.097 1   
Transition 
Year 0.035 0.0562 0.0372 0.019 -0.04 -0.197 -0.077 0.0739 1  
Years Since 
Promise -0.001 0.149 0.0096 -0.09 0.246 -0.026 0.044 -0.2045 -0.029 1 
Years Since 
Promise^2 -0.133 0.196 -0.124 0.013 0.170 -0.047 0.092 -0.1696 -0.028 0.7418 
Logged 
Population 0.023 -0.015 0.0175 0.226 -0.11 0.0941 0.145 0.0445 -0.046 -0.083 
Years Left in 
the Term -0.061 -0.133 -0.057 -0.05 -0.11 -0.093 -0.0216 0.0867 -0.060 -0.146 
Independent 
Judiciary -0.088 0.539 -0.038 0.230 0.128 0.029 0.5728 -0.0622 -0.053 0.2191 
Independent 
Subnational 
Units 0.074 0.170 0.0982 0.442 -0.10 0.0378 0.2641 0.1075 -0.044 0.1113 
Cultural 





ion 0.219 -0.058 0.2265 -0.12 -0.09 -0.093 -0.2289 0.0915 0.0398 -0.306 
Imports and 
Exports 
(logged) 0.118 0.3434 0.1398 0.439 0.134 0.2495 0.7455 -0.1582 -0.099 0.0838 
Corrupt 
Media 0.06 0.715 0.1169 0.467 0.066 0.1006 0.64 -0.0846 -0.005 0.0474 
Other Strong 
Victim Group -0.037 0.2804 -0.014 0.062 0.210 0.0564 0.365 -0.3377 -0.060 0.4089 






































           
Years Since 
Promise^2 1          
Population 
(Logged) 0.082 1         
Years Left in 
the Term -0.058 0.075 1        
Independent 
Judiciary 0.203 -0.037 -0.158 1       
Independent 
Subnational 
Units 0.105 0.4077 -0.059 0.215 1      
Cultural 
Diversity -0.082 -0.116 -0.036 -0.39 -0.12 1     
Ethnic 
Fractionalizat
ion -0.250 0.1645 0.0744 -0.37 0.128 0.6454 1    
Imports and 
Exports 
(logged) 0.167 0.635 -0.037 0.395 0.394 -0.302 -0.1427 1   
Corrupt 
Media 0.002 -0.102 -0.093 0.600 0.286 -0.238 -0.0963 0.3513 1  
Other Strong 
Victim Group 0.404 -0.002 -0.095 0.386 0.212 -0.162 -0.1998 0.3726 0.3245 1 
 
APPENDIX TABLE 7: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN VICTIM 
STRENGTH (5-YEAR AVERAGE) AND REGIME TYPE  
 Victim Strength 












Imputed Average of  
Freedom House  
and Polity Scores 
(e_fh_ipolity2) 
.2557 
Freedom House Status 
(e_fh_status) 
-.1963 




APPENDIX TABLE 8: PAYMENTS MODEL WHERE VICTIM STRENGTH IS 3 OR 









4.52 9.56 .475 
Polity Score 
 
8.52 .0987 .168 
Interaction of Victim 
Strength & Polity 
Score 
 
.918 .12 .512 
Political Region 
 
1.34 .635 .536 
Ethnic Minority 
 




.962 .058 .521 
Logged GDP Per 
Capita 
 
2.89 5.48 .576 
Post-Dictatorship 
 




1.23 1.64 .855 
Time Since Promise 
 




.992 .001 .000 
Population (logged) 
 
1.89 1.69 .477 
Years Left in 
Electoral Term 
 








.427 .945 .701 







1.15 5.5 .977 
Imports and Exports 
(logged) 
 
.695 .489 .605 
Independent Media 
 
2.18 1.10 .120 
Other Strong Victim 
Group 
 
.412 .375 .330 
No. of Subjects 58 Prob > chi^2 0 
No. of Failures 
No. of Observations 
26 
305 






APPENDIX TABLE 9: PROMISES MODEL WITH NUMBER OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE MECHANISMS, PRESENCE OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSIONS, AMNESTIES, TRIALS, AND UN FUNDING FOR REPARATIONS 
 
 Hazard Ratio Robust Standard Error p-value 
Victim Strength 
 
1.25 1.78 .872 
Polity Score 
 
1.02 .126 .879 
Interaction of 
Victim Strength 
& Polity Score 
 
1.09 .181 .606 
Political Region 
 
.561 .169 .055 
Ethnic Minority 
 




1.04 .050 .402 
Logged GDP Per 
Capita 
 
3.93 2.80 .055 
Post-Dictatorship 
 
















2.09 .954 .103 
Years Left in 
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2.05 3.84 .701 
Amnesty 
 
1.93 4.17 .761 
Trial 
 
(omitted)   
UN Funding 
 
(omitted)   
No. of Subjects 53 Prob > chi^2 0.00 
No. of Failures 











APPENDIX TABLE 10: PAYMENTS MODEL WITH NUMBER OF TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE MECHANISMS, PRESENCE OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 









4.76 4.83 .124 
Polity Score 
 
.925 .105 .492 
Interaction of Victim 
Strength & Polity 
Score 
 
.929 .105 .517 
Political Region 
 
.967 .305 .916 
Ethnic Minority 
 
2.21 1.94 .366 
Lagged GDP Growth 
 
.966 .0412 .413 
Logged GDP Per 
Capita 
 
3.56 3.92 .248 
Post-Dictatorship 
 




2.03 1.61 .373 
Time Since Promise 
 
1.32 .121 .002 
Time Since Promise^2 
 
.995 .002 .004 
Population (logged) 
 
1.63 .856 .350 
Years Left in Electoral 
Term 
 
1.34 .204 .030 
Independent Judiciary 
 




1.18 1.60 .905 
Cultural Diversity 
 
2.62 4.60 .584 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 




Imports and Exports 
(logged) 
 
.571 .354 .367 
Independent Media 
 
1.38 .433 .297 
Other Strong Victim 
Group 
 










4.40 9.55 .494 
Amnesty 
 
6.00 9.83 .274 
Trial 
 
(omitted)   
UN Funding 
 
(omitted)   
No. of Subjects 60 Prob > chi^2 0 
No. of Failures 
No. of Observations 
31 
313 
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